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ABSTRACT  
   
This philosophical inquiry explores the work of philosophers Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari and posits applications to music education.  Through the concepts of 
multiplicities, becoming, bodies without organs, smooth spaces, maps, and nomads, 
Deleuze and Guattari challenge prior and current understandings of existence.  In their 
writings on art, education, and how might one live, they assert a world consisting of 
variability and motion.  Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on time and 
difference, I posit the following questions: Who and when are we?  Where are we?  
When is music?  When is education?  Throughout this document, their philosophical 
figuration of a rhizome serves as a recurring theme, highlighting the possibilities of 
complexity, diverse connections, and continual processes. 
I explore the question “When and where are we?” by combining the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari with that of other authors.  Drawing on these ideas, I posit an 
ontology of humans as inseparably cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and striving 
multiplicities.  Investigating the question “Where are we?” using Deleuze and Guattari’s 
writings as well as that of contemporary place philosophers and other writers reveals that 
humans exist at the continually changing confluence of local and global places.  In order 
to engage with the questions “When is music?” and “When is education?” I inquire into 
how humans as cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and striving multiplicities 
emplaced in a glocalized world experience music and education. 
In the final chapters, a philosophy of music education consisting of the ongoing, 
interconnected processes of complicating, considering, and connecting is proposed.  
Complicating involves continually questioning how humans’ multiple inseparable 
ii 
qualities and places integrate during musical and educative experiences.  Considering 
includes imagining the multiple directions in which connections might occur as well as 
contemplating the quality of potential connections.  Connecting involves assisting 
students in forming variegated connections between themselves, their multiple qualities, 
and their glocal environments.  Considering a rhizomatic philosophy of music education 
includes continually engaging in the integrated processes of complicating, considering, 
and connecting.  Through such ongoing practices, music educators can promote 
flourishing in the lives of students and the experiences of their multiple communities. 
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Philosophy is contextual.  One cannot ponder philosophical writings or ask 
philosophical questions apart from her evolving being and current locations.  For 
example, I remember sitting surrounded by mosquito netting on a cot in rural Ghana 
while using my flashlight to read Roger Scruton’s (2007) Culture Counts: Faith and 
Feeling in a World Besieged.  While Scruton’s defense of high culture may have 
resonated with me had I read his words in the Massachusetts house I shared with four 
music performance majors, I experienced cognitive dissonance as the intricate Ewe 
drumming patterns from a nearby village penetrated the night air, mixing with my 
contemplation of his text.  I interpreted Scruton’s writings in and through my then-current 
context.  Yet, my own context continually alters, and I have since reread and 
reinterpreted his philosophy through the accumulating lenses of my initial reading, the 
context of my current reading, and my intervening experiences, contexts, and readings.    
My interest in the relationship between philosophy and context began when, as an 
undergraduate student, my teachers inspired me to seek out and engage with authors 
ranging from Immanuel Kant to Bennett Reimer to Paulo Freire to Maxine Greene.  As a 
beginning teacher, I drew on such writings, experimenting with musical content and 
pedagogy that both propagated and challenged the values instilled in me by various 
teachers as well as my own developing ideas.  My philosophies have since evolved 
through my ongoing explorations and changing contexts, and I have found my teaching 
and thinking marked by the complex, multi-faceted interrelationships and contradictions 
between the authors I read, conversations I have, aspects of the American education 
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system, and students’ musical lives outside of school.  I am continually intrigued by 
questions such as: What is the purpose of education and, specifically, music education?  
What is the relationship between music, education, and society? and How might 
American music education look and sound differently? 
 Contemporary education philosophers have offered various responses to such 
inquiries.  For instance, Noddings (2005) posits the attainment of happiness as the 
purpose of education.  She writes: 
Many children would have no idea that their interests might be intellectual if the 
school does nothing to introduce them to the life of the mind.  But the purpose of 
opening doors is to invite children to explore so that they can find out how these 
new ideas fit their own purposes.  It is not to slam doors.  It is not to sort and 
assign them.  It is not to destroy their self-esteem by showing them that they are 
not very good at all at the things that have traditionally mattered in school. (pp. 
207-8) 
In other words, education serves to assist students in finding their own unique purposes in 
life.   
Higgins (2011) expands this idea, focusing on both individual and collective 
happiness.  He writes, “Education is the ongoing conversation taking place in the space 
opened by the question of what best facilitates human flourishing” (p. 258).  While 
Higgins does not assert that all humans will come to a consensus on individual or 
communal flourishing, he encourages teachers to engage with questions such as “What is 
the collective good?” and “How ought we best live together?” (p. 259). 
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In contrast, writers such as Apple (2000) and Freire (2000) have asserted that the 
purpose of education is to critique and reimagine current societies, including their 
institutions and interpersonal relationships.  While Apple (2000) focuses on education as 
a means of exposing power structures and developing critical thinking, Freire (2000) 
posits the “liberating purpose of dialogic education,” explaining that through 
conversation, teachers and students can investigate their world views as well as the 
“thought-language” with which they refer to reality (p. 97).  In other words, education 
can enable an interrogation of one’s daily experiences, including overarching societal 
norms and practices.  For Apple (2000), Freire (2000), Higgins (2011), and Noddings 
(2003), the purposes of education are inseparable from the relationships between society 
and education and from the examination of those relationships.   
 Other education philosophers have also articulated possible relationships between 
society and education.  hooks (1994) imagines university classrooms in which “the false 
dichotomy between the world outside and the inside world of the academy disappears” 
(p. 195).  Focusing on education at all levels, Hansen (2011) asserts the need for teachers 
to engage with their global communities, positing the importance of such interactions in 
our current globalized world.  Greene (1995) instead emphasizes altering society through 
education, asserting the importance of teachers and students collaboratively working “to 
change or to transform their intersubjective worlds” (p. 61).   
While music education writers articulate similar purposes of education and 
relationships between society and education, they offer specific suggestions for content, 
pedagogy, and overarching aims.  For instance, although authors such as Walker (2007) 
continue to assert a purpose of music education based on propagating Western classical 
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music, other writers, including Bradley (2012), Green (2002), Goble (2010), Kratus 
(2007), Regelski (2005), and Reimer (2003) have argued for the inclusion of more 
diverse musics and musical practices in the classroom.  While Green (2002) posits that 
music educators engage students with folk music, popular music, jazz, and contemporary 
classical music, Bradley (2012) and Goble (2010) argue for comprehensive instruction in 
music from non-Western cultures.  Alternatively, authors have posited the advantages of 
moving away from formal structures of learning music.  For example, Folkestad (2006) 
and Jorgensen (2012) note the benefits of informal learning practices, through which 
students learn without constant teacher intervention, while authors such as Allsup (2003) 
and Green (2008) articulate the value of specific forms of informal learning, including 
peer mentoring and purposeful listening.  
 Music education writers also assert that the purpose of music education includes, 
in part, assisting students in developing the skills needed to create music through various 
processes.  For instance, Kratus (2007) notes the possibilities of classes such as 
songwriting and composition.  Trustman (2006) and Finney and Bernard (2007) focus on 
musical engagement with technology, arguing for the incorporation of instructional 
techniques and software that enable students to invent and engage with music. 
Like Apple (2000) and Freire (2000), other music educators have argued that part 
of music education’s purpose is to assist students in becoming critical thinkers.  
Abrahams (2005) asserts the value of critical pedagogy, explaining that it draws on 
constructivism, experiential learning, and critical theory, and he challenges teachers and 
students to question their understandings of multiple facets of musical experiences.  
Similarly, Benedict (2007) and O’Toole (2000) posit that students should learn the links 
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between music, politics, and the hegemony of the dominant culture.  Arguing that 
educators should work against systems of unexamined power, Benedict writes, “Teachers 
need to lead discussions with students about how music is chosen, why it was chosen, 
and whose voice and culture is not represented in the choice of a particular piece” (p. 32).  
Likewise, O’Toole posits, “I start with the notion that in our society there is a conspiracy 
produced by values of the dominant class to silence and erase a multitude of diverse 
experiences and that this is bad” (p. 38).   
Allsup (2007) and Woodford (2005) offer a more specific purpose, arguing that 
music education could serve to facilitate the formation of democratic values.  After 
noting the problematic nature of the degree to which teachers “train” the minds of 
students and the methods used to teach performances skills in many music classrooms, 
Allsup explains that democratic classrooms foreground student enjoyment of musical 
processes and provide space for both teacher and student learning.  Similarly, Allsup and 
Westerlund (2012b) envision student-centered teachers who serve as both expert guides 
and fellow voyagers, enabling students to find and create their own educative journeys.  
Woodford (2005) views democracy as the fundamental goal of all education and asserts 
that democratic education practices enable students to leave learning experiences 
motivated to become more involved in their surrounding social worlds.   
Other authors have offered further purposes of education that address possible 
interconnections between society and music education.  For instance, philosophers such 
as Green (2002), Koza (2006), Kratus (2007), Regelski (2005), and Stauffer (2009) as 
well as the authors of the MayDay Action Ideals (2007) have explicated and 
problematized the divide between students’ musical practices outside of the school and 
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those undertaken in typical music classrooms.  They posit that music educators should 
embrace students' home and community musical practices, which may include popular 
music as well as music from their families’ or local communities’ heritages.   
Like Greene (1995) and Freire (2000), music educators such as Boyce-Tillman 
(2012), Bowman (2005), Regelski (2005), and O’Toole (2000) posit that music education 
can change society.  Regelski asserts that music education should seek to “‘make a 
difference’ that students and society find musically noteworthy” (p. 7), while Boyce-
Tillman (2012) notes the potential for the arts to serve as “tools for cultural intervention,” 
pitting their variability against the standardized practices of advertisers (p. 28).  Bowman 
(2005) posits the social nature of musical experiences as well as humans’ beliefs, arguing 
that since values are relational, music educators should ask what specific musical skills, 
experiences, and knowledge are good for in current society.  By engaging with such 
thought processes and questions, Bowman suggests that music educators have the 
potential to mitigate social injustices and inequalities rather than inadvertently 
propagating them. 
 I continue to ponder these and other writings about the purposes of education and 
the relationships between education and society, thinking about them in and through my 
present contexts.  Just as my then-current conditions in Ghana interfaced with my initial 
understandings of Scruton’s philosophy, my prior and immediate readings, educative 
experiences, and artistic practices interconnect and evolve with my present thinking about 
the philosophies inherent in the work of these and other writers.  I continue to be troubled 
by and curious about the disconnect between music education discourse and practice, the 
experiences of contemporary musicians and other artists, and the writings of twentieth 
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and twenty-first century philosophers.  This document is a response to my ongoing 
questioning.   
Statement of Problem 
As I read and think about music education content, practices, and overarching 
aims as articulated by these and other writers in light of my present contexts, I find 
myself pondering three questions: Why does the notion of continual change in humans, 
places, and artistic practices seem missing?  In what ways do these authors imply and 
intentionally or inadvertently propagate a human ontology based almost exclusively on 
cognition?  How would an acknowledgement of the interplay of location and music 
education alter thinking in music education?  I draw on contemporary happenings, 
including artistic practices, in order to unpack and offer an analysis of these questions 
and ideas below. 
Recent events provide evidence of humans embracing continual change rather 
than singular plans, aims, and ideals.  For example, Hertzberg (2011) explains: 
What OWES [sic] (Occupy Wall Street) doesn’t have—and is under some 
pressure, internal and external, to formulate—is a traditional agenda: a list of 
‘demands,’ a set of legislative recommendations, a five-point program.  For many 
of its participants, this lack is an essential part of the attraction.  They’re making it 
up on the fly.  They don’t really know where it will take them, and they like it that 
way. (p. 26)   
Such collective enthusiasm for ongoing uncertainty demonstrates how some members of 
twenty-first century societies have abandoned stagnant value systems and predetermined 
ends. 
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The idea of continual change is grounded in the notion of multiple truths, which 
arguably dates back to Nietzsche’s 1886 publication of Beyond Good and Evil.  In the 
book, Nietzsche develops the idea of perspectivism, asserting that humans can construct 





 go further, asserting not just the existence of multiple 
understandings of the same phenomenon, but that one’s perspective is both unique and 
evolving.  For example, writing for The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Lowe (1995) 
defines poststructuralism as “the idea that all perceptions, concepts, and truth-claims are 
constructed in language, along with the corresponding ‘subject positions’ which are 
likewise (so it is argued) no more than transient epiphenomena of this or that cultural 
discourse” (p. 708).  In other words, because each individual comes to know language 
through his or her own experiences, a person’s understandings of specific words and 
phrases constantly evolve.  This ongoing change, resulting from each unique individual’s 
continually altering experiences, inhibits one person from communicating with another 
with certainty.    
                                            
1
 According to Ayelsworth (2005), “That postmodernism is indefinable is a truism. However, it can be 
described as a set of critical, strategic and rhetorical practices employing concepts such as difference, 
repetition, the trace, the simulacrum, and hyperreality to destabilize other concepts such as presence, 
identity, historical progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of meaning.”  He considers Jean 
Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Martin Heidegger, and 
Jean-François Lyotard postmodern philosophers. 
 
2
 In Poststructuralism: A Very Short Introduction, Bersey (2002) explains that poststructuralism “questions 
the view that consciousness is an origin, treating it rather as an effect of signification” (p. 66).  She 
elaborates, “If language is differential rather than referential, if we owe our ideas of things to differences 
which are the effect of language in the first instance, then we can never be certain that what we say about 
the world in language, or in any other signifying system, is true” (p. 70).  According to Bersey (2002), 
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, Jean-François Lyotard are 
poststructuralist philosophers.  While Bersey does not discuss the work of Deleuze and Guattari, as I note 
in chapter 3, other authors consider them poststructuralists.  While postmodernism and poststructurlism 
carry different meanings, writers often share characteristics of both schools of thought.  Few of the 
aforementioned postmodernists and poststructuralists applied those terms to their own work.   
9 
Twentieth and twenty-first century artists have applied the idea of evolving 
understandings to artworks and processes.  For example, visual artists such as Duchamp 
and Warhol have challenged people to reimagine everyday objects as art.  Duchamp 
famously exhibited a urinal that he signed “R. Mutt,” and Warhol used printing 
techniques to recreate Brillo boxes and images of Campbell’s soup cans.  Similarly, 
Cage’s 4’33”, which consists of an instrumentalist not playing for 4 minutes and 33 
seconds, begs audience members to question when music occurs in their evolving 
soundscapes.  These artists and others challenge definitive borders between art and non-
art, drawing attention to people’s continually varying engagements with their 
surroundings.  
Given that in contemporary societies individuals ranging from artists to 
philosophers to protesters emphasize the idea of continual change, why does such a 
notion seem missing from many current music education writings?  Although authors 
such as Goble (2010), Szekely (2012), and Westerlund (2008) posit the evolving nature 
of the individual and his or her tendency to interpret and understand artistic works 
differently over time, music education discourse remains primarily centered on the 
benefits of various musical works, genres, practices, and musical and non-musical ends.  
I wonder about the possibilities of philosophizing that embraces the constantly 
fluctuating nature of humans’ musical and educative experiences.      
While pondering the potential of emphasizing continual change in music 
education, I also question how human qualities in addition to cognition might integrate 
with music education experiences.  In contrast with music educators’ discourse centered 
on the cognitive aspects of music and musical practices, poststructuralism “questions the 
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view that consciousness is an origin, treating it rather as an effect of signification” 
(Bersey, 2002, p. 66).  In other words, poststructuralists problematize the notion that 
humans have rational minds prior to and apart from their worldly interactions.  Rather, 
they posit that humans’ individual embodied relationships with their environments 
produce human consciousness.   
  Some visual artists draw attention to the interconnection of humans’ cognition 
and embodiment.  For instance, in “Untitled” (1991) Gonzales-Torres addresses his 
partner’s suffering and eventual death from AIDS through a 175-pound pile of 
individually wrapped, brightly colored candies, which museum visitors are invited to 
touch and take.  At such exhibits, museum goers no longer passively glance at cordoned-
off artworks in immobile frames, their bodies forcibly separated from the artistic pieces.  
Instead, the boundary between mind and body dissolves as participants touch and even 
alter the art.   
Other visual artists have troubled false boundaries between human cognition, 
sociality, and emotion.  For example, Collins (2012) describes Tino Sehgal’s piece of art 
entitled “This Progress” (2010) in which “interpreters” ranging from children to 
octogenarians stationed on the Guggenheim’s ramp interact with museum goers, offering 
them advice and sharing stories, leaving some in tears.  Collins writes, “The critic Jerry 
Saltz pointed out that it was the only work of art he’d ever encountered that could cry 
back” (p. 24).  Twenty-first century artists challenge divisions between artwork and 
viewer, enabling unique, multi-faceted experiences.  
These artists’ emphasis on human embodiment, emotion, and sociality contrasts 
music education discourse focused almost exclusively on cognition.  While O’Toole 
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(1994) has articulated the docility of the bodies in choral rehearsals and writers such as 
Bowman (2000, 2010), Bowman and Powell (2007), and Gould (2009) have noted the 
absence of the body in music education philosophies, the body remains neglected in 
much contemporary music education philosophy and practice.
3
  Likewise, while Reimer 
(2003) advocates that music educators seek to educate students’ emotions and Elliott and 
Silverman (2012) posit the need for increased attention to “musical-emotional 
experiences” (p. 40), both the emotions that students bring into the classroom and those 
felt while engaging in various musical experiences remain largely absent from most 
music education discourse.  Music educators tend to reinforce a divide between cognition 
and other human qualities. 
I addition to pondering the possibilities of continual change and a human ontology 
based on qualities in addition to cognition, I wonder why many of the philosophers above 
rarely acknowledge the interplay of location and music education.  People in different 
locations develop diverse customs, values, and ways of interfacing with each other and 
their environments.  In twenty-first century society, these disparate places are 
increasingly connected both physically and virtually.  For instance, the world-wide travel 
havoc caused by the eruption of an Icelandic volcano in 2010, which disrupted tens of 
thousands of flights and stranded millions of passengers, illustrated the physical 
interconnectivity of contemporary places.  Even children can now connect with others 
from diverse locations.  For example, in the United States, two-thirds of eight-year-olds 
will access the internet on any given weekday, and thirty-one percent of children between 
the ages of eight and ten own a cell phone (Gutnick, Robb, Takeuchi, & Kotler, 2011).  
                                            
3
 Some music methods, including Dalcroze, Orff, and Kodály, utilize the body.  These methods will be 
addressed and problematized in chapter 6. 
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While young adults in other countries may not currently have the same access to those in 
divergent locations as adolescents in the United States, such connections are increasingly 
rapidly.  For instance, as of January of 2012, over half a billion of China’s 1.3 billion 
people use the Internet (Asian News International).   
 Connections between the local musical practices in disparate locations occur as 
musicians collaborate, both in person and virtually, causing their unique traditions to mix, 
combine, and hybridize.  For instance, Yo-Yo Ma’s Silk Road4 Ensemble brings together 
performers from locations ranging from Iran to Kazakhstan to China.  Each musician 
adds the musical practices of his or her home, giving the group a unique and constantly 
varying sound.  The ensemble writes, “Our vision is to connect the world’s 
neighborhoods by bringing together artists and audiences around the globe” (Silk Road, 
2012).   
Those in separate locations can also engage in musical experiences that transcend 
their immediate places.  For instance, the use of technology that supports telepresence, in 
which performers in one location interact through live video feed with those in other 
places, has enabled everything from jam sessions between acoustic guitarists on different 
continents to choreographed performances between enthusiasts of traditional Japanese 
and Korean music in New York and South Korea.
5
  Such unique connections allow for 
original experiences that challenge divides between people in divergent locations.   
                                            
4
 The historical Silk Road was a connection of Afro-Eurasian trade routes. 
 
5
 For example, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1D_5cmfH6KY and http://ispr.info/2011/09/29/ 
telepresence-inspires-new-cross-border-music-making/. 
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While writers such as Green (2002) and Kratus (2007) advocate challenging the 
boundary between musical practices located inside school and those located outside of 
school, they neither examine the effects globalization on those practices nor the fact that 
such practices differ in various places.  Although researchers such as Stauffer (2009) 
advocate for an increased awareness of place in music education, questions about the 
interplay between localizing and globalizing musical forces remain underdeveloped.   
As I ponder the above writings about the purpose of education and relationship 
between music, education, and society in and through my lived experiences, I am 
intrigued by three questions: How might music education philosophizing emphasize 
continual change?  In what ways might multiple human qualities integrate with musical 
and educative experiences?  How would examining the role of location in musical and 
educative practices, including interactions between humans in diverse locations, elucidate 
new possibilities for music education? 
Purpose 
Given these three inquiries, the need for continued philosophical perspectives and 
questioning becomes clear.  Therefore, the purpose of this study is fourfold: 
1.  To use the work of Deleuze and Guattari to provide a philosophical basis for 
thinking about who, when, and where humans are.     
2.  To examine how thinkers from a variety of disciplines have explained the nature, 
importance, and continual development of who, when, and where humans are.   
3.  To explore how twentieth and twenty-first century philosophers and other writers 
address the questions “When is music?” and “When is education?” 
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4.  To propose a rhizomatic philosophy of music education based on complicating, 
considering, and connecting.   
I have organized this study in the following way: In chapter 2, I explore the qualities of a 
philosophical inquiry as well as the role of the researcher, offering a detailed account of 
my philosophical inquiry process.  In chapter 3, I explicate key concepts from the 
writings of Deleuze and Guattari.  In chapter 4, I draw on the works of Deleuze and 
Guattari and other authors to address the questions “When are we?” and “Who are we?”   
Likewise, in chapter 5, I draw on various writers to address the question “Where are we?”  
Drawing on chapters 3 through 5, I address the questions “When is music?” and “When is 
education?” in chapters 6 and 7, respectively.  In chapter 8, I posit a rhizomatic 
philosophy of music education, and in chapter 9, I offer possible implications of 
rhizomatic philosophizing for music educators’ engagement with policy as well as a 





Despite the profound and longstanding impact of writings by music education 
philosophers on the profession, philosophical inquiry remains an uncommon research 
methodology in music education.  For instance, the Journal of Research in Music 
Education almost never publishes philosophical research and, although its editors devote 
chapters to historical and qualitative research, The New Handbook of Research of Music 
Teaching and Learning (Colwell & Richardson, 2002) does not include a chapter on 
philosophical inquiry as an independent research methodology.  Even the journal 
Philosophy of Music Education Review and books devoted to music education 
philosophy, such as The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Music Education (Bowman 
& Frega, 2012a) include minimal writing about philosophical inquiry methods.  Perhaps 
as a result of the limited writing on philosophical methods, authors of philosophical 
dissertations do not always include methods sections.
6
  However, some writers have 
noted the role of philosophical inquiry in music education, and my examination of that 
literature has influenced my research.     
In this chapter, I articulate my own methods and involvement in the philosophical 
inquiry process.  First, I posit five aspects of philosophical inquiry, explaining how I 
utilize them in this dissertation.  Second, I elucidate the researcher’s role in philosophical 
inquiry, detailing how the concept of bricolage, which is central to my methods, guided 
the process of philosophical inquiry in this particular study. 
 
                                            
6
 See, for example, Goble (1999) and Wheeler (2006). 
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Defining Philosophical Inquiry 
As a result of my review of the literature about philosophical inquiry in music 
education, I posit five statements: philosophical inquiry interrogates a discipline’s 
underlying values; philosophical inquiry explores questions of a philosophical nature; 
philosophical inquiry connects multiple disciplines and experiences; philosophical 
inquiry involves clarifying, integrating, and analyzing preexisting concepts and ideas as 
well as creating new ones; philosophical inquiry ultimately aims to motivate and mobilize 
a field’s practices and thinking.  In this section, I begin by examining the sources of each 
of these statements in detail.  Next, I explain how I apply each of these ideas in the 
remainder of this document. 
First, philosophical inquiry illuminates and investigates a discipline’s unconscious 
beliefs, principles, values, and assumptions.  Phelps, Ferrara, and Goolsby (1993) argue, 
“Philosophical inquiry is employed to study the underlying principles in any field” (p. 
91), and Froehlich and Frierson-Campbell (2012) write that the philosopher’s “tasks lies 
in questioning taken-for-granted theories, concepts, and terms that are widely but, at 
times, somewhat indiscriminately used in music education” (p. 106).  Similarly, Bowman 
(1998) explains, “Philosophy manifests itself in an ongoing process of critically 
examining and refining the grounds for our beliefs and actions, the ideas we recognize as 
true, as deserving our loyalty and commitment” (p. 6).  Engaging in philosophical inquiry 
involves exploring the often unstated values that guide thought and action. 
Throughout their writings, Deleuze and Guattari exemplify such critical 
investigations by creating concepts that challenge previous interpretations of existence.  
May (2005) explains that for Deleuze, “Philosophy does not settle things.  It disturbs 
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them” (p. 19).  Jorgensen (1992) articulates the aim of such actions, writing, “In the 
process of exposing and evaluating underlying assumptions, the philosopher makes 
explicit that which otherwise may remain implicit, and clarifies aspects that are prior to 
and deeper than the actions to which they give rise” (p. 93).  Philosophical inquiry 
illuminates explicit and implicit beliefs that undergird practice. 
Second, in their endeavor to uncover and interrogate a field’s underlying values, 
philosophers typically explore specific categories of overarching, multifaceted questions, 
such as those relating to ontology or axiology.  Elliott (1995) argues that philosophers 
concern themselves with the “big picture,” targeting “issues that cannot be addressed by 
observation, description, or experiment alone” (p. 8).  Philosophers seek to engage with 
entire fields of thought and their accompanying practices, asking why they exist in their 
current forms.  Philosophical inquiry frequently involves investigating contemporary 
beliefs about longstanding philosophical constructs.   
Jorgensen (1992) explains that philosophical questions often relate to ontology, 
epistemology, axiology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics.  The authors of the Oxford 
English Dictionary (2000) define ontology as “the science or study of being,” 
epistemology as “the theory or science of the method or grounds of knowledge,” axiology 
as “the theory of value,” ethics as “the science of morals,”7 and aesthetics as “the 
philosophy of the beautiful or of art.”  Jorgensen offers a musical example of each 
category of question, positing “When does music occur?” as an ontological question, 
“How does one come to know music?” as an epistemological question, and “Is western 
                                            
7
 This definition is problematic because it insinuates that ethics, like science, is a reproducible, context-
independent system.  I will further address and complicate the idea of ethics in sections entitled 
“Considering” in chapters 7 and 8 of this document. 
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classical music ‘better’ than other western genres?” as an axiological question.  
Additionally, she poses “When is an elitist system of music education preferable to a 
universalistic one?” as an ethical question, “Who should control music education?” as a 
political question, and “Is this a work of art?” as an aesthetic question (pp. 95-6).  Any 
one or more of these types of philosophical questioning might undergird philosophical 
inquiry in music education.  
Alperson (1993) and Bowman (1998) detail how music education philosophers 
might utilize the aforementioned categories of overarching questions.  Bowman suggests 
that music philosophers look beyond traditional aesthetic questions.  He claims that 
musical aesthetics stem from an eighteenth-century effort to codify commonalities among 
the arts.  Bowman writes that aesthetics “has frequently based its claims on a rather 
restricted range of evidence,” adding “philosophy of music is broader than musical 
aesthetics, and subsumes it” (p. 6).  Alperson offers a more nuanced argument, stating: 
An adequate philosophy of music, in other words, would provide an 
understanding of what we might call the “musicworld,” by which I mean the set 
of practices related to the making, understanding, and valuation of music and the 
social, institutional, and theoretical contexts in which such practices have their 
place. (p. 218)   
Bowman and Alperson assert the value of overarching questions related to specific 
circumstances rather than ones posited in abstraction.  Bowman and Frega (2012b) 
summarize this notion, writing, “Philosophical problems and solutions are contextually 
situated affairs.  Philosophical inquiry exists to serve practical human needs, and these 
are not the same for everyone, everywhere, cross-culturally, or across time” (p. 23).  In 
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other words, philosophers address questions of a philosophical nature with regard to 
specific people in a given time and place.   
Alperson posits that examining the “musicworld” provides a foundation for a 
“reasoned account of the goals, techniques, and values of music education in particular” 
(p. 218).  In other words, a philosophy of the various aspects of music and musical 
practices serves as a prerequisite for a philosophy of music education.  While Alperson 
does not assert the need for a philosophy of education as underpinning for a philosophy 
of music education, such a notion logically extends from his argument.  In order to 
formulate philosophies of music, education, and music education, philosophers engage 
with specific categories of overarching questions, such as those relating to epistemology 
or ethics. 
Third, in addition to interrogating a discipline’s underlying values and 
investigating questions of a philosophical nature, philosophers explore and utilize 
disciplines, ideologies, and experiences beyond those under primary investigation; in 
fact, philosophy does not exist apart from such interactions.  Rainbow and Froehlich 
(1987) explain that philosophical research involves identifying “aspects (and problems) 
inherent to the stated purpose” and discussing “the literature pertinent to the research 
purpose and rationale” (p. 149).  Elliott (1995) elaborates, stating, “Philosophy is not an 
independent field of inquiry in the same way that physics and chemistry are.  Philosophy 
presupposes a fund of expressed meanings and problems from other areas of human 
experience” (p. 8).  For example, in conceptualizing “smooth spaces,” Deleuze and 
Guattari draw on composer Pierre Boulez’s comments about the relationship between 
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time and music and mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot’s theory of fractals.8  Aigen 
(1995) supports such connections, writing that philosophic thought “connects to other 
systems of thought as well as to human practices and beliefs” (p. 457), and Jorgensen 
argues that philosophy “is not isolated but integrated within, or related to, other systems 
of thought in ways that are clarified by the philosopher” (p. 94).  In other words, 
philosophical inquiry involves using multiple lenses from varying disciplines to 
investigate existing ideas and create new ones. 
Fourth, the process of conducting philosophical inquiry involves a combination of 
refining, synthesizing, and critiquing preexisting theories, ideas, and concepts as well as 
creating new ones.  Aigen (1995) identifies “clarifying terms” as an important 
philosophical procedure (p. 449), and Jorgensen (1992) asserts that philosophers need “to 
select the right words to clarify meaning and sharpen and refine the ideas being 
expressed” (p. 91).  Likewise, Froehlich and Frierson-Campbell (2012) argue that 
philosophers should “share with the reader how key terms were defined throughout the 
entire research process” (p. 98).  Defining terms and ideas enhances the communication 
between a philosopher and his or her audience.  Rainbow and Froehlich (1987) articulate 
four “approaches for constructing definitions” in philosophical inquiry: denotive 
definitions list all things that fall under the term; connotative definitions enumerate the 
characteristics common to all things to which the term applies; stipulative definitions 
attach a meaning to an unknown or uncommon word; and lexical definitions delineate 
meanings agreed upon by convention and tradition, often using standard dictionaries (p. 
                                            
8
 I expand on these ideas in chapter 3. 
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146).  Through such techniques, philosophers can avoid unintended confusion and make 
their ideas more intelligible. 
While clarifying and refining their terms, philosophers critically interrogate and 
synthesize preexisting writings.  Bowman (1998) emphasizes the role of critique, arguing 
that philosophical inquiry “is more properly regarded as the systematic and critical 
examination of the grounds for belief” (p. 5).  Additionally, Elliott (1995) notes the role 
of synthesis, writing, “Philosophers often synthesize and criticize past philosophical 
thinking on a topic to discover why others have been correct or mistaken” (p. 8).  
Jorgensen (1992) elaborates on this position, distinguishing between “synopsis,” which 
involves “constructing a comprehensive paradigm that elaborates one’s own 
philosophical perspective while building on the views of other philosophers” for purposes 
of verification, and “analysis,” which necessitates breaking down preexisting 
philosophies for purposes of refutation (p. 98).  Critical investigation, analysis, and 
synthesis all play meaningful roles in philosophical inquiry. 
In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) emphasize the creative aspect of 
philosophical inquiry, arguing, “Philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and 
fabricating
9
 concepts” (p. 2).  In addition to emphasizing creation over critique and 
synthesis, Deleuze and Guattari seek to problematize readers’ conceptions of objects, 
places, processes, and ideas.  Instead of advocating for the strict definitions of terms, they 
leave words and ideas open to multiple understandings and functions.  Philosophical 
inquiry involves balancing these contrasting views, considering how much to clarify and 
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 Deleuze and Guattari do not view fabrication as an arbitrary or disingenuous process but rather as an act 
in which a philosopher takes into account the current time, location, and circumstances in order to construct 
concepts. 
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how much to complicate as well as the appropriate amount of critique, synthesis, and 
creation.   
Lastly, researchers engaging in philosophical inquiry ultimately strive to guide, 
influence, and alter thought and practice.  Aigen (1995) defines philosophy as a “system 
of beliefs or principles set forth to guide practical action” (p. 435).  Likewise, Elliott 
(1995) posits a direct link between philosophy and practice.  He writes, “The products of 
good philosophizing are not new facts but new perspectives on the assumptions, beliefs, 
meanings, and definitions that inhabit our thoughts and actions” (p. 8).  Music education 
philosophers constantly question how theories might impact everyday music teaching and 
learning.  Through their explorations, critiques, and syntheses, philosophers aim to offer 
practitioners questions and thought processes that may guide their work. 
Although philosophers challenge people to think and act differently, they rarely 
provide simple or straight-forward directives.  Phelps, Ferrara, and Goolsby (1993) 
assert, “Explicit answers to questions posed in the process of philosophical inquiry are 
rarely available” (p. 112).  Similarly, Bowman and Frega (2012b) write that philosophy 
inquiry “must seek improved understanding and more effective practice without insisting 
upon a single, definitive, or ultimate point of arrival” (p. 14), and Froehlich and Frierson-
Campbell (2012) note the importance of “remaining open to the irresolvable tension 
between wanting to draw finite conclusions even if the inquiry promises to be ongoing” 
(p. 102).  While philosophers acknowledge the link between theory and practice, they 
refrain from imposing specific ideas, actions, and goals on others.  
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In the following philosophical inquiry, I aim to exhibit all of the attributes 
above.
10
  I begin by elucidating the assumptions, beliefs, and principles currently 
delimiting much of contemporary music education discourse and practice.  In chapter 1, I 
inventory contemporary purposes of education and music education as well as assertions 
about possible relationships between music, education, and society.  Subsequently, in 
chapter 3, I use the writings of Deleuze and Guattari to lay the groundwork for alternative 
conceptions of the nature of existence, emphasizing their innovative descriptions and 
understandings of space, time, and the nature of being.   
Second, following the writings of Elliott (1995) and Jorgensen (1992), I engage 
with overarching ideas and traditional philosophical questions.  The titles of chapters 4, 5, 
6, and 7 pose the ontological questions “When and who are we?”  “Where are we?”  
“When is music?” and “When is education?” respectively.  Additionally, I address 
questions of an ethical nature in the final section of chapter 7 and the middle section of 
chapter 8, both entitled “Considering.”  In accordance with Alperson’s (1993) assertion 
that a philosophy of music should precede a philosophy of music education, I inquire into 
the nature of musical experiences in chapter 6 and educative experiences in chapter 7 
before addressing music education in chapter 8.  I also tangentially address questions 
related to aesthetics, axiology, epistemology, and politics at various points throughout 
this document.   
Third, this philosophical inquiry connects to a variety of disciplines and 
experiences.  I draw upon the work of poststructuralist philosophers, place philosophers, 
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 These five philosophical attributes are problematic because they draw on modernist rather than 
poststructuralist writings.  As noted in the following section, I utilize bricolage in order to problematize 
aspects of these traditional attributes.   
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education philosophers, aesthetic philosophers, and music education philosophers as well 
as that of cognitive linguists, cultural anthropologists, economists, ethnomusicologists, 
neuroscientists, psychologists, and sociologists.  Rather than viewing these disciplines in 
isolation, I posit their nuanced interconnections.  I also make connections to real-world 
practices by peppering my writing with hypothetical examples as well as short narratives 
from my own experiences and the experiences of others whose writing and conversations 
have informed my thinking.   
Fourth, this philosophical inquiry incorporates the processes of clarification, 
analysis, synthesis, and creation.  For example, in chapter 3, I clarify Deleuzean terms 
such as “rhizome,” “becoming,” and “bodies without organs.”  Similarly, in chapter 5, I 
clarify words such as “place” and “glocalization.”  While this document includes 
critiques of preexisting philosophies, I primarily seek to synthesize disparate ideas, 
observations, and theories.  In Jorgensen’s (1992) terminology, I engage in “synopsis” by 
combining the work of various writers with my own theories to construct a 
“comprehensive paradigm” (p. 98).  While I do not create concepts in the same way as 
Deleuze and Guattari, I have approached this philosophical inquiry as a creative 
endeavor, breaking with the frameworks of prior philosophical music education 
dissertations and other writings and positing innovative questions, processes, and 
visualizations of music teaching and learning.   
Lastly, through this philosophical inquiry, I aim to offer practices and questions 
that I hope will shape and challenge music educators’ thinking and actions, including my 
own.  Chapter 8 includes guiding questions based on these practices music educators, 
including myself, might consider.  The goal of my work is not abstract theory, 
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unachievable ends, or rhetorical questions, but rather a practical philosophizing that 
challenges music educators while simultaneously empowering them to find their own 
paths.   
Role of the Researcher 
The preceding description of philosophical inquiry presupposes the centrality of 
the researcher in the process.  I begin this section by examining the role of philosophical 
researchers.  Subsequently, I explore the concept of bricolage, explaining how it guided 
my philosophical inquiry in this document. 
Philosophers ultimately choose what philosophies, ideas, and practices come 
under questioning as well as the course of the clarification, criticism, synopsis, and 
creation processes.  In writing about qualitative research, Patton (2002) explains, “The 
researcher is the instrument" (p. 14).  A similar statement appears applicable to the 
researcher’s role in philosophical inquiry.  Rainbow and Froehlich (1987) assert, “The 
origin of any philosophical inquiry lies in the philosopher’s basic convictions about 
something” (p. 131).  Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) write, “Concepts are 
not waiting for us ready-made. . . . They must be invented, fabricated or rather created 
and would be nothing with their creator’s signature” (p. 5).  The philosopher continually 
engages with and actively creates all aspects of the philosophical inquiry process.   
Philosophical inquiry carries the mark of its author, remaining inseparable from 
her prior undertakings, values, places, and moments in history.  Phelps, Ferrara, and 
Goolsby (1993) assert that philosophical researchers cannot completely suspend their 
own biases (p. 112).  Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) elaborate, explaining, “New 
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concepts must relate to our problems, our history, and, above all, to our becomings” (p. 
27).  Philosophers cannot separate their past, present, and future from their research.   
The literature addressing the relationship between qualitative researchers and their 
research processes may illuminate aspects of philosophical researchers’ thinking and 
action.  For instance, Glesne (2011) explains the role of reflexivity in qualitative research, 
asserting that reflexivity involves “critical reflection on how researcher, research 
participants, setting, and research procedures interact and influence each other” and 
adding that researchers often discuss reflexivity by “inquiring into their own biases, 
subjectivity, and value-laden perspectives” as well as their methodology and 
interpretations (p. 151).  Similarly, Rainbow and Froehlich argue that the first step in 
philosophical research is describing “your own belief system and view of the field of 
music education” (p. 149).  Reflexivity is also a defining characteristic of feminist 
philosophy (Gould, 2011).  These writers posit that articulating one’s underlying values 
informs the reader of the researcher’s biases and allows the researcher to question how 
her dispositions and beliefs affect her inquiry. 
 St. Pierre (2010) contradicts these ideas, asserting that statements of researcher 
bias are grounded in humanist descriptions of human beings.  She explains that such 
disclosures assume both the existence of “a stable, conscious identity on which to 
reflect,” rather than one that is constantly becoming, and the idea that “reflection can 
serve as a corrective and, thus, guarantee the validity of a study” (p. 47).  Likewise, I 
argue that my own identity is neither quantifiable nor static, and possessing an awareness 
of my past does not mean that I can read, write, interpret, criticize, or synthesize apart 
from that past.  Following St. Pierre, I have chosen not to offer a single statement of 
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researcher bias; however, I do assert that active reflection on one’s changing identity can 
benefit both researcher and reader.  Therefore, I will reveal elements of my prior 
experiences and current beliefs via various stories throughout this document.  
Additionally, in chapter 9, I reflect on how I have changed as a result of engaging in this 
philosophical inquiry. 
 The product of philosophical inquiry relies not only on the researcher’s subjective 
histories, experiences, and beliefs, but also on the nature of the content under 
investigation.   Phelps, Ferrara, and Goolsby (1993) assert, “In philosophical inquiry, 
content is not easily separable from method” (p. 90).  As noted above, in this 
philosophical inquiry, I draw on work of Deleuze and Guattari as well as a multitude of 
other writers.  Given the intricate intermingling of these diverse ideas, I have adopted the 
concept of bricolage as a framework for my philosophical inquiry process in this 
document.  Denzin (1994) explains that bricolage is “a complex, dense, reflexive, 
collage-like creation that represents the researcher’s images, understandings, and 
interpretations of the world or phenomenon under analysis” (p. 18).  Kincheloe (2005) 
elaborates on the intricate nature of bricolage, writing, “The bricolage exists out of 
respect for the complexity of the lived world.  Indeed, it is grounded on an epistemology 
of complexity” (p. 324).  Since Deleuze and Guattari seek to complicate rather than 
simplify beings, places, and ideas,
11
 bricolage aligns with their conceptualization of 
existence.  Drawing on their writings, Gould (2012) explains that becoming-musician 
“transformatively through and as difference” creates bricolage that explores rather than 
moves towards a specified goal (p. 83).  Similarly, bricolage relates to Deleuze and 
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Guattari’s (1980/1987) concept of a rhizome,12 which they use to promote the unceasing 
formation of diverse connections. 
Bricolage begins with a single concept, idea, or object that Kincheloe and Berry 
(2004) call the “point of entry text” or “POET.”  They define the POET as anything that 
“has or can generate meaning—a picture, a book, a photograph, a story, a theory, a 
newspaper article, a social issue, a history, healthcare flyer from the doctor’s office, a 
classroom, a movie” (p. 108).  In Kincheloe and Berry’s (2004) conception of bricolage, 
the point of entry text becomes a place of departure, from which the researcher moves in 
multiple directions only to continually return.  They write that the POET “acts as point of 
origin through which all the different areas of bricolage are threaded” (p. 111).  Like a 
person sewing who returns a needle to a button hole only to move it again in a new 
direction, the bricoleur moves away from her POET, returning again and again with 
diverse insights.   
To help illustrate bricolage, Kincheloe and Berry (2004) offer a series of diagrams 
that I have reproduced below as Figures 2.1 and 2.2 (pp. 112-113).  Figure 2.1 shows the 
beginning stages of bricolage while Figure 2.2 demonstrates the continued application of 
bricolage (p. 112).  In Figure 2.1, the researcher began at the point of entry text and then 
addressed that object or idea using one of the surrounding “features,” such as axiology or 
semiotic readings.  Subsequently, the researcher returns to the point of entry text only to 
again move away from it and towards another “feature.”  Kincheloe and Berry add that 
looping through each point on the bricolage map is unnecessary, stating, “Each area of 
the structure can be visited once, several times or not at all and threaded back to the 
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 I address this idea in chapters 3 and 8. 
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POET” (p. 113).  Any process of bricolage, including my own, is therefore problematic 
because it does not loop through all possible features.  For example, different readers may 
see more loops through features such as feminism, post-colonial theory, and non-Western 
philosophical perspectives than I have included here.     
      
Figure 2.1. “Bricolage map and the emergence of complexity.”   From Kincheloe, J. L., & 
Berry, K. S.  (2004).  Rigour and complexity in educational research:Conceptualizing the 
bricolage.  New York, NY: Open University Press, p. 112.        
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Kincheloe and Berry (2004) explain that through this ongoing process, “The 
threaded return acts as a feedback loop to the initial text and changes, expands, clarifies, 
modifies, and challenges the existing knowledge.  In the process new perspectives and 
knowledge about the text are produced” (p. 110).  The researcher continues to engage in 
these movements of leaving and revisiting, eventually producing the complex image of 
bricolage in Figure 2.2.  This process provides the researcher an evolving, multi-faceted 
understanding of the complicated nature of her selected POET.  
 
Figure 2.2. “Butterfly image of complexity.”  From Kincheloe, J. L., & Berry, K. S.  
(2004).  Rigour and complexity in educational research:Conceptualizing the bricolage.  
New York, NY: Open University Press, p. 113. 
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 I view my philosophical inquiry as a process of doing bricolage.  Figure 2.3 offers 
a visualization of my overarching bricolage map, without the butterfly loops.  In 
subsequent chapters, I repeat the map with arrows indicating where looping occurred.  In 
chapter 3, I review Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about the nature of being, place, art, 
education, and the question “How might we live?”  These ideas function as prominent 
“features” on the bricolage maps of chapters 4 through 8.  The titles of chapters 4 through 
7, “When and Who Are We?” “Where Are We?”  “When is Music?” and “When is 
Education?” each raise a question that serves as the “POET” for that chapter.  In those 
chapters, I continually return to Deleuze and Guattari’s writings, looping through them 
and then returning to my point of entry text.  In each chapter, I also augment and 
challenge Deleuze and Guattari’s work by looping through the writings of various other 
authors, ranging from education philosophers to neuroscientists to economists.  In chapter 
8, I combine Deleuze and Guattari’s writings addressing the question “How might we 
live?” with the work of diverse writers in order to propose processes in which music 





Figure 2.3. Bricolage mapping of chapters 3-8. 
33 
 Elements of each chapter also serve as “features” on the bricolage maps of future 
chapters.  For example, in chapter 5, in addition to utilizing Deleuze and Guattari’s 
writings from chapter 3, I integrate the ontology of being that I posit in chapter 4.  In 
chapter 6, I draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s work, the human ontology in chapter 4, and 
the ontology of place in chapter 5.  Similarly, in chapter 7 I combine the ideas from 
chapters 3 through 5, and in chapter 8 I synthesize the writings from chapters 3-7.  
Chapters 4 through 8 include a replication of Figure 2.3 overlaid with arrows illustrating 
the connections made in that chapter.   
  In summary, philosophers continually create and guide the process of 
philosophical inquiry while engaging reflexively with their work.  Their prior, current, 
and future experiences and beliefs inevitably affect their thinking and writing.  While it 
may benefit philosophers and their readers to reflect on their values, philosophers can 
never work apart from their own evolving beings.  Since philosophical content is 
inseparable from one’s method of inquiry, I chose the process of bricolage, which aligns 
with Deleuze and Guattari’s writings by emphasizing complexity and diverse 




THE WORK OF DELEUZE AND GUATTARI 
A French philosopher and friend of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) 
drew inspiration from the works of Lucretius, Hume, Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Bergson 
while defining himself as “an enemy” of Kant (Massumi, 1987, p. x).  He taught 
philosophy at various schools in France, eventually finding a permanent position at The 
University of Paris VIII in Vincennes, which he held from 1969 until his retirement in 
1987.  Deleuze wrote both alone and with Félix Guattari (1930-1992), a practicing 
psychoanalyst who engaged in political activism.  Guattari trained with the French 
psychoanalyst and philosopher Jacques Lacan and spent most of his life working at an 
experimental psychiatric clinic (Massumi, 1987, p. x).  In this document, I draw on both 
Deleuze’s solo works and his collaborative writings with Guattari.   
Scholars consider Deleuze and Guattari “post-1968 thinkers” and post-
structuralists
13
 (Colebrook, 2000, p. xxxiii).  Deleuze and Guattari wrote together 
following the May 1968 protests in France, during which students and later workers went 
on strike against university and government authorities.  Colebrook (2000) explains the 
impact that the May 1968 events had on Deleuze’s work, asserting, “Far from writing 
being the expression of a unique vision or belief, Deleuze and those around him felt that 
it ought to be an open and almost involuntary response to the events of one’s time” (p. 
xxxiii).  The relationship between lived experience and philosophy resonates throughout 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work.   
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Through their collaborations, Deleuze and Guattari authored the two-volume 
work Capitalism and Schizophrenia, with the first volume, Anti-Oedipus, released in 
French in 1972 and the second, A Thousand Plateaus, following in 1980.  While I draw 
on many of Deleuze and Guattari’s works, the ideas in A Thousand Plateaus figure 
prominently into my thinking and this document.  In Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Deleuze and Guattari challenge the nationalism, Marxism, and “school-building strains of 
psychoanalysis” that dominated the then current French intellectual climate (Massumi, 
1987, p. xi).  Writing more broadly, Colebrook (2002) explains that Deleuze sought not 
only to react to contemporary existence but also to alter its course, stating, “Philosophy, 
for Deleuze, was not about creating correct pictures of theories of life, but transforming 
life” (p. xvii).  In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari challenge traditional 
Western conceptions of existence, positing alternative ways of thinking and becoming in 
the world.   
 In their works, Deleuze and Guattari address an array of topics, ranging from 
science to the arts to the nature of philosophy.  Through these explorations, they 
formulate a variety of new concepts, often abstract, multifaceted, and evolving.  Given 
the breadth and complexity of Deleuze and Guattari’s writings, the goal of this chapter is 
not to summarize, synthesize, or critique the totality of their work.  Rather, I seek to 
articulate, extend, and experiment with ideas from their writings that inform the thinking 
in this document.   
Deleuze and Guattari’s work is intentionally nonlinear and connected through 
themes and references, with each segment relating to and altering the meaning of other 
sections and their writing as a whole.  They write, “Every concept relates back to other 
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concepts, not only in its history but in its becoming or its present conditions” (1991/1994, 
p. 19).  Colebrook (2002) summarizes this idea, positing advice for readers.  She states: 
In order to read Deleuze you have to accept that finding your way around his 
work is never going to be a question of adding one proposition to another.  
Rather, you need a sense of the whole in order to fully understand any single 
section; but the whole also seems to transform with the interpretation of each new 
section. (p. xix)   
Deleuze and Guattari’s work exists in a continually developing relationship between its 
whole and its parts.  Likewise, over the course of writing this dissertation, my own 
thinking about Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas has evolved, altering as I read additional 
works by and about them and as I applied their concepts to my experiences. 
In this chapter, I discuss selected concepts and ideas from Deleuze and Guattari in 
light of my broader understanding of their writings.  While I note connections between 
the chosen concepts and tangential concepts, I do not detail all possible aspects of each 
concept.  In future chapters, I further extrapolate on, connect, and problematize the 
concepts below.   
I begin this chapter by outlining two concepts that underlie much of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work: time and difference.  I then apply these principles to explain 
characteristics of their philosophies about human ontology and location, their writings on 
the arts, their statements about education, and their assertions about how one might live.  
In the section on human ontology, entitled “No Longer ‘I,’” I discuss how Deleuze and 
Guattari conceive of humans as multiple and existing in a constant state of flux.  In the 
section on location, entitled “Proceeding from the Middle,” I explain how Deleuze and 
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Guattari posit the mobility of locations and foreground humans’ capacity to journey 
within and between spaces.  In “The Art of Composing Sensations,” I note the centrality 
of sensation and composition in Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about the arts.  In the 
section entitled “How Does Education Work for You?” I articulate Deleuze and 
Guattari’s assertions about the relationship between education and society as well as their 
writings about the role of teachers.  Lastly, I posit how Deleuze and Guattari might 
engage with the question “How might one live?” by exploring their writings about the 
link between experimentation and life and explaining how they use the image of a 
rhizome to promote the formation of diverse, evolving connections. 
Key Principles 
When I asked Elizabeth Gould
14
 how she speaks about Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work with her undergraduate music education students, she replied that she places a tenor 
saxophone on a table at the front of the room and then asks the students how the 
saxophone has changed since they entered the classroom.  Gould continued that the 
students sit in silence for some time before one might offer “Well, maybe it has a bit 
more rust on it.”  Subsequently, other students add varied ideas about the changing status 
of the familiar instrument (personal communication, September 22, 2011).  This simple 
exercise exemplifies two basic elements of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy: time and 
difference.  In this section, I detail how Deleuze and Guattari define and utilize these 
ideas, which in turn serve an integral role in their other philosophical concepts. 
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 Elizabeth Gould is a professor of music education at the University of Toronto and a prominent 
Deleuzean scholar in music education. 
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Time 
Humans exist in time, and time is fundamental to humans’ understanding of the 
world.  Deleuze (1990/1995) explains that time both defines reality and keeps existence 
from reaching complete closure (p. 55).  Because the universe continually evolves in 
time, time precludes life and non-life from reaching a final ending point; existence 
remains in constant motion.   
Deleuze and Guattari propose a unique means of understanding the essence of the 
present moment in time.  Utilizing Bergson’s image of the past as a cone, Deleuze 
envisions variegated histories integrally linked to, and in turn enveloping, each ephemeral 
moment.  May (2003) explains, “The cone’s point is the present with the past enlarging 
itself behind it.  At each cross-sectional slice of the cone—including its point in the 
present—the entirety of the past exists, but in more or less ‘contracted’ state” (pp. 145-6).  
Figure 3.1 visualizes Bergson’s cone for a fifteen-year-old person, with the cone’s point 
representing the present.   
 
 
Figure 3.1. Bergson’s time cone for a person at age 15.          
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At each passing present moment, illustrated by the continually moving point of 
the cone, a person’s entire past exists and grows as the cone’s point moves forward in 
time.  For example, when a person reaches fifteen years of age, she experiences each 
minute of her fifteenth birthday as both the present moment and as a compressed version 
of every moment from the past fifteen years.  The present and the past exist concurrently.  
We cannot choose what parts of our past influence our present thoughts and actions; our 
entire history resides in every new moment.   
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994), the past does not exist exactly 
like the present but rather as “virtual.”  They explain the “virtual” as the chaos 
“containing all particles and drawing out all possible forms, which spring up only to 
disappear immediately,” elaborating that the “virtual” denotes not only the past but also 
the future that actualizes in the present (p. 118).  Each passing moment consists of the 
present as well as the “virtual” past and future.  In contrast with the time demarcated by 
clocks, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize “the indefinite time of the event, the floating line 
that knows only speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already-there 
that is at the same time not-yet-here” (p. 262).  In other words, Deleuze, beyond arguing 
that the past impacts the present, asserts the indivisible, integrated nature of the past-
present-future moment.   
 Such an explanation of the paramount importance of time in experience raises 
another fundamental question: What, then, is the nature of time?  According to Deleuze 
and Guattari, difference comprises time’s essence.  May (2003) elaborates that for 
Deleuze, “The content of time, since it cannot come in the form of identities or 
samenesses, must be difference” (p. 146).  Since the past constitutes an integral part of 
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the present, even repeated actions occur differently each time.  As Heraclitus once said, 
“You cannot step twice into the same river.”15  Time flows constantly; like the water 
moving in a stream, it necessitates that life remains in a constant state of flux.  Repeated 
stepping in a river or any other reiterated action is fundamentally different on each 
occasion because time has passed and the water has flowed since the initial event.  For 
instance, as an oboist, my performance of a B flat scale on the oboe is never the same; 
each time I repeat it, I actualize every prior experience of that scale, as well as the 
entirety of my past, in the present moment.  I therefore experience the scale as a 
singularity with each repetition.   
Time not only enables difference, it demands it.  Returning to Gould’s example of 
the saxophone, equating time with difference necessitates acknowledging that the 
saxophone changes with each passing moment.  The saxophone, and indeed all existence, 
resides at continually growing past-present-future moments. 
Difference  
 Initially, the idea of a world constitutive of difference may appear simplistic.  For 
example, our planet clearly teams with a vast variety of life and non-life, with endless 
variations between and within categories of organic and inorganic matter.  Yet, such 
images presuppose a certain understanding of difference.  While things, people, and ideas 
may differ from each other, they also differ from themselves over time.  For example, 
from a Deleuzean perspective, the tenor saxophone both differs from other instruments 
and continuously differs from itself. 
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Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) distinguish between two types of difference, 
the first numeric, discrete, and homogenous and the second qualitative, continual, and 
heterogeneous.  They summarize this notion, writing, “There are not, therefore, two kinds 
of languages but two possible treatments of the same language.  Either the variables are 
treated in such a way as to extract from them constants and constant relations or in such a 
way as to place them in continuous variation” (p. 103).  Asking how forms of life differ 
from one another exemplifies the first type of difference, while asking how a single 
person differs from herself involves the second type of difference.  Deleuze and Guattari 
do not just assert the existence of this second type of difference, they posit an ontology of 
existence based on it.  They write, “The essential thing is no longer forms and matters, or 
themes, but forces, densities, intensities” (p. 343).  As Bell (2006) summarizes, “This 
notion of a non-identifiable differential element is perhaps the most ‘central’ notion of 
Deleuze’s work” (p. 86).  All existence continually differs from itself. 
Conceiving of difference as continual variation rather than constants diverges 
from long-standing Western philosophical beliefs.  For instance, in the Republic, Plato 
conceives of worldly objects and qualities, such as justice and goodness, mimicking what 
he termed Forms, or archetypes or essences, of those objects and qualities.  Using 
Socratic dialogue, he writes; 
Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute beauty, 
nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the many just, and 
not absolute justice, and the like,—such persons may be said to have opinion but 
not knowledge? … But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable 
may be said to know, and not to have opinion only? (p. 173)   
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This conception results in a dualism between the world of Forms and the world of 
perception, with the Forms constituting true knowledge and perception facilitating the 
formation of opinion.  Plato’s ontology of existence assumes preexistent ideal Forms as 
the basis of existence.   
Similarly, in Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1781/2007) espouses a philosophy 
based on similarity and stability rather than difference and fluctuation.  For example, 
describing his principle of the unity of apperception,
16
 Kant states: 
It must be the case that each of my representations is such that I can attribute it to 
my self, a subject which is the same for all of my self-attributions, which is 
distinct from its representations, and which can be conscious of its 
representations. (pp. 131-2).   
Kant defines humans as separate, stable, reasoning beings, focusing on how humans 
differ from their surroundings rather than how humans differs from themselves over time. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s assertion that difference comprises the universe’s 
fundamental element breaks with long-standing principles of Western philosophers.  In 
contrast to Plato’s ideal Forms and Kant’s transcendental self, Deleuze and Guattari posit 
an existence based on diversity and change.  They argue that artistic, scientific, and 
philosophic thinking constantly confront an underlying difference, temporarily 
organizing it through creative acts (1991/1994, p. 197).  For Deleuze and Guattari, 
difference is primary and structure is both secondary and ephemeral.  May (2005) notes 
that Deleuze inverts the traditional relationship between identity and difference, writing, 
“It’s not identity that captures what things are; it’s difference that does it” (p. 81).  The 
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tenor saxophone exists not by retaining certain qualities over time, but by continually 
changing from itself.  Rather than Forms and stable identities, difference, change, and 
variability constitute humans.  
Difference is ongoing motion rather than a definable entity.  Deleuze (1995) 
explains, “There are no such things as universals, there’s nothing transcendent, no Unity, 
subject (or object), Reason; there are only processes, sometimes unifying, subjectifying, 
rationalizing, but just processes all the same” (p. 145).  In other words, Deleuze 
contradicts the idea of transcendental objects, ideas, or ways of being to which all 
existence must conform or aspire.  He instead posits an existence comprised of continual 
flows and fluctuations. 
Because difference exists in a constant state of motion, difference cannot be 
captured or quantified.  May (2005) explains that according to Deleuze, “Difference is 
not a thing, it is a process.  It unfolds—or better, it is an unfolding (and a folding, and a 
refolding).  It is alive” (p. 24).  Likewise, Colebrook (2002) writes, “Deleuze insists that 
we need to begin from a mobility, flux, becoming
17
 or change that has no underlying 
foundation” (p. 52).  Difference exists as movement, resisting containment, limitations, 
and definitions. 
 Time and difference change constantly, causing the existence that they constitute 
to defy exact repetition and to remain in constant flux.  They serve as essential 
components in a diverse array of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts.  In the following 
sections, I explain how time and difference underpin Deleuze and Guattari’s notions 
about the nature of subjectivity, location, the arts, education, and how might one live. 
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No Longer “I” 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on time and difference rather than stability and 
similarity leads them to envision humans as multi-faceted and ever-evolving rather than 
singular and fixed.  This loss of a stagnant and distinct individuality necessitates 
examining the vocabulary we traditionally use to understand, name, and articulate 
ourselves.  For example, the pronoun “I” reinforces the idea of separate, unchanging 
identities.  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) articulate the importance of reaching “not 
the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any 
importance whether one says I” (p. 3).  Instead, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) 
promote an existence based on the term “and” (p. 25).  To think of ourselves as an 
amalgamation of “ands” rather than a single “I” creates a human ontology based on flux, 
diversity, and connections. 
  Throughout their writing, Deleuze and Guattari use a multitude of philosophical 
figurations
18
 and theories to experiment with a human ontology based on mobility.  In 
this section, I will detail three of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts related to human 
subjectivity: multiplicities, becoming, and bodies without organs.  These concepts 
provide images for how the difference underlying existence serves as an integral part of 
humanity.   
Multiplicities 
In order to explicate how a person might envision herself other than an “I,” 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) create the concept of multiplicities.  As Rajchman 
(2000) notes, “The question of Deleuze’s logic is then what it might mean to think in 
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terms of multiplicities rather than identities or propositions, and so to see ourselves, and 
our brains, as composed of multiplicities” (p. 50).  Instead of conceiving of humans, or 
indeed any organism, as stable, singular entities, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize 
continual interrelationships between disparate facets.  They define multiplicities neither 
by their elements nor by a center of unification, explaining that “heterogeneous terms in 
symbiosis” constitute multiplicities (1980/1987, p. 249).  As Semetsky (2003) 
summarizes, for Deleuze, “individuality is always posited as collective and plural” (p. 
213).  Multiplicities, like the gears of a hand-made watch or the nucleotides of a DNA 
strand, consist of inseparable parts functioning in combination.  Rather than individual 
components or a unified whole, multiplicities are the ongoing interaction between their 
facets.   
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987), multiplicities negate traditional 
divides between individuals and groups.  Building on their ontology of existence based 
on difference rather than similarity, they propose the concept of multiplicities as an 
alternative to a conception that the multiple always exists as a part of a larger totality.  In 
other words, multiplicities emphasize different individual parts functioning in 
combination rather than similar wholes.  Deleuze and Guattari assert that they created the 
concept of multiplicities: 
in order to escape the abstract opposition between the multiple and the one, to 
escape dialectics, to succeed in conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to cease 
treating it as a numerical fragment of a lost Unity or Totality or as the organic 
element of a Unity or Totality yet to come. (p. 32)   
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Rather than envisioning multiplicities as parts of an incomplete whole, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that multiplicities, and their accompanying difference, constitute 
existence. 
Multiplicities, like difference, exist in a constant state of motion.  Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980/1987) explain, “A multiplicity is continually transforming itself into a 
string of other multiplicities” (italics theirs, p. 249).  For example, imagine the individual 
gears of the watch integrating with the gear systems of a drill, cork screw, egg beater, or 
mixer.  While the each gear maintains its uniqueness, it transforms its function as it 
connects with each device.  Rather than stagnant collections, multiplicities continually 
change and connect.   
  What, then, are the implications of understanding existence as constitutive of 
multiplicities?  Rajchman explains that thinking in multiplicities leads us to forfeit an 
understanding of ourselves as “distinct persons or selves” (p. 81).  As noted above, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) challenge humans to no longer think in terms of “I” (p. 
3).  They directly relate this idea to multiplicities, explaining: 
When the individual opens up to the multiplicities pervading him or her, at the 
outcome of the most severe operation of depersonalization, that he or she acquires 
his or her true proper name.  The proper name is the instantaneous apprehension 
of a multiplicity. (p. 37)   
Thinking in multiplicities means dropping understandings of humans as stable, separate, 
and uniform beings in favor of a conception of humans as changeable, interconnected, 
and diverse.  Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of multiplicities emphasizes existence as a 
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diverse set of forces temporarily organizing into functioning units only to develop into 
new combinations. 
Becoming 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) create the concept of becoming to explain a 
second aspect of human ontology.  Like the concept of multiplicities, the concept of 
becoming derives from Deleuze and Guattari’s assertion that difference constitutes 
existence.  Although Deleuze and Guattari write that “becoming and multiplicity are the 
same thing” (p. 249), they tend to use the concept of becoming to foreground time, 
temporality, and process while they use the concept of multiplicities to emphasize spatial 
and qualitative differences.  While the words “multiplicity” and “becoming” could be 
used interchangeably, understanding how Deleuze and Guattari articulate the nuances of 
each provides a more intricate picture of their ontology of existence. 
Like many of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, becoming changes throughout 
their writing.  Deleuzean scholar Todd May (2003) distinguishes between two uses of the 
term “becoming,” the first occurring in Deleuze’s solo writing before his collaborative 
works with Guattari.  For example, Deleuze (1968/1994) writes, “The arcs of the circle 
are distinguished to the extent that the ground establishes moments of stasis within 
qualitative becoming, stoppages in between the two extremes of more and less” (p. 273).  
In other words, the arcs of the circle exist temporarily, forming from the becoming that 
constitutes life.  Such statements assert an existence based on complexity and change 
from which momentary stabilities form.  May (2003) summarizes this initial usage of 
becoming, arguing that it “is a concept by means of which one jettisons traditional 
philosophy’s search for stable identities and allows oneself to see things by means of 
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instability, play, and ceaseless creativity” (p. 148).  In other words, becoming is an 
ongoing, basic process of existence; although humans momentarily form identifiable 
selves from this becoming, instability, change, and diversity comprise existence.   
While May (2003) attributes this description of becoming to Deleuze’s early 
individual works, evidence of it also appears in his later works as well as his works with 
Guattari.  For instance, in Negotiations: 1972-1990, Deleuze (1990/1995) writes, 
“Processes are becomings, and aren’t to be judged by some final result but by the way 
they proceed and their power to continue” (p. 146).  Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987) write, “Becoming produces nothing other than itself” (p. 238), and “A 
becoming is always in the middle; one can only get it by the middle” (p. 293).  In this 
more general definition, Deleuze and Guattari posit becoming as the underlying state of 
the world; all existence is always becoming. 
 May (2003) explains that a second use of the term “becoming” occurs in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s collective works, in which, instead of using becoming as a facet of 
existence, they assert specific types of becomings, such as becoming-woman, becoming-
animal, and becoming-imperceptible (p. 149).  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) argue, 
“There is no becoming-majoritarian; majority is never becoming.  All becoming is 
minoritarian” (p. 106).  While “becoming” more generally refers to a continual process 
undergone by all people, this second use of the term “becoming” denotes specific 
becomings. 
 Exploring Deleuze and Guattari’s definitions of “majorities” and “minorities” will 
further elucidate their collaborative definition of becoming.  Deleuze (1995) writes:  
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The difference between minorities and majorities isn’t their size.  A minority may 
be bigger than a majority.  What defines the majority is a model you have to 
conform to: the average European adult male city-dweller, for example. . . . A 
minority, on the other hand, has no model, it’s a becoming, a process. (p. 173) 
Though women may outnumber men, the idea of “man” still serves as the dominant 
model of humanity, and therefore one can become woman but not man.
19
  Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980/1987) elaborate on these ideas, viewing “majoritarian” as a homogenous 
and constant system and minorities as heterogeneous subsystems (p. 105).   
 What, then, does it mean to become minoritarian?  One becomes minoritarian 
when he or she emphasizes uniqueness, innovation, and creativity in place of the 
majority’s homogeneous practices and thinking.  Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) 
explain that becoming occurs when one turns away from history in order to “create 
something new” (p. 96).  Take, for example, the idea of becoming-animal.  When my 
husband and I reached the end of a scenic bike trail in Anchorage, Alaska, we decided to 
stop and rest for a bit before returning to town.  Upon looking around, we noticed two 
magnificent bald eagles perched almost tangent to each other on a branch protruding far 
above our heads.   
Deleuze and Guattari (1975/1986) explain “the act of becoming is a capturing, a 
possession, a plus-value, but never a reproduction of an imitation” (p. 13).  When 
watching the eagles, I did not try to sit like them or mimic their head and eye movements.  
Instead, I attempted to see the world through their eyes, to perceive the fluctuating water, 
to feel the chill of the flowing sea air, to smell the verdant forest, and to hear the rustling 
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of the moist leaves and underbrush.  As I observed one eagle’s jolting head movements 
and silent interactions with its partner, I could feel its becomings.  As Colebrook (2002) 
summarizes: 
Becoming-animal is not, then, attaining the state of what the animal means (the  
supposed strength or innocence of animals); nor is it becoming what the animal is.  
It is not behaving like an animal.  Becoming-animal is a feel for the animal’s 
movements, perceptions and becomings: imagine seeing the world as if one were 
a dog, a beetle or a mole. (p. 136)   
Over the twenty minutes we lounged in the shadow of those birds, I began to feel the 
world from the point of view of an eagle.   
While becomings do not occur absent one’s surroundings, Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987) emphasize the random and uncontrollable nature of becomings.  They assert 
“becoming is involuntary” (p. 238), and “we can be thrown into a becoming by anything 
at all, by the most unexpected, most insignificant of things” (p. 292).  Similarly, Deleuze 
(1995) writes, “We’ve no sure way of maintaining becomings, or still more of arousing 
them, even within ourselves” (p. 173).  Becomings occur by chance.  While we may open 
ourselves up to becomings or take note of them as they happen, we can never force them 
to occur. 
Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari posit becomings as ongoing processes.  In 
both usages of the term “becoming,” May (2003) asserts that the question “When is a 
becoming?” should take precedence over the question “What is a becoming?” because “to 
think of a becoming as a what threatens to reduce it to the stability of an identity” (italics 
his, p. 147).  My becoming-animal occurred over time and bounded by time; while I will 
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never know how that becoming has since affected my life, my becoming-animal did not 
sustain past those fleeting moments.  Asking “What is a becoming?” attempts to codify 
an ongoing experience that occurs uniquely every time.  Asking “When is becoming” 
accentuates the temporal and variable nature of becoming. 
 In summary, while Deleuze and Guattari equate multiplicities and becoming, 
becoming emphasizes time, process, and change.  Deleuze initially posited becoming as 
the underlying state of existence, the chaos out of which beings momentarily form.  In 
Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative writings, they assert, “All becoming is minoritarian” 
offering specific examples such as becoming-woman or becoming-animal (p. 106).  Both 
uses of the term emphasize an existence based on difference and fluctuation.   
Body without Organs 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) also note the importance of difference and 
processes through their philosophical figuration of a body without organs (BwO). They 
write that the body without organs is “the unformed, unorganized, nonstratified, or 
destratified body and all its flows” (p. 43).  The body without organs is not a body but 
rather the underlying difference that can become a body.  Deleuze and Guattari explain 
that the BwO makes up the body; the body orders the BwO in order to serve its needs (p. 
159).
20
   
Deleuzean scholars have offered further explanations.  For example, Buchanan 
(1997) defines the body without organs as an “inorganic matrix” (p. 73), and Bell (2006) 
writes, “The BwO is the very affirmation of difference” (p. 163).  Likewise, Colebrook 
(2002) explains that the BwO constitutes the “disorganized ‘life’ or ‘ground’ from which 
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different bodies emerge” (p. xxi).  In other words, the body without organs is the 
variability, change, and motion that constitute existence and from which all varieties of 
organization form. 
Perhaps the primordial soup that comprised the earth shortly after its formation 
can serve as a useful metaphor for the body without organs.  At that time, the earth 
consisted of atoms and molecules all chaotically mixing together.  Just as organisms 
organize the body without organs, so did early life occur as a result of ordered 
combinations within the primordial stew.  While disorder constitutes a body without 
organs, stability, organization, and hierarchies compose a body or organism.  According 
to Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987), the fluctuating chaos of the body without organs 
comprises all past, present, and future existence.   
As with Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptions of time, difference, multiplicity, and 
becoming, movement and process rather than identity comprise the BwO.  They write 
that the body without organs “is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a set of 
practices” (1980/1987, pp. 149-50).  Subsequently, they articulate the possible nature of 
these practices, describing the BwO as “connection of desires, conjunction of flows, 
continuum and intensities” (p. 161).  Peters (2004) elaborates that the body without 
organs, “is the play of forces, both mutable and endlessly transformable” (p. 25).  The 
body without organs is not a thing but processes in constant motion.  Organisms form 
from these processes and temporarily organize and limit them.   
 Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that humans can begin becoming 
bodies without organs by thinking differently about their bodies.  They write, “The BwO: 
it is already under way the moment the body has had enough of organs and wants to 
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slough them off, or loses them” (p. 150).  Humans traditionally view organs or body parts 
as serving individual, predetermined functions—the mouth eats, the legs walk, the hands 
grasp, and so forth.  For instance, using Socratic dialogue, Plato (1978) asserts, “Can you 
see, except with the eye? … Hear, except with the ear? …These then may be truly said to 
be the ends of these organs?”  (p. 38).  In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) 
assert that humans attain a BwO when they realize the restraints of perceiving each organ 
as only having the capacity for one action.  They explain that bodies without organs occur 
when people “place elements or materials in a relation that uproots the organ from its 
specificity” (pp. 258-9).  Offering an example, Deleuze and Guattari write: 
Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, 
breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your tongue, 
thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, head and legs?  Why not 
walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with 
your belly. (pp. 150-1)   
The BwO complicates understandings of humans as stable and stagnant beings whose 
organs and bodies serve single purposes.  The images of walking on your head or singing 
with your sinuses prompt alternative thinking about taken-for-granted assumptions not 
only about our bodies but also, and more profoundly, about our way of being in the 
world. 
Although Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) offer the above suggestions for 
moving towards a BwO, they also explain that the body without organs is never 
completely realizable arguing, “You never reach the Body without Organs, you can’t 
reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit” (p. 150).  Buchanan (1997) puts this 
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notion into physical terms, explaining that the BwO lies “beyond the physical limits of 
the physical body” (p. 79).  Given the limits of the human condition, one can never 
completely return to the fluctuating chaos that composes existence.  Yet, the process of 
attempting to become a BwO can alter thinking and action.  Rather than asserting the 
body without organs as an achievable ending goal, Deleuze and Guattari use the notion to 
promote ongoing divergent thinking about bodies and about life, emphasizing the 
difference and process that constitute existence.   
In summary, like the concepts of multiplicities and becoming, the body without 
organs relies on difference and process.  Deleuze and Guattari conceive of the body 
without organs not as a body but as a chaotic process out of which organisms might form.  
The BwO serves as a challenge to predefined functions and static forms of organization, 
including that of bodies.  Though Deleuze and Guattari challenge humans to strive for a 
BwO, they note the impossibility of completely becoming one.  I return to these concepts 
in chapter 4 of this document. 
Proceeding from the Middle 
The words location, space, and place often invoke stagnant images.  Humans may 
envision houses, offices, streets, and parks as relatively uniform and stable.  In contrast, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that location, and indeed all of existence, consists of 
difference rather than homogeneity; spaces constantly change through time.  Goodchild 
(1996) explains that for Deleuze, “Our existential territory, the place where we live, is 
determined by what we relate to, assemble, and function together with” (italics his, p. 
141).  Locations, like humans themselves, exist in a state of connection and motion. 
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As people reside in and interact with various places, they also define themselves 
in terms of those places.  For instance, I might say, “I am going to the grocery store today 
and then I will be at the coffee shop.”  In these statements, the physical boundaries and 
social customs of such places in part define me while I am in them as well as when I 
speak or write about my interactions with and within such places.  You might think 
differently of a person stating, “I am going to the tattoo parlor and then I will be at 
Symphony Hall” than a person talking about being in the grocery store and coffee shop.  
However, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) caution against defining ourselves by stable 
locations, asserting instead that we should perceive places as fluctuating and focus on the 
non-linear process of moving from one space to another.  They state the uselessness of 
questions such as “Where are you going?” “Where are you coming from?” and “What are 
you heading for?” elaborating that such questions imply endpoints as well as “a false 
conception of voyage and movement” (p. 25).  In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari 
challenge us to “proceed from the middle and through the middle, focusing on coming 
and going rather than starting and finishing” (p. 25).21  Deleuze and Guattari entreat us to 
focus on the variability of a single location and our continued movement within and 
between locations. 
I have entitled this section “Proceeding From the Middle” in order to emphasize 
the dynamic nature of locations and people.  In this section, I first detail Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1980/1987) concepts of “striated space” and “smooth space,” explaining how 
they relate to deterritorialization and reterritorialization as well as local and global 
locations.  Subsequently, I articulate Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of nomads and 
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 These statements apply not only to locations but also to a general way of conceiving existence and our 
place in it.  I will indirectly address other applications of these quotations throughout this chapter. 
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maps, noting how they might enable people to think differently about their relationships 
with their environments. 
Striated Space and Smooth Space 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) distinguish between “striated” or sedentary 
places and “smooth” or mobile places.  They argue that walls, enclosures, and roads 
between enclosures bound and divide striated space (p. 381).  Such boundaries restrain 
movement, change, and variation, separating items and ideas into predefined, closed 
locations.  For example, Deleuze and Guattari designate the city as “the striated space par 
excellence” (p. 481); in cities, streets, highways, walls, canals, buildings, and other 
structures work to confine and control motion and difference.  Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987) add that striated space requires constraints, borders, and markings, asserting, 
“it is limited in its parts, which are assigned constant directions, are oriented in relation to 
one another, divisible by boundaries, and can interlink” (p. 382).  An aerial photograph of 
any city reveals boroughs or other divisions, separated by natural or man-made 
boundaries, which inhabitants can use to navigate between sections.  For instance, a New 
Yorker might say, “I’m going over to Manhattan next weekend.”  Deleuze and Guattari 
explain that striated spaces also allow for diversity by separating objects, places, and 
people rather than integrating them in a continuous, varied pattern.  New York City’s 
Chinatown and Little Italy serve as examples of how restraints within a city can mark 
diversity to subsist and flourish in differentiated sections.  The man-made boundaries that 
encourage people of certain backgrounds to live and work in specific locations also 
encourage divergent practices to occur in close proximity.   
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In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) posit that smooth spaces lack 
limitations, foregrounding growth, movement, and multiplicity.  They write that in 
smooth spaces, “the points are subordinated to the trajectory” (p. 478).  In other words, 
smooth space emphasizes the evolving journey rather than the destination.  Deleuze and 
Guattari use the desert, steppe, ice, and sea as philosophical figurations of smooth spaces.  
In contrast to the restrictive boundaries and barriers within striated spaces, smooth spaces 
allow for constant flow, alteration, and diversity.  However, they explain that smooth 
space can occur in any location (including cities), elaborating, “There are not only 
strange voyages in the city but voyages in place” (p. 493).  While certain locations may 
possess characteristics indicative of either striated spaces or smooth spaces, ultimately, 
humans’ evolving interpretations of and interactions with their surroundings create 
continually evolving striated and smooth spaces. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) note that events, affects, and intensities
22
 rather 
than stable properties fill smooth space (p. 479).  For example, the sea teems with events, 
such as waves and water swells, that continually move and change in intensity.  
Elaborating on the unceasing fluctuation and variability of smooth space, Deleuze and 
Guattari relate smooth space to other concepts such as becoming and the body without 
organs.  They argue that “Voyaging smoothly is a becoming” (p. 482) and smooth space 
is “a Body without Organs instead of an organism and organization” (p. 479).  Yet, just 
as a body without organs is a limit that one can never attain, smooth space does not exist 
absent striated space. 
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 Deleuze and Guattari explain that intensities, such as speed, are not composed of addable and 
displaceable magnitudes.  They write, “Speed is not the sum of two smaller speeds.”  Intensities cannot 
divide without changing in nature each time.  They also emphasize the relationship between intensity and 
difference, asserting “intensity is itself a difference” (p. 483). 
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Explaining the interconnectedness of smooth and striated spaces, Deleuze and 
Guattari write that in striated spaces, “what is limiting (limes or wall, and no longer 
boundary) is this aggregate in relation to the smooth spaces it ‘contains,’ whose growth it 
slows or prevents, and which it restricts or places outside” (p. 382).  Striated spaces 
delimit where smooth spaces can exist.  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) demonstrate 
this interconnectedness using the example of the striated spaces marked by agricultural 
grids in contrast with the smooth crop spaces lying within the grids (p. 384).  The grids 
mark boundaries within which the crops must reside.  Yet, within those limits, the 
vegetation can grow freely.    
Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) emphasize the symbiotic 
relationship between smooth and striated spaces.  They assert, “Smooth space is 
constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly 
being reversed, returned to a smooth space” (p. 474).  While Deleuze and Guattari 
insinuate the value of smooth spaces over striated ones, they maintain that their foremost 
interest is the ongoing symbiotic processes and combinations of smoothing and striation.    
 Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) also note the relationship between smooth and 
striated spaces and local and global spaces.  They define striated spaces as “relatively 
global” and smooth spaces as “relatively local,” although they note that such an 
opposition does not hold in all instances (p. 494).  They explain that striated spaces 
generally require long-distance vision, a constancy of orientation, points of reference, and 
a central perspective (p. 494).  Moving away from a space enables the viewer to see the 
boundaries and borders that mark and comprise it.  Returning to the example of a city, a 
person wandering in New York’s Central Park may experience the space as smooth, not 
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realizing the surrounding striated space until he or she approaches an edge of the park.  
Yet, an aerial view of the park would quickly reveal its borders and limits.  
Conversely, viewing smooth spaces up close reveals that their “orientations, 
landmarks, and linkages are in continuous variation” (p. 493).  Deleuze and Guattari posit 
that fractals, in which successive levels of detail retain the same shape, demonstrate the 
local characteristics of smooth space (p. 486).  Figure 3.2 illustrates a view of a fractal, 
called the Mandelbrot Set, at two different levels of detail.
23
  Comparing the picture on 
the left with the closer subset on the right reveals that they both share the same pattern.  
As a viewer moves ever closer, he or she could theoretically continue to observe the 
never-ending, diverse border.  When viewed locally, fractals exhibit the continually 
evolving and differing nature indicative of smooth space. 
 
   
Figure 3.2. Different levels of detail of the Mandelbrot Set. 
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 The term “Mandelbrot Set” refers to a single fractal. 
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Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) offer other assorted examples of, details about, 
and philosophical figurations for smooth and striated space.  For instance, they contrast 
the striated space of sedentary cultivators with the smooth space of nomadic animal 
raisers and the “work” that takes place in striated space with the “free action” occurring 
in smooth spaces.  The repetition of “work” and the bounded lives of farmers exemplify 
the limits and constant orientation of striated space.  In contrast, the wandering herders 
and those engaged in innovative and variable “free action” demonstrate the flow 
indicative of smooth spaces.  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) also note the inverse 
relationship between points and lines in different spaces, stating “in the case of the 
striated, the line is between two points, while in the smooth, the point is between two 
lines” (p. 480).  In other words, in striated space, the directionality and limited path of the 
line takes precedence, while in smooth space, the point possesses the freedom to wander 
between the confining lines (see Figure 3.3).   
 
Figure 3.3. Visualization of lines and points in smooth and striated space. 
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Various games and aspects of music can serve as grounds for either striated or 
smooth spaces.  For instance, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) contrast the striated 
space of chess with the smooth space of Go,
24
 explaining that in chess, “it is a question of 
arranging a closed space for oneself” in order to fight an “institutionalized, regulated, 
coded war, with a front, a rear;” conversely, in Go, “it is a question of arraying oneself in 
open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point” 
(p. 353).  Chess relies on rules that limit the movements of various pieces while Go opens 
the board an almost endless number formations.   
In explicating the role of space in music, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) 
reference Boulez’s belief that striated space occurs when “one counts in order to occupy” 
while smooth space occurs when “one occupies without counting” (p. 477).  In other 
words, musical striated spaces occur through the repetition and standardization of sounds, 
such as the strain of a Sousa march or the repeated drum patterns and chords of a Brittany 
Spears song, while musical smooth spaces happen through sonic variability, perhaps in 
the wanderings John Cage’s works or Charlie Parker’s improvisations.  Striated spaces 
emphasize stagnation and limitations while smooth spaces foreground motion, 
possibility, and difference.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of smooth and striated space directly relate to 
their concepts of territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization.  These 
concepts, like most of Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas, defy specific, limited definitions, 
although various Deleuzean writers have articulated aspects of them.  Lambert (2005) 
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 Go is a two-person game, originating in China, played with black and white stones on a board consisting 
solely of a grid.  A player wins by surrounding the largest total area of the board with his or her stones.  For 
a discussion about this concept in music education, see Gould (2009). 
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and Colebrook (2006) note the relationship between deterritorialization, motion, and the 
possibility for variation and change.  Lambert argues that territorialization, in contrast, 
provides “stability or relative fixity” (p. 38).  Smith and Protevi (2008) assert how these 
concepts relate to practices, associating deterritorialization with the “breaking of habits” 
and reterritorialization with the “formation of habits.”  Offering an alternative 
perspective, Massumi (1992) and May (2005) posit how deterritorialization and 
territorialization relate to human subjectivity; Massumi argues that deterritorialization 
occurs through “an uprooting of the individual” (p. 51), while May states that a 
territorialized line “has a specific territory.  It has been captured and imprisoned in a 
particular identity” (p. 138).  All of these authors associate difference and movement with 
deterritorialization, contrasting it with the stability indicative of territorialization and 
reterritorialization.   
While Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) generally limit their use of the words 
striated and smooth to physical locations, they apply the terms “deterritorialization” and 
“reterritorialization” more broadly, frequently using them in conjunction with objects, 
with systems such as language and capitalism, and with concepts such as becoming and 
body without organs.  For example, Deleuze and Guattari note how the concepts of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization relate to the relationship between a book and 
the world, writing, “The book assures the deterritorialization of the world, but the world 
effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world” 
(p. 11).  The book alters habits and subjectivities within the world, making them 
changing and fluid, while the world in turn makes the book and its content fixed and 
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stable.  Subsequently, the book changes the world, affording different possibilities for 
deterritorialization, and the cycle repeats again and again.   
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that books, as well as “all things,” have 
lines of flight (p. 3), and that reterritorializations “obstruct lines of flight” (p. 510).  In 
other words, lines of flight enable the flows and ongoing change of deterritorialization 
while reterritorialization blocks such movements.  Just as striated space constantly 
becomes smooth space and vice versa, all spaces, objects, concepts, and processes 
continually territorialize, deterritorialize, and reterritorialize.   
Building on the concept of deterritorialization, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) 
assert the role of local spaces in creating change.  They assert, “The earth does not 
become deterritorialized in its global and relative movement, but in specific locations, at 
the spot where the forest recedes, or where the steppe and the desert advance” (pp. 381-
2).  Or, to take a more familiar example, the striated garden becomes deterritorialized 
where the grass overtakes its boundaries.  I further examine the relationships between 
smooth and striated spaces, local and global spaces, and deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization in chapter 5.   
Nomads and Maps 
 So how might humans interact with smooth and striated and local and global 
spaces?  Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of nomads and maps illustrate the variety of 
ways in which people can understand and connect to their environments.  They use the 
philosophical figuration of a nomad to emphasize journeying while their distinction 
between tracings and maps illuminates how humans can view their locations, as well as 
their multiplicities and practices, as evolving combinations of stagnation and fluctuation. 
64 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) concept of the nomad is central to their work, 
adding nuance to many of their concepts.
25
  Given that the nomad possesses a human 
form, this image illuminates Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking about the relationship 
between people and locations.  When Westerners hear the term “nomad,” images of a 
bearded man on a camel wandering through a nondescript and vacant desert may come to 
mind.  While Deleuze and Guattari would likely argue against appropriating such images, 
these stereotypical pictures exemplify two central points of their concept of nomads: 
nomads exist in smooth spaces, such as the desert, and nomads journey constantly.
26
   
First, nomads, like the camel rider, inhabit smooth spaces, remain in them (though 
they are not stationary), make them grow, and are in turn altered by them.  Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980/1987) explain that nomads “add desert to desert, steppe to steppe, by a 
series of local operations whose orientation and direction endlessly vary” (p. 382).  For 
example, imagine a person wandering about a major city.  The individual’s nomadic 
movements would contrast the ordered lines and predictable motion of the people and 
cars following the preset paths indicative of the city’s striated space.  Deleuze and 
Guattari call nomads “vectors of deterritorialization,” meaning that nomads constantly 
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 Most notably, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) utilize the concept of a nomad in relation to at least two 
other substantial concepts that I will not address in this dissertation.  First, Deleuze and Guattari relate 
nomads to the concept of “nomadology,” which they define as the “opposite of history” because history is 
written from a sedentary perspective.  They offer examples of nomadology, including books with multiple 
narratives and those written in unique styles, such as one consisting of a single, uninterrupted sentence (p. 
23).  Second, Deleuze and Guattari relate nomadology to the concept of the “war machine,” which they 
explain exists outside of the “State” apparatus and exterior to its law (p. 352).  Nomads use the war 




 The appropriation of such images is problematic because it reinforces colonialist stereotypes.  For 
example, Gould (2005) writes, “Post-colonial feminists argue that [philosopher Rosi] Braidotti’s 
valorization of nomadism is ethnocentric as it emanates from a position of privilege as a white, academic 
feminist and does not take into account the realities of actual displaced persons, many of whom are non-
white” (p. 156).  Nonetheless, I have chosen to draw on this stereotypical image of a nomad in order to 
assist readers in understanding aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical figuration.   
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embrace the difference beneath striated spaces, helping to make such spaces smooth (p. 
382).  Nomads introduce new practices into striated spaces, turning stability to change.   
Second, nomads emphasize process, motion, and journeying rather than 
destinations.  All journeys occur amid set points; even those wandering the desert still 
move between water and food sources.  Yet, nomads distinguish themselves by 
emphasizing the path between their destinations.  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) 
explain, “A path is always between two points, but the in-between has taken on all the 
consistency and enjoys both an autonomy and a direction of its own.  The life of the 
nomad is the intermezzo” (p. 380).  While nomads journey from one fixed point or 
location to another, they reach those points only to leave them behind.  Nomads do not 
linger in fixed locations but rather constantly move freely through smooth space.  
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) also note the tension between stagnation and 
flux through their philosophical figurations of tracings and maps.  They explain that a 
tracing “is like a photograph or X ray that begins by selecting or isolating, by artificial 
means such as colorations or other restrictive procedures, what it intends to reproduce” 
(p. 13).  For instance, photographs of the Grand Canyon cannot fully capture the vastness 
and luminosity of the environment.  Pictures inevitably limit panoramic views to 
rectangles, diverse colors to pixels, and the depth of human perspective to a flat surface.  
Deleuze and Guattari elaborate that a tracing “has organized, stabilized, and neutralized” 
life’s complexities, and go on to call a tracing “dangerous” because “it injects 
redundancies and propagates them” (p. 13).  Tracings function as limiting, stagnant 
representations in a world full of diversity and movement. 
66 
In contrast, the person perceiving the panoramic view, when standing at the rim or 
walking the trail, creates a developing map, one under construction with each moment.  
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that a map must be continually produced and 
constructed, it is “detachable, connectable, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and 
exits” (p. 21).  In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, the documents we traditionally call 
“maps” are actually tracings that relegate complexity to lines and redundant symbols.  In 
contrast, Deleuze and Guattari envision a map as a developing document that exists in 
relation to the world.   
Kamberelis (2012) explains that for Deleuze and Guattari, maps produce 
organizations of contemporary reality rather than reproducing prior theorizations of 
reality.  Like early cartographers who mapped unfamiliar places, humans create maps 
through their interactions with their environments.  Thinking of ourselves as nomads who 
continually map our surroundings offers new possibilities for connecting to our multiple 
locations. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) concepts of striated space and smooth space 
offer nuanced understandings about location, as well as objects, multiplicities, and 
practices, as stationary and mobile.  Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the importance of 
acknowledging both smooth space and perceiving the interaction between striated and 
smooth spaces.  They create the concepts of nomads and maps to illuminate alternative 
ways for thinking about and interacting with one’s environment.  I return to Deleuze and 




The Art of Composing Sensations 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of art, like their writings about human 
subjectivity and location, emphasizes the importance of time and difference.  They write 
at length about art throughout various sections of multiple writings.  Deleuze and Guattari 
(1991/1994) posit the relationship between difference, sensation, and composition, 
summarizing, “Art is not chaos but a composition of chaos that yields the vision or 
sensation, so that it constitutes, as Joyce says, a chaosmos, a composed chaos—neither 
foreseen nor preconceived” (p. 204).  In this section, I detail the role of sensation and 
composition in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of art as well as problematize their 
Eurocentric conception of art. 
Sensation 
While difference occupies a prominent position in much of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s writing, they rarely discuss sensation except when referring to artistic 
processes.  According to Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994), sensation distinguishes 
artistic endeavors and experiences from other modes of thinking and being in the world.  
They explain that philosophy extracts concepts, science extracts prospects, “propositions 
that must not be confused with judgments,” and art extracts percepts and affects, “which 
must not be confused with perceptions or feelings” (p. 24).  Deleuze and Guattari 
articulate the relationship between percepts, affects, and sensations, writing: 
The aim of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of 
a perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affection as the transition from one 
state to another: to extract a bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensations. (p. 
167)   
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In contrast with philosophy and science, Deleuze and Guattari posit art as a process 
specifically linked to the production and propagation of sensation.   
Sensation serves a dual function: the tool that artists use to create and the product 
of their creation.  Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) assert, “We paint, sculpt, compose, 
and write with sensations.  We paint, sculpt, compose, and write sensations” (p. 166).  
They envision sensations not as a stagnant result of a symbolic interaction but as forces 
that circulate in the world.  Artists create evolving sensations from the world’s diversity.  
Deleuze (1981/2003) writes, “To render Time sensible in itself is a task common to the 
painter, the musician, and sometimes the writer” (p. 54).  Since difference constitutes 
time, artists rely on difference for their production of sensations.  Deleuze and Guattari 
(1991/1994) write, “Art struggles with chaos but it does so in order to render it sensory” 
(p. 205).  Art is the process of creating sensations through embracing the difference 
underlying existence.   
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994), sensations themselves actively 
propagate through artworks apart from creator and perceiver.  They explain: 
Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and 
exceeds any lived.  They could be said to exist in the absence of man [sic] 
because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a 
compound of percepts and affects.  The work of art is a being of sensation and 
nothing else: it exists in itself. (p. 164)   
For example, Michelangelo’s David, Picasso’s Guernica, or Duchamp’s Fountain exist 
as sensations that have survived decades or centuries, taking on lives of their own apart 
from their creators.   
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Such descriptions of sensation are problematic, however, because they emphasize 
art as stable entities composed of sensations rather than active processes.  Yet, Deleuze 
and Guattari (1991/1994) also note the role of sensation in artistic processes such as 
listening to music.  They state: 
Even if the material lasts for only a few seconds it will give sensation the power 
to exist and be preserved in itself in the eternity that coexists with this short 
duration.  So long as the material lasts, the sensation enjoys an eternity in those 
very moments. (italics theirs, pp. 166-7)   
Since, for Deleuze, time exists as a cone that actualizes the past in each passing present 
moment, each artistic experience affects one’s future.  Viewers experience sensations in 
light of their individual pasts, present, and future circumstances, and those sensations 
survive as they actualize again and again.   
In addition to affecting the totality of one’s future, engaging with sensations 
during endeavors with the arts can cause profound momentary transformations.  Deleuze 
(1981/2003) asserts: 
At one and the same time I become in the sensation and something happens 
through the sensation, one through the other, one in the other. . . . As a spectator, I 
experience the sensation only by entering the painting, by reaching the unity of 
the sensing and the sensed. (p. 31)   
Such descriptions draw attention to both the transformative power of engaging with and 
in art and the idea that artistic experiences change over time.   
For Deleuze and Guattari, sensations constitute a central role in artistic 
engagements, distinguishing them from other endeavors.  Artists engage with existence’s 
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underlying difference, making it sensory.  While Deleuze and Guattari often use 
examples of stagnant artworks, they also explain the sensations arising through active 
musical and artistic practices and posit that artistic experiences occur in and through time.   
Composition 
In addition to sensation, Deleuze and Guattari frequently discuss composition in 
their writings about art.  They assert plainly, “Composition is the sole definition of art” 
(1991/1994, p. 191).  Deleuze and Guattari explain how artists use difference to create 
artistic experiences.   
 In order to create new art, artists must begin by acknowledging the effect of the 
current artistic paradigm and their prior experiences, subsequently seeking out the 
difference that constitutes existence.  Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) state: 
The painter does not paint on the empty canvas, and neither does the writer write 
on a blank page; but the page or canvas is already so covered with preexisting, 
preestablished clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, even to 
shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos that brings us the vision. (p. 
204)   
Artists begin their composition processes by acknowledging, challenging, undoing, and 
moving beyond their prior experiences and existing artistic frameworks. 
Deleuze (1995) elaborates that art challenges the world as it currently exists.  He 
argues, “You write with a view to an unborn people that doesn’t yet have a language.  
Creating isn’t communicating but resisting” (p. 143).  Similarly, Colebrook (2002) 
summarizes that for Deleuze, “The purpose or force of art and philosophy goes beyond 
what life is to what it might become” (p. 14).  Although each present moment also 
71 
consists of past and future, Deleuze encourages artists compose with an eye towards 
future possibilities rather than past conventions.   
 Building on the importance of innovation, Deleuze and Guattari write at length 
about musical composition.  They assert, “Music is a creative, active operation” 
(1980/1987, p. 300), summarizing that musicians aim to “extract new harmonies” 
(1991/1994, p. 176).  They explain that musicians should leave the comfort of preset 
musical conventions, disorganizing them to invent new orderings.  Equating musical 
form to a house from which composers must leave and then reenter, Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987) write that in order to compose music “We distance ourselves from the house, 
even if this is in order to return, since no one will recognize us any more when we come 
back” (p. 339).  Unique composition, rather than structured recreation, takes on primary 
importance.   
Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) praise composers who think 
beyond separate forms to “a continuous development of form” and “a continuous 
variation of matter” (p. 411).  Rather than replacing one stagnant form with another, they 
challenge musicians to unceasingly strive to compose differently.  For example, they 
state, “Ravel and Debussy retain just enough form to shatter it, affect it, modify it through 
speeds and slownesss” (1980/1987, pp. 270-1).  Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987) praise the work of composers such as John Cage for “freeing” time and 
affirming “a process against all structure” (p. 267).  Continual difference rather than 
replication underlies Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of art.   
 Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about musical composition, however, are 
problematic for four reasons.  First, their examples almost exclusively draw on Western 
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classical music.  While they include contemporary composers of their time such as 
Boulez, Messiaen, and Varèse, they rarely mention popular music or non-Western music.  
Second, Deleuze and Guattari consistently describe compositions as finished, 
unchangeable documents rather than as guidelines or suggestions.  They also do not 
acknowledge that music can transfer from person to person aurally, without notation.  
Third, Deleuze and Guattari rarely note the role of performance in musical experiences 
and never explain that performances can deviate from written scores.  Lastly, while they 
argue that musicians need to “deframe,” find openings, and compose (1991/1994, p. 190), 
they neglect other aspects of musicians’ lives, such as their relationships with scores, 
audiences, and communities.   
Sensation and composition serve as essential components of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy of art.  They assert that artists use sensation to create art and that 
their artistic products consist of sensations.  Arguing that art involves composition, 
particularly unique composition, Deleuze and Guattari praise composers who use musical 
forms in innovative ways or who break with forms completely.   However, they rely 
almost exclusively on examples of Western classical music and they neglect other aspects 
of musical practices and experiences.  I elaborate on and depart from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy of art, integrating it with those of numerous other writers, in 
chapter 6. 
How Does Education Work for You? 
 
 While education plays a relatively minor role in Deleuze and Guattari’s overall 
philosophy, they do reference it briefly in multiple works.  In these writings, Deleuze and 
Guattari again emphasize the importance of temporal processes and difference by noting 
73 
education’s evolving role in the world and by mourning the standardization of education.  
I begin this section by explaining how Deleuze and Guattari articulate the relationship 
between society and education.  Subsequently, I describe their writings about the practice 
of teaching, noting the possibilities of educative experiences unique to each individual. 
With the World 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) writings about education emphasize the 
relationship between lived experience and learning.  They explain that instead of asking 
what a book means: 
We will ask what it functions with, in what connection with what other things it 
does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are 
inserted and metamorphosed, and with what bodies without organs it makes its 
own coverage. (p. 4)   
For Deleuze and Guattari, significations and interpretations hold little value; educative 
materials and experiences have meaning only to the extent that they relate to other objects 
and ideas and enable growth and change.   
 The developments resulting from interactions with books and other educative 
materials and experiences occur not in isolation but in conjunction with outside 
relationships.  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) assert, “The book is not an image of the 
world.  It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of the book and 
the world” (p. 11).  Education happens within and through interconnected environments 
and social organizations, and one cannot separate learning from life.  When humans 
engage in education, they come to see existence differently.  The world in turn impacts 
the information and practices they have learned, creating an ongoing cycle. 
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 While Deleuze and Guattari assert the importance of the relationship between 
schools and society, they sharply criticize education as a means of workplace training and 
standardization.  For example, Deleuze (1990/1995) writes, “One can envisage education 
becoming less and less a closed site differentiated from the workspace as another closed 
site, but both disappearing and giving way to frightful continual training, to continual 
monitoring of worker-schoolkids or bureaucrat-students” (p. 175).  Given Deleuze and 
Guattari’s emphasis on difference and motion throughout their philosophical writings, it 
follows that they would assert a philosophy of education based on change rather than 
replication of norms.   
Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) mourn teachers’ role in transmitting 
the preexistent systems and signs.  They write: 
When the schoolmistress instructs her students on a rule of grammar or 
arithmetic, she is not informing them, any more than she is informing herself 
when she questions a student.  She does not so much instruct as “insign,” give 
orders or commands. . . . The compulsory education machine does not 
communicate information; it imposes upon the child semiotic coordinates 
possessing all of the dual foundations of grammar. (p. 75)   
It follows that any form of mandated education will always in part impose signs and 
forms of organization on students.   
Deleuze (1990/1995) also criticizes the application of business principles to 
education, particularly the influx of evaluation systems in schools.  He laments “forms of 
continuous assessment, the impact of continuing education on schools, and the related 
move away from any research in universities, ‘business’ being brought into education at 
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every level” (p. 182).  Through such critiques, Deleuze insinuates that educators might 
focus on challenging and changing society rather than propagating the existing social 
order.  While Deleuze asserts the inseparability of education and society, he rejects the 
idea that education serves merely as training for employment.   
Do With Me 
Teachers, like education in general, play a relatively minor role in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s writings.  One of Deleuze’s earliest works, Difference and Repetition 
(1968/1994), includes a short but poignant story about a swimming lesson that offers 
nuanced understandings about the practice of teaching.  In one of his later works, 
Negotiations: 1972-1990 (1990/1995), Deleuze briefly reflects on his own teaching, 
noting how he promoted difference rather than standardization.  These two references 
reveal aspects of Deleuze’s thinking about how teachers might facilitate educative 
experiences.   
In one of his longest passages on education, Deleuze (1968/1994) makes a very 
subtle distinction about teachers’ place in education. He writes: 
The movement of the swimmer does not resemble that of the wave, in particular, 
the movements of the swimming instructor which we reproduce on the sand bear 
no relation to the movements of the wave, which we learn to deal with only by 
grasping the former in practice as signs.
27
  That is why it is so difficult to say how 
someone learns: there is an innate or acquired practical familiarity with signs, 
which means that there is something amorous—but also something fatal—about 
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 Deleuze (1968/1994) defines a sign as “what flashes across the intervals when communication takes 
place between disparates” (p. 20).    
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all education.  We learn nothing from those who say: ‘Do as I do’.  Our only true 
teachers are those who tell us to ‘do with me’. (p. 23)   
This passage highlights two aspects of educative experiences.  First, it addresses the 
importance of teaching and learning with respect to specific environments and contexts.  
One does not learn to swim by reading a book in a classroom; one learns to swim by 
moving his or her body while standing near and being in the waves.  As noted above, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) emphasize learning in connection with the world.  
While teachers in traditional settings will always face the limitations of given spaces and 
materials, they might contemplate how their endeavors relate to life outside of the 
classroom and alter their practices accordingly.     
Second, the passage posits a distinction between teachers as models and teachers 
as fellow students of learning.  For example, in the past few months, I have attended 
classes with four different yoga teachers, one of whom stands out to me as a superior 
teacher.  At the end of a recent class, this teacher said, “Thank you for practicing with 
me.”  Recalling Deleuze’s distinction between “do as I do” and “do with me,” I reflected 
on why I enjoyed this teacher’s classes more than those of other teachers.  I concluded 
that the other teachers spent more class time modeling and were less engaged with their 
own experiences while leading the group.  This exemplary teacher did relatively little 
modeling, instead focusing on her own practice; she actively participated with us as a 
fellow student rather than as a disengaged leader.  Deleuze (1995) encourages educators 
to teach content that they themselves are investigating rather than information that they 
already know (p. 139).  Although the yoga teacher did not necessarily learn the poses 
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alongside us, she intensely explored her own movements as she taught, drawing her own 
and her students’ attention to aspects of their flowing bodies. 
 While Deleuze (1968/1994) asserts the value of teachers engaging in educative 
experiences alongside their students, he emphasizes that students should not replicate 
their teachers.  Instead, he asserts that teachers might contemplate how they can enable 
students to think differently rather than recreate prior thought processes and actions, 
writing, “True teachers . . . emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than 
propose gestures for us to reproduce” (p. 23).  Teachers can embrace the idea that 
students will approach, experience, and change in unique ways as a result of their 
educative endeavors.  Deleuze (1990/1995) explains that when interacting with a book, 
“The only question is ‘Does it work, and how does it work?’ How does it work for you? 
If it doesn’t work, if nothing comes through, you try another book” (p. 8).  He 
emphasizes the function of a book for a developing individual rather than some 
predetermined or collective end. 
  Recalling his own university teaching, Deleuze (1990/1995) posits learning as an 
individual process, meaningful to each student in connection with his or her past, present, 
and future experiences.  Writing about students who took his courses, he explains, 
“nobody took in everything, but everyone took what they needed or wanted, what they 
could use” (p. 139).  Rather than seeking uniformity, Deleuze wanted each student to 
engage with his class in a unique way, taking what he or she could integrate with prior 
practices and understandings as well as with future interactions with the world.  
 In his own writing and those with Guattari, Deleuze asserts the relationship 
between education and society, explaining how educative materials and experiences 
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affect the world and vice versa.  Yet, Deleuze (1990/1995) critiques education aimed at 
the development of workforces and propagation of the status quo.  Teachers, according to 
Deleuze (1968/1994), have the responsibility to engage in educative experiences with 
their students while allowing each individual to develop uniquely as a result of his or her 
educative endeavors.  In chapter 7, I draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of 
education, synthesizing it with the work of other authors.  
How Might We Live? 
As explicated in chapter 2, philosophers ultimately aim to explore and question 
humans’ practices.  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) are no exception.  For instance, 
they question how books might interface with the world by connecting with everything 
from multiplicities to bodies without organs (p. 4).  Throughout their writing, Deleuze 
and Guattari posit ideas in connection with other concepts and with experiences.  In 
doing so, they approach the relationship between life and philosophy in ways that break 
with longstanding philosophical traditions.   
May (2005) explains that while Western philosophers such as Nietzsche, Sartre, 
Foucault, and Derrida have “shown the constrictions that arise when the question of how 
one might live must answer to ontology,” Deleuze instead focuses on creating “an 
ontology that answers the question of how one might live” (p. 17).  Goodchild (1996) 
echoes this idea, adding that Deleuze’s philosophy emphasizes the inseparability of 
cognition and worldly experiences.  He states, “Deleuze replaces the ‘will to truth’ of 
metaphysical philosophers, which effectively prevents thought from reaching the truth 
through an encounter with the real forces that act upon thought, with a ‘will to life’” (p. 
34).  Deleuze and Guattari create a philosophy that, rather than delimiting the boundaries 
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of thought, action, and being, encourages people to think, act, and interact in unique 
ways.  May (2005) summarizes that for Deleuze, the question of how we might live 
becomes “‘What connections might we form?’ Or, ‘What actualizations can we 
experiment with?’” (p. 133).   
Given that connections and actualizations
28
 can only occur within specific 
locations and situations, Deleuze and Guattari encourage people to take note of and 
engage with their current environments.  Using the rhizome as a philosophical figuration, 
they detail how humans can form multifaceted, non-hierarchical, constantly changing 
connections.  In this section, I elaborate on Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about the link 
between experimentation and life as well as explain how they use the image of a rhizome 
to promote lives of connections. 
Experiments with the Real  
 Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) explain that philosophers create concepts in 
relation to the lived experiences of people in a given location.  They write, “Philosophy 
finds a way of reterritorializing itself in the modern world in conformity with the spirit of 
a people and its conception of right” (p. 104).  Once people accept that beliefs about 
“right” and “wrong” are not transcendental, they can begin constructing their own 
philosophies, philosophical concepts, and experiments based on their experiences within 
the world.  As Deleuze (1990/1995) explains, “The notions of relevance, necessity, the 
point of something, are a thousand times more significant than the notion of truth” (p. 
130).  Rather than directing thinking and experimentation toward some eternal “truth,” 
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 The authors of the Oxford English Dictionary define “actualization” as “The action of making real or 
actual; realization in action or fact.” 
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addressing the question “How might we live?” involves engaging with and perhaps 
improving contemporary situations.   
 Deleuzean writers such as May (2005) and Goodchild (1996) have elaborated on 
the importance of philosophizing with an awareness of the world, seeking multiple paths, 
and possessing a desire for transformation.  May asserts that real-world dilemmas allow 
people to open up “fields of discussion, in which there are many possible solutions, each 
of which captures something, but not everything, put before us by the problem” (p. 83).  
Engaging with problems does not mean finding simple solutions to complex situations 
but rather undertaking sustained, reflective experimentation.   
Additionally, by embracing continual difference, philosophers can strive to 
continually alter the world rather than produce new forms of stability.  Goodchild (1996) 
explains that for Deleuze, philosophy lacks value if “it connects thought to a life of 
everyday banality or some new representative of transcendence,” instead arguing for a 
creative and revolutionary philosophy that transforms life (p. 16).  Philosophy takes place 
within the context of one’s lived experiences and with an eye towards engaging with the 
world. 
 According to Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994), philosophical concepts should 
address pertinent problems.  They write, “A concept lacks meaning to the extent that it is 
not connected to other concepts and is not linked to a problem that it resolves or helps to 
resolve” (p. 79).29  Addressing problems, however, does not mean simply recreating past 
solutions and thought processes.  Instead, Deleuze and Guattari assert the need for 
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 The term “resolve” is problematic because it connotes stability and certainty, which are antithetical to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on motion and difference.  I suggest that “resolve” be interpreted not as a 
final resting point but as a part of an ongoing process.  
81 
experimentation in the world.  They write, “There is no creation without experiment” 
(1991/1994, p. 127) and “Make consciousness an experimentation in life” (1980/1987, p. 
134).  Deleuze and Guattari urge readers to consider ongoing experimentation through 
their interactions with others and their environments.   
Rhizomes 
Experimenting includes the formation of diverse, evolving connections.  Part of 
exploring the question “How might we live?” includes experimenting with relationships 
and interrelationships.  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) use the concept of rhizomes as 
a philosophical figuration for understanding the endless possibilities of human 
interactions, explorations, and connections.  They directly link this concept with 
experimentation, writing, “But you don’t know what you can make a rhizome with, you 
don’t know which subterranean stem is effectively going to make a rhizome, or enter a 
becoming, people your desert.  So experiment.” (p. 251).  Humans form connections by 
experimenting with the world around them. 
Botanical rhizomes, such as ginger (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5), grow differently 
than other plants.  As depicted in the piece of ginger in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, rhizomes 
have no distinct hierarchy.  They burgeon horizontally, allowing growth in multiple 
directions as well as the constant formation of or connections from and with any of their 
segments.  Such an image illustrates three main aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception of a rhizome: rhizomes grow horizontally rather than vertically; rhizomes 
form diverse connections; and rhizomes foreground process and movement rather than 
stagnation.  A detailed examination of each of these characteristics will elucidate ways in 
which rhizomes might relate to Deleuze and Guattari’s vision of how we might live.   
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First, the horizontal growth of rhizomes contrasts hierarchies of all forms.  
Deleuze and Guattari directly distinguish rhizomes from the hierarchy inherent in trees; 
trees grow vertically, with their roots, trunk, and leaves existing in a given order, serving 
specific functions, and limited in the type and directions of their off-shoots.  May (2005) 
explains that, unlike a tree, the rhizome seeks neither a particular shape nor territory of 
residence; rhizomes develop freely, shooting off in new directions and growing into new 
places (p. 133).  As illustrated by the differences between Figures 3.4 and 3.5, rhizomes 
burgeon at varying points.   
    
Figure 3.4. Fresh ginger root.  Figure 3.5. Same ginger root after three  
months.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) assert that the tree metaphor has dominated 
Western thinking, influencing members of scientific fields, such as botany and biology, 
as well as writers of topics ranging from theology to philosophy (p. 18).  The hierarchies 
and systems of organization within these disparate fields mimic the structural patterns of 
trees.  In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari posit a world in which the tree metaphor is no 
longer primary, one in which difference constitutes existence.  Abandoning various 
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hierarchies and stagnant forms of organization enables growth in multiple, continually 
diversifying directions, emphasizing complexity and variability over simplicity and 
reproducibility.   
Second, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) emphasize that rhizomes form diverse 
connections.  They summarize, “Unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any 
point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same 
nature” (p. 21).  While a tree’s vertical orientation generally limits its roots from touching 
its leaves, any segment of a rhizome can connect to any other segment.  As Figures 3.4 
and 3.5 illustrate, the offshoots of a rhizome can connect to divergent parts of itself.  
Additionally, May (2005) explains that rhizomatic plants can connect to everything from 
trees, other plants, and the ground to fences and themselves (p. 134).  While the 
organization of a tree limits its ability to form connections, rhizomes can form endless 
networks.   
Using the philosophical figuration of the rhizome to contemplate connections 
between ideas, actions, and disciplines, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) state, “A 
rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of 
power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles” (p. 7).  
Thinking rhizomatically involves forming constant connections between diverse 
concepts, practices, and thought processes as well as breaking down boundaries that have 
traditionally divided everything from institutions to academic disciplines to artistic 
practices from each other and from the world.   
 Lastly, rhizomes exist in a constant state of growth and motion.  The dynamic and 
continually varying nature of rhizomes exemplifies Deleuze and Guattari’s notions about 
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time and difference constituting existence.  May (2005) explains that the rhizome is 
“always in process” (p. 133), while Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) note that the 
rhizome “has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it 
grows and which it overspills” (p. 21).  As illustrated in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, rhizomes 
continually spread in divergent directions, emphasizing processes rather than endpoints. 
Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction between trees’ resistance to motion and 
rhizomes’ predilection for it.  They assert, “The tree imposes the verb ‘to be,’ but the 
fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, ‘and . . . and . . . and . . .’” (p. 25).  Viewing the 
world through the metaphor of a tree accentuates stability and singularity while 
perceiving existence as the philosophical figuration of a rhizome emphasizes growth and 
diversity.   
These contrasting viewpoints lead to drastically different ways of thinking about 
and acting in and with the world.  For instance, addressing the question “How might we 
live?” through arboreal thinking might lead to statements such as “People need to be 
industrious,” “People need to be temperate,” and “People need to be democratic.”  Such 
normative statements call for static and predetermined actions rather than continually 
changing ones.  In contrast, exploring “How might we live?” through rhizomatic thinking 
might lead to statements such as “People might experiment with diverse connections 
along evolving paths of their individual choosing.” 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) concept of the rhizome relates to many of 
their aforementioned ideas regarding subjectivity.  As noted above, Deleuze and Guattari 
use the concepts of multiplicities, becoming, and bodies without organs to posit aspects 
of existence, including human subjectivity.  They assert the rhizomatic nature of 
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multiplicities and becoming, explaining that multiplicities, becoming, and rhizomes all 
resist hierarchies, instead emphasizing motion, change, and variability.  Likewise, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) assert that rhizomes remove blockages on bodies 
without organs and that becoming a body without organs means “opening the body to 
connections” (p. 160).  Thinking and acting rhizomatically involves questioning prior 
conceptions of human ontology and a willingness to experiment with diverse, changing 
ideas and practices. 
 In their writings about location, Deleuze and Guattari equate the rhizome with 
smooth space, explaining that rhizomatic vegetation thrives in the smooth spaces such as 
the desert (p. 382).  In contrast to the rows of trees and buildings that mark striated space, 
smooth spaces such as the sea and steppe emphasize horizontal growth, movement, and 
continual connections.  Like rhizomes, the nomads who inhabit smooth space live 
dynamic lives; as May (2005) explains, nomads “seek not to discover but to connect” (p. 
150).  Additionally, rhizomes, such as ginger, deterritorialize their local environments by 
forming diverse connections to their surroundings.  Deleuze and Guattari explain that 
lines of deterritorialization define rhizomes, stating that rhizomes are “made only of lines, 
with lines of deterritorialization as the maximum dimension” (p. 21).  Rhizomes relate to, 
resemble, and constitute constantly changing places.  
 Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) also reference the rhizome in their writings 
about music.  They posit the rhizomatic nature of music, stating, “By placing all its 
components in continuous variation, music itself becomes a superlinear system, a 
rhizome instead of a tree” (p. 95).  Music’s temporal nature resembles a rhizome’s 
constant growth.  Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) compare musical form 
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to a rhizome because composers can alter or expand upon preexisting forms in novel 
ways or rupture them completely (pp. 11-12).
30
  Thinking rhizomatically about musical 
experiences means seeking out innovation and variation.   
While Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) directly link the arts to their 
philosophical figuration of a rhizome, they only reference the rhizome obliquely in their 
writings on education, asserting that a book “forms a rhizome with the world” (p. 11).  
Similarly, although Deleuze (1968/1994; 1990/1995) does not refer to the rhizome in his 
solo writings about education, he posits the value of teaching and learning interfacing 
with the world as well as the benefits of each individual having unique educative 
experiences.  Such notions relate to the diverse, horizontal connections emphasized by 
the philosophical figuration of a rhizome.   
In summary, Deleuze and Guattari use the image of a rhizome as means of 
encouraging humans to embrace non-hierarchical ways of thinking and being that 
foreground variegated, dynamic connections to people, places, and ideas.  The rhizome is 
synonymous or shares similarities with the concepts of multiplicity, becoming, bodies 
without organs, smooth spaces, nomads, artistic composition, and education.  Deleuze 
and Guattari assert that rather than aiming for transcendence, humans might live through 
constant experiments and connections situated in lived experiences.  I return to the 
philosophical figuration of a rhizome throughout this document as well as reexamine the 
question “How might we live?” in chapter 8. 
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 Again, Deleuze and Guattari almost exclusively use examples from Western classical music. 
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Summary 
 In this chapter, I began by articulating how the notions of time and difference 
interface with Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical writings.  Expanding on these ideas, I 
described and explained some of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts related to human 
subjectivity, location, the arts, education, and the aims of life.  The following chapters 
draw on these concepts, problematizing them and connecting them with the work of other 
writers.  In chapter 4, I assert a human ontology that expands on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
ideas about multiplicities, becoming, and bodies without organs.  In chapter 5, I 
synthesize Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of smooth and striated spaces, nomads, and 
maps with the work of contemporary place philosophers and other authors.  In chapters 6 
and 7, time and difference as well as the ontologies posited in chapters 4 and 5 hold 
pivotal places in my explorations of the questions “When is music?” and “When is 
education?”  In chapter 8, I return to Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about context-
specific experimentation and rhizomes to posit a philosophy of music education based on 
complicating, considering, and connecting.   
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Chapter 4 
WHEN AND WHO ARE WE? 
It was the summer before my senior year of high school, and I had just finished 
playing the exposition from the first movement of the Mozart Oboe Concerto in C major, 
K. 314 when a prominent professional oboist placed his hand firmly on the top of my 
head and told me to play a C major scale, explaining that I moved too much while 
performing.  Having spent many years doing ballet and other forms of dance, my body 
resisted the pressure of his hand while my mind focused on the notes of the scale, the 
movement of my fingers, the speed of my air, and the shape of my embouchure.  My 
emotions ranged from embarrassment at having to perform such a simple exercise in 
front of my peers to joy and excitement from being in the presence of a master musician.  
Throughout the ordeal, I found myself striving—to play the scale as elegantly as possible, 
to please my teacher and impress my peers, to express beauty.  In addition to my 
location,
31
 my cognition, embodiment, emotions, past and present social circumstances, 
and strivings inevitably influenced the totality of the meaning that I derived from those 
fleeting moments.   
As the above narrative illustrates, cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and 
striving function as an integrated whole during musicking.
32
  In contrast, contemporary 
music education discourse typically treats these five qualities of being as separate, at 
times asserting the need for increased attention to one or more of them but ultimately 
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 In chapter 5, I explore the role of place in human experiences. 
 
32
 Small (1988) uses the term “musicking” to refer to the combination of all human musical endeavors 
including composing, performing, rehearsing, practicing, and listening.  Small uses the term “musickers” to 
refer to people who engage in musicking. 
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neglecting the notion that each exists only in relation to and inseparable from the others.  
Such rhetoric propagates an ontology of humans, and therefore musickers, based on 
discrete rather than integrated qualities.  Instead, I posit a human ontology comprised of 
the interconnectedness of cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving.   
In chapter 3, I detailed how Deleuze and Guattari provide an innovative ontology 
of being, one that emphasizes difference and process through concepts such as 
multiplicities, becoming, and bodies without organs.  Consistent with the bricolage 
process of this inquiry, in this chapter, the questions “When are we?” and “Who are we?” 
serve as the point of entry text (POET) through which I loop Deleuze and Guattari’s 
writings as well as those of contemporary researchers, philosophers, and other writers to 
provide a nuanced understanding of human ontology.  Figure 4.1 includes a replica of my 
original bricolage map (Figure 2.3) with the addition arrows showing the relationships 
between ideas in chapters 3 and 4 of this document.  I begin by using Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of multiplicities to argue that humans exist as integrated cognitive, 
embodied, emotional, and social beings.  Second, I use Deleuze and Guattari’s evolving 
concept of becoming to posit a fifth inseparable aspect, which I call striving, of this 
ontology of being.  Last, I invoke Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical figuration of a 
body without organs to trouble and complicate my proposed human ontology. 
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Figure 4.1.  Bricolage mapping of chapter 4. 
91 
Deleuze and Guattari would likely find fault with attempts to codify humans’ 
nature of being; as May (2005) explains, Deleuze urges us to “consider the possibility 
that the world (or, since the concept of the world is too narrow, things or being of what 
there is) outruns any categories we might seek to use to capture it” (p. 81).  Delineating 
categories of human ontology inevitably minimizes the centrality of difference.  
However, failing to articulate any aspect of human ontology leaves existing ontologies 
unchallenged.  Nealon and Giroux (2003) observe: 
If we avoid encountering the reflexive or critical questions of “theory”—if we 
avoid asking “where do opinions come from?”—then we risk a situation in which 
“Each day seems like a natural fact”: Everything seems self-evident; everything is 
the way it’s always been, the way it’s supposed to be. (p. 5)   
Unarticulated beliefs about ontology are still existent beliefs about ontology; neglecting 
to elucidate the paradigms in which we work means defaulting to an unacknowledged 
and unquestioned conception of reality.  While codifying facets of human ontology is 
both limiting and contrary to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, such action challenges 
the current ontological paradigm.   
I have entitled this chapter “When and Who Are We?” to acknowledge my dual 
purpose of foregrounding Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of time and difference while 
simultaneously challenging often unstated assumptions about human nature and practices.  
I place the word “when” first in order to emphasize the importance of process and 
variability over definable identities.  I follow it with the word “who” in hopes that an 
articulation of human ontology might encourage practical alternative conceptions of 
human nature that may lead to changes in thinking and practice.  Examining the questions 
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of “When are we?” and “Who are we?” simultaneously allows for an ontology based on 
concreteness and ambiguity, similarity and difference, and stability and motion.  In the 
spirit of Deleuze and Guattari, I posit the following ontology as a beginning, or in their 
language a midpoint, which I encourage readers to constantly challenge, alter, and adapt.     
Multiplicities 
 In Chapter 3, I explained that Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) replace the idea 
of a singular human identity with multiplicities, using the concept to emphasize 
difference and process.  They assert that multiplicities are reducible neither to their parts 
nor to their whole, existing instead as continually evolving symbiotic interactions 
between their facets.  Although Deleuze and Guattari leave the substance of human 
multiplicities open to ongoing interpretation, Semetsky (2006) directly relates their ideas 
to the interconnected, rather than dualistic, nature of cognition and sensation, writing 
“Deleuze is adamant that if relations are irreducible to their terms, then the whole 
dualistic split between the sensible and the intelligible, between thought and experience, 
between ideas and sensations becomes invalid” (p. 4).  In other words, the sensible and 
the intelligible are not separate but interconnected, continually fluctuating flows.  In this 
section, I add to Semetsky’s statement, positing an ontology based on humans as 
inseparably cognitive, embodied, emotional, and social beings.  I will address a fifth 
integrated quality, which I call “striving,” in the following section. 
Examining the writings of music philosophers as well as researchers in fields such 
as cognitive linguistics, neuroscience, and sociology may elucidate the intricacy of these 
interconnected aspects of human ontology.  Given the difficulty of discussing cognition, 
embodiment, emotion, and sociality simultaneously, these authors generally address no 
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more than two at a time.  While an examination of two or more qualities allows for a 
detailed exploration of their interrelationships, such action is problematic because it 
neglects the inseparability of all four qualities.  In this section, I offer an investigation of 
pairs and trios of qualities as well as note the integration of cognition, embodiment, 
emotion, and sociality. 
First, I consider the interplay of cognition and embodiment.  I chose to begin with 
these qualities because Western philosophers have traditionally asserted an explicit divide 
between them.  Second, I posit the role of emotion in my developing human multiplicity, 
noting its continual integration with cognition and embodiment.  Lastly, I interconnect 
sociality to cognition, embodiment, and emotion, asserting that sociality interfaces with 
each of the other three qualities and that the four qualities exist inseparably in changing 
human multiplicities.  I ask the reader to keep the integration of cognition, embodiment, 
emotion, and sociality in mind throughout this section. 
Cognitive and Embodied 
Western philosophers from Plato to Descartes assert a strict division between 
mind and body, at times ignoring the latter.  Butler (1999) notes that in such writings, 
“The mind not only subjugates the body, but occasionally entertains the fantasy of fleeing 
its embodiment altogether” (p. 52).  In contrast, contemporary writers such as Deleuze 
and Guattari, Lakoff and Johnson, and Shusterman have noted the interconnected nature 
of mind and body.  As Kirk (2003) summarizes, “The more that is discovered about the 
workings of the brain, the less room there seems to be for any contribution from a 
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Cartesian mind: it seems redundant” (p. 45).33  The authors above offer scientific and 
philosophical arguments articulating various aspects of the integrated mind-body, which I 
explain further below.   
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) reject the subservience of the mind to the body, 
mourning the notion of “being slave to oneself, or to pure ‘reason,’ the Cogito” (p. 130).  
Buchanan (1997) elaborates that Deleuze both follows Spinoza in rejecting the Cartesian 
mind-body split and avoids theorizing a body as merely an inanimate cultural object or 
subservient vehicle of the mind (pp. 75-76).  Although Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) 
do not write overtly about the integration of mind and body, their philosophy presupposes 
this condition.  They refer frequently to the body and embodiment throughout their 
writing, asserting the value of thinking about bodies and their capabilities in new ways.
34
  
Additionally, they consistently equate thinking with embodiment, inundating readers with 
descriptions of images of various human and non-human bodies and body parts and 
charging them to become animals, women, and bodies without organs.  Semetsky (2006) 
summarizes that for Deleuze: 
Mind is not taking priority over material body or vice versa, instead both are 
considered to be a series in operation: the actions in the mind are the actions of 
the body and, respectively, the passions of the body are the passions in the mind. 
(p. 18)   
                                            
33
 “Cartesian mind” refers to Rene Descartes’ (1641/1984) assertions about the separateness of mind and 
body.   
 
34
 As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) philosophical figuration of a body without 
organs is not a body but the chaos from which organisms form.  See further discussion in chapter 3. 
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While Deleuze and Guattari’s writings challenge the aforementioned Western 
philosophical tradition of excluding the body, the broad and abstract nature of their 
discussion of the body as well as the time period in which they wrote limit a more 
nuanced understanding of the integration of mind and body.   
Cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999) assert not only the 
inseparability of mind and body but the body’s pivotal role in constructing humans’ 
understanding of reality.  They write, “Human concepts are not just reflections of an 
external reality, but that they are crucially shaped by our bodies and brains, especially by 
our sensorimotor system” (p. 22).  All thinking, from basic to abstract, from individual 
reason to socially constructed “truths,” derives from and relies on the integration of the 
mind and body.   
Almost five years to the day after the aforementioned oboe master class, I became 
the director of a declining sixty-person band program at a high school in a predominantly 
white, blue-collar town in western Massachusetts.  As a first-year teacher, I made the 
poor decision of programming Norman Dello Joio’s Scenes from “The Louvre” for our 
December concert.  Despite my efforts, students took little interest in the piece and 
struggled with its technical and artistic demands.  As I frantically tried to prepare the 
band, I thought primarily about the students’ music cognition:  Did they understand the 
rhythms?  Did they know the fingerings?  Could they name the articulation markings?   
Besides occasionally asserting, “Sit with good posture” or “Use better breath support,” 
my instruction largely ignored students’ bodies, perceiving them only as extensions of 
their minds.  If their minds could comprehend the conventions of Western classical 
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music, I thought, their cognition would control their bodies.  For instance, if they “knew” 
the correct fingerings, their bodies would move accordingly. 
In contrast to the mind-body divide that I unknowingly reinforced, Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) posit the body’s role in forming human reason.  While they acknowledge 
that all humans have the capacity for reason (p. 4), they argue, “There is no such fully 
autonomous faculty of reason separate from and independent of bodily capacities such as 
perception and movement” (p. 17).  Lakoff and Johnson explicate how, by using a 
multitude of metaphors relating to embodied experiences, humans reason through and 
understand abstract concepts.  For example, they articulate how members of Western 
cultures use the metaphor of a love as a journey, equating lovers with travelers, common 
goals as destinations, the relationship as a vehicle, and difficulties as impediments to 
motion.  Humans come to understand the idea of journeying not through their 
disembodied minds, but as a result their embodied actions in the world.   
Through bodily interactions with their environments, humans have experiences 
with sensations, such as movement and motion, that can then form the basis of their 
understandings of abstract concepts.  Lakoff and Johnson (1999) provide phrases such as 
“The marriage is on the rocks,” “It’s been a long, bumpy road,” and “We’re at a 
crossroads” to exemplify how common discourse utilizes aspects of the metaphor of love 
as a journey (italics theirs, p. 64).  Humans do not reason through a disconnected mind 
but rather through a unified mind-body that senses and experiences the surrounding 
world.   
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) offer additional examples of how humans use 
embodied metaphors to understand abstract concepts.  For instance, they assert that 
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humans use spatial metaphors to distinguish between categories, often envisioning them 
as containers with an interior and exterior (p. 20).  Banana belongs “in” the category of 
fruit while asparagus belongs “out of” that category.  Bowman (2000) draws on these 
metaphors to explain how ideas such as being “in” a key or “out of” a key relate to 
embodied experiences (p. 54).  If my high school students understood that they played 
sections of Scenes from “The Louvre” “in” tune or “out” of tune and “in” time or “out” 
of time, they did so not through minds disconnected from their bodies, but as a result of 
an inseparable mind-body.   
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) also assert that humans’ conceptions of truth35 are 
culturally grounded and derive from the body, stating:  
Truth is not simply a relation between words and the world, as if there were no 
being with a brain and a body interposed.  Indeed, the very idea that beings 
embodied in all these concept-shaping ways could arrive at a disembodied truth 
based on disembodied concepts is not merely arrogant, but utterly unrealistic. (p. 
102)   
By explaining how abstract concepts have their roots in embodied experiences, Lakoff 
and Johnson demonstrate the relationship between truth and the body.  For example, 
across cultures, the concept of morality has its roots in physical positions: being good is 
being upright; being evil is being low; doing evil is falling; resisting evil is possessing 
strength (p. 300).  Using bodily experiences to construct metaphors for intangible ideas 
allows humans to develop the ability to think about and understand abstract concepts 
critical for functioning within societies.  Humans’ embodied metaphors for morality may 
                                            
35
 Lakoff and Johnson define truth broadly as “what we understand the world to be like” (p. 300). 
98 
also apply to other aspects of social life.  For instance, English speakers tend to associate 
embodied experiences similar to those that enable metaphors for moral values with 
artistic endeavors and products.  The abstract idea of “high art,” like that of “morally 
upstanding,” develops through embodied interactions with the world.   
Philosophers such as Shusterman posits other ideas about the interconnectedness 
of mind and body.  In proposing a new discipline called “somaesthetics,” Shusterman 
(1999) asserts the paramount importance of the body.  He defines somaesthetics as “the 
critical, meliorative study of the experience of one’s body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic 
appreciation (aisthetsis) and creative self-fashioning” (p. 302).  Through somaesthetics, 
Shusterman asserts the importance of both acknowledging the body’s fundamental role in 
experience and developing an awareness, reflectivity, and reflexivity to engage with 
one’s body in innovate ways.36   
Shusterman (2008) positions somaesthetics in opposition to philosophies 
separating mind from body, writing, “somaesthetics, in its experiential dimension, clearly 
refuses to exteriorize the body as an alienated thing distinct from the active spirit of 
human experience” (p. 28).  My own musicking revealed the falsity of a mind-body 
dichotomy.  For example, when I played oboe, my phrasing resulted from my mind, lips, 
lungs, and other body parts functioning simultaneously.  My mind does not manipulate 
my body; rather, both operate in ongoing integration.  Similarly, Shusterman (2011) 
explains that in somaesthetics, “soma” refers to the combination of the mind and body, 
denoting “not mere physical body but the lived, sentient, intentional, body that involves 
                                            
36
 Such creative thinking about the capabilities of one’s body relates to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a 
body without organs, which I detail in chapter 3. 
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mental, social, and cultural dimensions” (p. 315).  Somaesthetics presupposes an 
integrated mind-body.   
In elaborating on how humans’ awareness of, relationship with, and control over 
their bodies changes, Shusterman (2009) distinguishes between four levels of body 
consciousness that can blend or overlap.  In the first level, corporeal intentionality, 
humans exhibit an “unconscious consciousness” of their bodies, such as the limited 
awareness experienced during sleep.  When humans become conscious of their bodies, 
although not specifically aware of their movements, Shusterman argues that they have 
reached the second level, primary consciousness.  Activities such as breathing or walking 
naturally occur at this level.  In the third level, somaesthetic perception, Shusterman 
explains that bodies become explicit objects of consciousness, such as when a runner 
focuses on his or her breathing while moving up an incline.  The fourth level of 
consciousness, somaesthetic reflection, occurs through reflection on one’s body.  For 
instance, Shusterman posits that this type of engagement happens when “we are not only 
explicitly aware that we are breathing but also clearly conscious of our conscious 
awareness of breathing and of how that reflexive consciousness affects our breathing and 
other dimensions of somatic experience” (p. 14).   
Shusterman (2009) posits the inseparability of mind and body in all four levels of 
body consciousness.  Such awareness, however, was absent from my teaching.  For 
example, as I prepared my band for our December concert, I ordered students’ bodies into 
proper playing positions and encouraged them to hold notes longer or play passages 
faster, but I rarely asked them to reflect on their bodies or to use their bodies to help them 
gain musical understandings other than simply playing correctly.  I viewed their bodies as 
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separate from and secondary to their minds.  Conversely, Deleuze and Guattari, Lakoff 
and Johnson, and Shusterman propose an inseparable mind-body as central to human 
ontology. 
Cognitive, Embodied, Emotional 
Along with cognition and embodiment, emotions constitute a third inseparable 
quality of humans’ continually evolving multiplicities.  Imagine yourself feeling sad, 
afraid, or happy.  Do you feel changes in your mind-body?  Can you imagine such 
emotions as separate from your mind-body?   
While I write about the experience of my master class, I feel noticeable changes 
in my own mind-body.
37
  I sense a slight redness returning to my face as I remember the 
embarrassment of playing a simple C major scale in front of my peers, and my heart races 
a bit as I reminisce about the excitement of standing alongside one of my musical idols.  
In contrast, authors of the Oxford English Dictionary (2000) explain that, historically, 
writers have distinguished emotion from reasoning or knowledge.  While philosophers 
such as Plato, Spinoza, and Hume acknowledged a positive relationship between 
cognition and emotion, philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant reinforced a 
dichotomy between mind and emotion (Solomon, 2010, pp. 4-7).  For example, Solomon 
(2010) asserts that Kant, Deleuze’s proclaimed enemy, made a clear distinction between 
reason and emotion, designating emotion as “inessential to morals at best and disruptive 
at worst” (p. 8).   
                                            
37
 Damasio (1999) distinguishes emotions and feelings, explaining that emotions are outwardly directed and 
public while feelings are inwardly directed and private (p. 36).  I maintain this distinction throughout this 
paper.   
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Although Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) rarely address the concept of emotion 
outright,
38
 they use words related to it, including “affect,” “feeling,” and “sensation,” 
throughout their writing, noting their important role in human experiences.  They 
distinguish between affect and feeling, writing, “Affect is the active discharge of 
emotion, the counterattack, whereas feeling is an always displaced, retarded, resisting 
emotion.  Affects are projectiles just like weapons; feelings are introceptive like tools” (p. 
400).  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) specifically link feelings to the changing body, 
providing them a central place in one’s constantly evolving experiences and self-
knowledge.  For example, they describe the process of becoming-animal: “the 
instantaneous apprehension of a multiplicity in a given region, is not a representative, a 
substitute, but an I feel.  I feel myself becoming a wolf, one wolf among others, on the 
edge of the pack” (p. 32).  They also indirectly acknowledge the integration of cognition 
and emotion, stating, “Art thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects 
and percepts” (1991/1994, p. 66).  Deleuze and Guattari, however, do not elaborate on 
the integration of emotion and the mind-body.  Since the time of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
collaborative publications, neuroscientists such as Damasio (1999) and Ekman (1994) 
have offered more detailed explanations of the integration of emotions and the mind-
body.   
Damasio (1999) and Ekman (1994) detail the relationship between physiology 
and emotion, often describing the existence of emotions in terms of bodily responses.  
Damasio (1999) distinguishes between primary or universal emotions, secondary or 
social emotions, and background emotions, explaining that all emotions share core 
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 For example, a search of a digital copy of A Thousand Plateaus, they only use the word “emotion” 
(“émotion" in French) twice.  
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biological processes.  Primary emotions, which people express regardless of culture, 
include happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust,
39
 while secondary emotions 
include embarrassment, jealousy, guilt, and pride.  In contrast, background emotions 
involve prolonged feelings such as well-being, calm, malaise, and tension.   
According to Damasio (1999), five characteristics related to the integration of 
mind-body and emotions underlie all human emotional phenomena.  First, “Emotions are 
complicated collections of chemical and neural responses” that form patterns in order to 
help an organism maintain life.  Second, although emotions are “biologically 
determined,” learning and culture alter the expression of emotions.40  Third, the “devices” 
that “produce” emotions reside in a limited number of brain regions.  Fourth, emotions 
can be automatically engaged without conscious deliberation.  Lastly, “All emotions use 
the body as their theater. . . . The variety of the emotional responses is responsible for 
profound changes in both the body landscape and the brain landscape” (pp. 50-51).  
Damasio’s third and fifth statements are problematic because they imply directionality; in 
his third statement, Damasio insinuates that the mind-body causes emotions, while in his 
fifth statement he asserts that emotions change the mind-body.  However, examining 
these five statements simultaneously illuminates the interconnectedness of mind-body 
and emotion.  Similarly, Ekman (1994) argues that all emotions share seven 
characteristics: “automatic appraisal, commonalities in antecedent events, presence in 
                                            
39
 Numerous researchers, including Ekman (1972) and LeDoux (2012), also enumerate these six primary 
emotions.  Yet, LeDoux (2012) problematizes this list, noting competing theories with different numbers of 
basic emotions, data collection problems such as forced choices, the diversity of phenomena included under 
a single primary emotion, and the possible social rather than biological construction of such emotions (p. 
654).   
 
40
 This idea will be addressed in greater detail under the “Cognitive, Embodied, Emotional, Social” 
heading. 
103 
other primates, quick onset, brief duration, unbidden occurrence, and distinctive 
physiology” (p. 18).  Although all of these characteristics rely on the relationship 
between emotion and the mind-body, Ekman’s final characteristic directly notes the 
inseparability of mind-body and emotion.   
While teaching Scenes from “The Louvre,” I did on rare occasions ask students to 
portray and feel certain emotions while playing, imploring them to feel the longing 
sadness in the introduction of the second movement and the happiness, joy, and 
excitement that ensued with the entrance of the main theme.  Yet, I did not mention that 
such emotions involved physiological changes.  I talked about emotion as if one’s mind 
could conjure emotion on cue and apart from embodied reactions; in fact, I neither 
wondered whether students had visceral reactions linked to emotions aroused from any 
aspect of our musical endeavors nor did I contemplate how students’ emotions 
interplayed with their cognition during musicking. 
Damasio (1999) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999) explicitly challenge the divide 
between cognition and emotion, asserting that emotion does not exist apart from 
reasoning.
41
  Enumerating recent changes in scientists’ conceptions of reason, Lakoff and 
Johnson write, “Reason is not dispassionate, but emotionally engaged” (p. 4).  Similarly, 
Damasio (1999) argues, “Emotion is integral to the process of reasoning and decision 
making” (p. 41), elaborating that while reason can control “the pervasive tyranny of 
emotion . . . the engines of reason still require emotion, which means that the controlling 
power of reason is often modest” (p 58).  Given a world in which I could reason without 
emotion, I likely would have remained calm when the renowned oboist asked me to play 
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 In chapter 6, I will explore philosophies of art that relate to emotion and cognition. 
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a C major scale; embarrassment is an illogical response to instruction arguably intended 
to help my playing.  Yet in practice, my emotions occurred inseparable from my 
decisions and actions.   
 Since humans have physiological responses when experiencing emotions, it seems 
logical that one can sometimes interpret another’s emotional states by observing his or 
her body.  For example, the other oboists in the master class might have noticed the 
redness in my cheeks, the nervous shaking of my hands and arms, or the excitement in 
my open eyes.  Through these observations, they could likely tell in part how I felt as I 
stood playing before them.   
Researchers have repeatedly documented the ability of people to identify others’ 
emotions through their facial expressions and have also demonstrated that people can 
infer specific emotions from stagnant bodies devoid of facial features.  For instance, 90 
percent of participants in Coulson’s (2004) study associated anger and sadness with 
certain views of the bodies of static, computer-generated mannequins without facial 
expressions.  Humans can also identify bodily expressions of emotions in cultures beyond 
their own.  Sogon and Makoto (1989) studied Americans watching the bodily movements 
(without facial expressions) of Japanese actors, and Japanese people watching the bodily 
movements of American actors.  They concluded that both American and Japanese 
participants exhibited the ability to identify sadness, fear, and anger, although other 
emotions had some cultural variation.  In other words, observers can see bodily 
manifestations of emotional states and, at times, can accurately identify the emotions 
shown in the body.   
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Neuroscientists studying mirror neurons offer further evidence of the 
interconnectedness between one’s mind-body and others’ emotions.  Cattaneo and 
Rizzolatti (2009) define mirror neurons as a class of neurons “that discharge both when 
individuals perform a given motor act and when they observe others perform that same 
motor act” (p. 557).  For example, as I watched and heard a fellow oboist play a staccato 
passage, my own mind-body in part reacted as if I were playing the same notes, tensing 
and relaxing with the phrases.  Iacoboni (2009) adds that mirror neurons “support the 
simulation of the facial expressions observed in other people, which in turn would trigger 
activity in limbic areas, thus producing in the observer the emotion that other people are 
feeling” (p. 665).  As I observed the facial expressions of one of my peers as she 
performed, my mind-body would have partially reacted as if I were producing those same 
facial expressions and possibly enabled me to experience emotions similar to hers.  
Humans’ emotions, both those experienced through observing others’ emotional 
expressions and those triggered by other means, integrate with their bodies. 
 Averill (1980) explains that when various events evoke the same or similar 
physiological responses, humans’ minds distinguish between different emotions specific 
to those events.  While anger, jealousy, and envy may elicit similar physiological 
responses, such as a rise in blood pressure, a person distinguishes between these three 
emotions through a cognitive appraisal of the event, such as whether the person has done 
him or her an injustice, or of the object inducing the emotion (pp. 251-2).  For instance, 
had the oboe teacher placed his hand on my head in a different context, such as a 
demonstration for elementary students, a private lesson, or accidentally while riding the 
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subway, my mind-body would have interpreted the hand placing differently, and 
simultaneously, I would have felt emotions contrasting those in the master class.   
Averill (1980) adds that as a result of continued cognitive appraisal of inducers of 
emotions, people’s accumulated amount of emotional experience may lead them to 
perceive current emotional experiences as automatic rather than integrated with their 
cognition (p. 258).  In other words, while emotions may feel automatic to an adult, 
Averill argues that such a perception results from a lifetime of evaluating emotion 
inducers.  Averill argues that humans’ appraisals of objects, people, and situations work 
in union with their emotions, explaining that interpretations of events rather than the 
events themselves enable the emotion someone will feel.   
While engaging with Scenes from “The Louvre,” my past experience with similar 
pieces set up certain cognitive expectations that interfaced with my emotions.  Yet, I 
became frustrated when students did not recognize and experience those same emotions.  
The emotional responses that I deemed “automatic” resulted from years of experiences 
with that music and similar music, from conscious and unconscious musical evaluations 
and emotional and physiological responses that differed from those of my students.  Not 
only did I neglect to engage students in conversations about how various aspects of music 
cognition and embodiment might interface with emotions, I failed to inquire about their 
unique emotional experiences while musicking.  Human multiplicities exist as ongoing 
symbiotic processes between their whole beings and their interconnected cognition, 
embodiment, and emotion in all experiences, including musical ones.   
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Cognitive, Embodied, Emotional, Social 
 If all humans are inseparably cognitive, embodied, and emotional beings, then 
what accounts for the immense diversity of human practices and values that exist within 
and between contemporary societies?  Would an oboist from China, Brazil, or a rural 
town in the American midwest react differently than me, an oboist raised in suburban 
Pennsylvania, to the professional oboist’s teaching?  Humans’ social nature constitutes a 
fourth aspect of our continually changing multiplicities.   
 Humans’ social nature underlies much of Deleuze and Guattari’s writings.  They 
acknowledge a social construction of right and wrong, asserting that philosophy exists “in 
the modern world in conformity with the spirit of a people and its conception of right” 
(1991/1994, p. 104).  Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari (1975/1986) presuppose humans’ 
social nature in their writings about minor literature, defining minor literature as that 
which a minority
42
 constructs within a major language, giving the example of Jewish 
literature in Warsaw and Prague (p. 16).  Sociality, in integration with humans’ other 
qualities, enables the formation and propagation of major literature and languages as well 
as the authoring of minor literature.  Yet, Deleuze and Guattari don’t elaborate further on 
sociality and human social nature. 
Human sociality begins in the womb.  Gomez and Gerken’s (2000) review of 
literature about infant language learning reveals that newborns prefer their mothers’ 
voices to those of another women.  They also note that infants can recognize their native 
language and prefer both passages and rhymes read aloud by their mothers during the end 
of their pregnancies to unfamiliar ones (p. 179).  Early social interactions occur not only 
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 See the “becoming” section of chapter 3 for a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of 
“minoritarian.” 
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between children and adults but also between children and other children.  For example, 
between eighteen and twenty-four months of age, babies can solve problems 
cooperatively with same-age partners (Warneken and Tomasello, 2009, p. 475).  As 
humans mature, their sociality integrates with their other qualities in both obvious and 
subtle ways.  Human sociality interconnects with everything from choices of language 
and religion to their personal values, gender, and emotional triggers.  For instance, after 
surveying the literature related to adolescent musicking, Hargreaves, North, and Tarrant 
(2006) suggest that peer groups and social norms closely related to adolescents’ musical 
choices.   
Human sociality is linked to the concept of culture; cultures develop, propagate, 
and change through and with social interactions.  Culture is not easily defined, although 
various authors have posited contrasting descriptions.  For example, one group of cultural 
sociologists offers two explanations of culture, defining it both as a way of life and as 
process and development (Longhurst et al., 2008, pp. 2-4).  Education professor 
Frederick Erickson (2004) details six definitions of culture: cultivation, tradition, bits of 
information, a symbol system, motive and emotion, and power structure (pp. 34-36).  
Linguists Michael McCarthy and Ronald Carter (1994) distinguish between “culture with 
a capital C” and “culture with a small c,” defining the former as cultural products such as 
artworks and institutions and the latter as patterns of practice.  They also posit a third 
dimension of culture, “culture as social discourse,” which they define as the social 
knowledge and “interactive skills” such as conventions of politeness (p. 151).  These 
variegated definitions of culture presuppose its social foundations and development. 
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Such definitions, however, tend to reify culture and contradict Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1980/1987) emphasis on movement, processes, and divergent possibilities.  
Arguing against the view that people live as members of single, homogeneous cultures, 
Geertz (2001) offers a particularly Deleuzean conceptualization of culture.  He asserts 
that each person participates in multiple cultures, noting the impossibility of 
distinguishing where one culture ends and another begins.  Geertz writes: 
It is difficult to find a commonality of outlook, form of life, behavioral style, 
material expression . . . whatever . . . that is not either itself further partitioned 
into smaller, infolding ones, boxes within boxes, or taken up whole and entire into 
larger, incorporative ones, selves laid on top of selves. There is, at least in most 
cases, and I suspect in all, no point at which one can say that this is where 
consensus either stops or starts. It all depends on the frame of comparison, the 
background against which identity is seen, and the play of interest which engages 
and animates it. (p. 253) 
Like Deleuze and Guattari, Geertz emphasizes heterogeneity rather than uniformity.  
Although defining cultures by general similarities carries certain advantages, Geertz 
warns against solidifying representations of any given person, group of people, or culture.  
Despite their differing definitions of culture, the above authors note that people construct 
cultures through their social interactions, thus implying the interrelationship of human 
sociality and culture.  I argue that the notion of culture presupposes humans as social 
beings.  While the following writers do not offer a definition of culture, they posit and 
detail its relationship with cognition, embodiment, and emotion. 
110 
Sociality, in integration with humans’ other inseparable qualities, allows for 
members of different cultures to produce and propagate metaphors unique to their groups.  
Masservey, Ji, and Uchida (2004) explore the interplay of human sociality and cognition 
in tasks ranging from reasoning and categorizing to making social inferences (pp. 358-
360).  For example, they explain that when performing reasoning tasks, North Americans 
focus on the object and categories, such as banana and fruit, while East Asians focus on 
context and relationships, such as banana and monkey (p. 359).  The integration of 
sociality, cognition, and embodiment also affects how people understand, interpret, and 
recall events.  For instance, when asked to recall a situation, Japanese tend to spend more 
time discussing the actions of their friends while European Americans more time on their 
own actions (p. 360). The value I placed on both playing Mozart and interacting with the 
prominent oboist developed through many layers of social relationships: my public 
school band director, conductors and fellow competitors at school-sponsored music 
festivals, my private oboe teacher, and my community youth orchestra.  Because my 
students and I had different layers of social experiences and relationships, we understood, 
interpreted, and recalled the same music in different ways. 
Humans’ social nature integrates with their emotions.  Averill (1980) asserts, 
“Societies can shape, mold, or construct as many different emotions as are functional 
within the social system” (p. 259).  In the master class, my own past and present social 
experiences interfaced with my emotions.  For instance, the prominent oboist’s 
instruction caused me to feel shame in a classical music culture that encourages 
musicians to show off their speed and technique.  My extended mind-body reaction to my 
emotions, solemnly playing the C major scale, also resulted from prior social 
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experiences.  While I saw other oboists in the master class blame performances on their 
reeds or make other excuses, I can only guess that my silence stemmed from years of 
socialization under authoritarian teachers and other adults.  
Damasio (1999) explains how members of a society tend to react with similar 
emotions when experiencing certain events.  He asserts, “The classes of stimuli that cause 
happiness or fear or sadness tend to do so fairly consistently in the same individual and in 
individuals who share the same social and cultural background” (p. 56).  Psychologist 
Richard Lazarus (1994) echoes this notion, citing the example that Japanese people tend 
to feel shame when they attribute failing to insufficient effort but not when they attribute 
failing to lack of ability while Americans tend to have the opposite emotional reactions 
(p. 186).   
When teaching Scenes from “The Louvre,” I felt perplexed that students 
expressed little emotion upon hearing the angry intensity of the opening movement or the 
joyful clarinet solo at the beginning of the fourth movement.  I blamed their lack of 
emotion on their failure to cognitively understand the music, neglecting to acknowledge 
that the interconnection of their sociality and emotions influenced what they felt when 
musicking.  My past social experiences with classical music, in integration with my 
cognition and emotions, provided me with the knowledge needed to understand both 
Mozart’s and Dello Joio’s conventions.  The interplay of students’ diverse prior and 
present social experiences and evolving cognition and emotions meant that they could not 
possibly think the same thoughts or feel the same emotions that I did while performing or 
listening to the piece.  When engaging with Scenes from “The Louvre,” my body and 
students’ bodies functioned inseparably from our other qualities.   
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Humans’ sociality, cognition, and emotions continually integrate with their 
embodiment.  As I performed in front of the renowned oboist, my body, influenced by 
dance culture which had dominated my life for many years, swayed back and forth and 
up and down with the musical lines.  Yet, the teacher brought the bodily value of 
different cultures, that of Curtis, Julliard, and the Metropolitan Opera, to our master class.  
As I performed with the prominent oboist’s hand restraining my head, our contrasting 
embodiments of culture physically confronted each other.  I can only imagine the reaction 
of an American popular musician or an Ewe drummer watching this situation; my 
movements during my initial performance would likely have seemed restrained compared 
to those of their prior musical experiences.   
Shusterman (2011) explains that the interconnection of sociality and the body 
begins before birth, writing that “somas,” the combination of mind and body, “are 
essentially shaped by culture as well as by nature, even prenatally in the mother’s womb” 
(p. 316).  Humans’ sociality and embodiment develop in integration throughout one’s life 
via observations and experiences.  Mans (2004) provides an example of the inseparability 
of embodiment and sociality in both bodily actions and the physical shapes of bodies.  
Following the influx of Western media images into Nambia, he states: 
No longer is the feminine stereotype with round, high buttocks, rounded stomach, 
and solid placement on the ground thought of as modern or beautiful.  The new 
slim denim clad African girl and the resultant race after slenderness is evidenced 
in the marked increase in the incidence of anorexia. (p. 88)   
Such changes in physical appearances and embodied actions demonstrate the 
inseparability of sociality, cognition, and embodiment. 
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Active reflection on the integration of one’s embodiment and sociality can also 
lead to positive alterations.  Shusterman (2002) argues, “Self-improvement . . . should 
involve a receptive encounter with other selves and other cultures that help define who 
we are” (p. 110).  Examining how others use and understand their bodies may influence 
how we interpret and alter our bodies and their actions.  For instance, two years after I 
began teaching high school band, I had the opportunity to study Ewe drumming in 
Ghana.  My Ghanaian musical endeavors exposed me to new possibilities for bodily 
movements while musicking, causing me to question the emphasis on posture and 
stillness in most American middle and high school music classrooms.   
The metaphors created through the integration of humans’ cognition and 
embodied experiences vary by culture, demonstrating the inseparability of human 
sociality and other qualities.  While Johnson and Lakoff (2002) acknowledge the 
existence of conceptual universals, they maintain that “there is extensive cross-cultural 
variation in conceptual systems that has been studied in detail” (p. 252).  For example, 
they explain how members of Western societies use the metaphor of life as a journey to 
convey the concept of a purposeful life.  In contrast, they assert: 
There are cultures around the world in which this metaphor does not exist; in 
those cultures people just live their lives, and the very idea of being without 
direction or missing the boat, or being held back or getting bogged down in life, 
would make no sense. (1999, p. 63)   
The interplay of sociality, emotion, embodiment, and cognition enables the creation of 
diverse metaphors for geographically disparate groups of people. 
114 
Similarly, the ways in which people express, think about, and act on their 
emotions may vary by culture.  For example, Lazarus (1994) asserts that members of 
certain cultures may be more inclined to respond to an insult with a verbal attack while 
others are inclined to respond with physical attacks (p. 168).  Even within societies, the 
prior social experiences of various members can interface with their emotions to produce 
divergent reactions.  For example, upon hearing this narrative of my experience in the 
master class, some of my friends, particularly those with music performance degrees, 
laugh and recall similar experiences.  Other friends show sadness and lament the 
embarrassment I experienced.  A third group of friends, particularly those with advanced 
degrees in music education, exhibit anger accompanied with words such as “docile 
bodies.”  I have changed greatly since that event.  If I were to attend that same master 
class today, the interplay of my cognition, embodiment, emotions, and sociality would 
facilitate a markedly different type of musical experience. 
Summary 
Asking “When and who are we?” involves examining how humans’ cognition, 
embodiment, emotions, and sociality exist inseparably.  Rather than stable beings, 
humans are evolving multiplicities, constantly changing through the mixing of their 
various integrated qualities.  While Deleuze and Guattari would likely decry any 
enumeration of the substance of multiplicities, such action helps to expose unquestioned 
assumptions about human ontology.  Envisioning humans as continually changing 
cognitive, embodied, emotional, and social multiplicities, though incomplete, may help 




As noted in Chapter 3, while Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) assert the 
equivalence of multiplicities and becoming, they generally use the concept of 
multiplicities to emphasize spatial or qualitative differences while they use the concept of 
“becoming” to foreground time, temporality, and process.  May (2003) distinguishes 
between two uses of the term “becoming.” The first occurs in Deleuze’s solo works and 
refers to the dynamic change constituting reality; the second occurs in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s collaborative works and refers to the existence of specific types of 
“becomings,” such as becoming-woman, becoming-animal, and becoming-imperceptible.  




In recalling my master class, I remember striving for various processes—to 
perform at my technical and artistic best, to receive the praise of my teacher and peers, to 
express myself and my feelings about the music.  Since these strivings occurred 
inseparable from my cognition, embodiment, emotion, and sociality, describing them 
solely in terms of these four aspects seems inaccurate and incomplete.  The striving I 
experienced comprised an additional, essential aspect of my being.   
In some sense, my striving related to Deleuze’s initial conception of “becoming.”  
Through my oboe performance, I became aware of the difference, motion, and instability 
that constituted my existence.  Within the confines of my home, I had played the piece 
hundreds of times with minimal attention to the passing of each moment; in contrast, as I 
stood in front of my peers, I experienced an awareness that each note was occurring 
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uniquely, becoming acutely aware of time.  Yet, my experiences did not qualify as 
“becoming” under Deleuze and Guattari’s second conception of the term.  American 
institutions designate classical music as the major musical language; I performed this 
language not to make it minor, but to replicate the established major language.  In their 
collaborative works, Deleuze and Guattari (1975/1986) argue that “becoming” never 
consists of reproduction or imitation (p. 13).  While my striving exhibited characteristics 
of Deleuze’s initial overarching conception of “becoming,” it did not meet the criteria for 
Deleuze and Guattari’s later development of “becoming.” 
When articulating this fifth aspect of human existence, the multiple meanings of 
the word “becoming” lead to confusion.  In order to direct attention towards the concept 
itself rather than terminology, I have chosen to use the word “striving” to encompass this 
fifth aspect of human ontology.  In this section, I define my conception of “striving,” 
taken partly from the work of philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, and relate “striving” to 
the above notions of human beings as inseparably cognitive, embodied, emotional, and 
social. 
Striving 
Schopenhauer’s concept of “will” shares similarities with both versions of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “becoming” and inspired my choice of the term 
“striving.”  Schopenhauer devised the concept “will” by examining the writings of Kant 
and then moved beyond them to offer a contrasting account of human existence.  In The 
Critique of Pure Reason (1781/2007), Kant divides the world into phenomenon, or the 
aspects of the world that we can apprehend through our senses, and noumenon, or the 
“thing-in-itself” that we can never comprehend.  For example, given an object such as an 
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apple, we can understand its phenomenon through tasting, touching, seeing, smelling, and 
listening to it.  Yet, we can never know the apple’s noumenon, its existence apart from 
our ability to sense it.  According to Magee (1983), Kant fails to note that if the 
noumenon exists in everything, then it must also constitute humans.  Schopenhauer 
augments Kant’s description of the unknowable noumenon or “thing-in-itself,” 
explaining that humans can have direct experience of themselves (Magee, 1983, p. 119).  
Therefore, given that the noumenon exists in everything, including humans, and that 
humans can know themselves, Schopenhauer asserts that the noumenon is partly, 
although “not absolutely and completely,” knowable (Magee, 1983, p. 140). 
Schopenhauer terms his version of Kant’s noumenon the “will,” although Magee 
(1983) asserts that the terms “force” or “energy” are really closer to Schopenhauer’s 
conception of “will.”44  Magee explains that Schopenhauer defined “will” as “a universal, 
aimless, undividualized,
45
 non-alive force such as manifests itself in, for example, the 
phenomenon of gravity” (p. 144).  Although gravity affects our every movement, we 
seldom take note of it.  Likewise, the “will” is fundamentally an aimless force, always 
present and acting but not always obvious until it manifests itself through our conscious 
desires.  Schopenhauer believed that as an act of will emerges from a human’s inner 
being, it undergoes a transition from a timeless thing-in-itself that we can never 
completely understand to a knowable phenomenon (p. 140).  For Schopenhauer, the 
“will” fundamentally manifests itself as a desire to live.  Magee explains: 
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 This is not a problem of translation but of Schopenhauer’s actual word choice. 
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 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “undividual” means indivisible. 
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Because the will itself is a sheer, blind striving, Schopenhauer contends that its 
manifestation in each one of us is devoted above all else to sustaining itself in 
existence, and hence to survival. . . .  In most people, most of the time, we find 
that what is ultimate in their inner lives is a will to live. (p. 155) 
While the “will” in its pure form is both unknowable and undirected, its realizations are 
often aimed at the maintenance of life as well as other processes.  In other words, the 
most basic manifestation of the will occurs as the desire to live, although humans often 
consciously or unconsciously direct their striving towards other desires and goals.
 
 
I selected “striving” rather than “will” or “becoming” in order to distinguish my 
theory from Schopenhauer’s and to avoid possible confusion resulting from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s multiple conceptions of “becoming.”  While it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to detail the many possible critiques of Schopenhauer’s concept of “will,”46 I will 
briefly enumerate how it relates to Deleuze and Guattari’s multiple conceptions of 
“becoming.”  The relationship between “will” and the various versions of “becoming” 
serves as the basis of my conception of “striving.” 
First, both “becoming,” as originally articulated by Deleuze, and “will,” as 
articulated by Schopenhauer, constitute all existence.  As noted above, Schopenhauer’s 
“will,” like Kant’s noumenon, exists everywhere as a universal force (Magee, 1983, p. 
144).  Similarly, May (2003) explains that in Deleuze’s initial description of “becoming,” 
becoming is the “reality behind which there is no other reality” (p. 143).  He elaborates, 
“There is no being that can serve as the stable model or unity founding what exists. There 
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is only the unfolding of difference in time” (p. 146).  Deleuze’s “becoming” and 
Schopenhauer’s “will” are ever-present components of existence. 
Second, both Schopenhauer’s “will” and Deleuze’s initial conception of 
“becoming” lack directionality.  Magee (1983) states that Schopenhauer asserts the basic 
aimlessness and blindness of the “will” (p. 144, 155).  Likewise, May (2003) explains for 
Deleuze, “becoming” is the “final reality,” seeking nothing beyond itself (p. 143), and 
Colebrook (2002) asserts that for Deleuze, “There is no goals towards which life is 
striving” (p. 57). 
Third, both Schopenhauer’s “will” and Deleuze and Guattari’s later conception of 
“becoming” allow for directionality.  According to Magee (1983), Schopenhauer believed 
that humans often direct, either consciously or unconsciously, the aimless “will” towards 
the maintenance of life as well as towards various other goals and desires.  Although 
Schopenhauer’s “will” is fundamentally directionless, humans can and do direct it.  
Likewise, while Deleuze’s original conception of “becoming” exists without direction, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s developed conception of “becoming” implies directionality, 
allowing for multiple forms for “becoming,” such as “becoming-woman” or “becoming-
animal” (p. 149).   
Lastly, Schopenhauer’s “will,” Deleuze’s initial conception of “becoming,” and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s later evolution of “becoming” all emphasize temporality and 
process.  Magee (1983) explains that for Schopenhauer, the “will” often manifests itself 
through temporal practices such the maintenance of life (155).  Likewise, May (2003) 
asserts that Deleuze’s original explanation of “becoming” accentuates the temporality 
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continually underlying all existence, and Deleuze and Guattari’s later use of the term 
involves temporal processes such as “becoming-woman.”   
I have chosen to combine Schopenhauer’s writings about “will” and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s developing concept of “becoming” to posit a fifth integrated quality of human 
ontology that I call “striving.”  I posit four statements about striving: first, “striving” is an 
inseparable quality of human ontology; second, “striving” is fundamentally directionless; 
third, humans often direct, either consciously or unconsciously, their strivings towards 
various simultaneous processes and/or goals; lastly, “striving” occurs in time, thus 
emphasizing the temporal nature of existence.  I chose the word “striving” because it 
emphasizes motion and allows for variable goals and processes.  I find “striving” 
preferable to words such as “longing” that imply certain ends and emotions.47  While 
striving does usually imply directionality, as noted above, one can strive aimlessly.  As 
noted earlier, according to Magee (1983), Schopenhauer states that at a basic level, most 
of the time, most people strive to stay alive (p. 155).  Therefore, strivings almost always 
occur in the direction of the maintenance of life. 
While Schopenhauer’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s perspectives are similar in 
many ways, their differences necessitate a couple of points of clarification.  While all 
three philosophers might support my first statement, humans are always “striving,” 
Schopenhauer would envision striving as coming from underlying similarity, while 
Deleuze and Guattari would contend that it comes from difference.  I posit my concept of 
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 Drawing on writings by Braidotti and hooks, Gould (2009) uses the word “yearning” as an ongoing 
question of how rather than who we are (p. 46).  While I currently prefer the word “striving,” the word 
“yearning” shares similarities with my continually developing concept of “striving.”   
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“striving” in agreement with Deleuze and Guattari’s idea that difference constitutes 
existence.   
In regard to my third statement about directing striving, Schopenhauer would not 
limit the nature of this direction.  In contrast, in their collaborative writing, Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980/1987) assert that one cannot become “majoritarian” (p. 106).  While I 
emphasize the importance of striving to “become minoritarian,”48 I posit that human 
“striving” can occur in any direction.  Additionally, while Schopenhauer would assert 
that humans can direct their strivings, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987), as noted in 
chapter 3, assert the involuntary nature of becoming (p. 238).  I follow Schopenhauer in 
asserting that humans can direct their strivings, either consciously or unconsciously, 
towards various ends and processes.   
In summary, drawing on the writings of Schopenhauer and Deleuze and Guattari, 
I posit “striving” as a fifth inseparable aspect of human ontology.  While striving is 
fundamentally directionless, humans frequently direct their strivings towards concurrent 
endeavors.  Striving exists in integration with cognition, embodiment, emotion, and 
sociality. 
Cognitive, Embodied, Emotional, Social, Striving 
In my oboe master class, my becoming did not occur in isolation from the other 
four facets of my being.  During my initial performance, I strived to master the 
movements of some of my body, perfectly controlling my hands, breathing, and 
embouchure, and to keep my mind on task, reading the next notes and anticipating the 
musical phrases.  I also strived for the social acceptance of my teacher and peers as well 
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as to express emotion through the music while controlling my own fear and excitement.  
Yet, such simplistic pairings fail to account for the complex, integrated nature of all five 
elements.  For example, the social environment, a room of accomplished oboists, 
influenced my strivings and my heightened emotions while my mind sought to control 
my emotions and bodily actions in socially acceptable ways, and my body used past 
social experiences to decide how to react to the musical notation and social environment.  
Although any prose account of the interplay between the five facets of being reads like 
linear story, in reality, the facets function simultaneously and inseparably from each 
other.   
Figure 4.2 offers an image of an ontology based on an understanding of humans 
as integrated cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and striving beings.  The words lay 
atop a picture of a rhizome, in this case ginger.  As explicated in chapter 3, Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980/1987) use rhizomes as a philosophical figuration to foreground 
interaction, motion, and connectivity.   
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Figure 4.2. Human ontology based on the inseparability of cognition, embodiment, 
emotion, sociality, and striving.  
 
In chapter 3, I drew on Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about rhizomes to 
emphasize three principles: rhizomes grow horizontally rather than vertically; rhizomes 
form diverse connections; and rhizomes foreground process and movement rather than 
stagnation.  Figure 4.2 illustrates how these three principles apply to the above proposed 
human ontology.  First, the equal font sizes and word positioning emphasizes the 
horizontal rather than vertical relationship between cognition, embodiment, emotion, 
sociality, and striving; because these five qualities work inseparably, none carries more 
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weight than the others.
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  Second, these qualities interact with each other in diverse ways.  
In the figure, the words lie at different angles to each other.  Imagining the ginger root 
growing would cause the words to collide, forming diverse interactions and connections, 
which I will address in the next section.   
Lastly, Figure 4.2 illustrates that these qualities exist in a continual state of 
motion.  Colebrook (2002) explains that the problem with Western thought is that it 
begins with being rather than becoming, explaining that for Deleuze, “The perception of 
fixed beings—such as man [sic]—is an effect of becoming” (xx).  Likewise, the ginger in 
the background of this image emphasizes processes rather than stable beings.  Asking 
“When and who are we?” accentuates the rhizomatic, moving nature of this ontology.  
Human cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving exist in continual 
integration.   
Body without Organs 
 
 Describing humans as cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and striving allows 
for the questioning of frequently unstated assumptions about human ontology.  As noted 
earlier, Deleuze and Guattari would shun attempts to codify difference.  Colebrook 
(2002) explains that for Deleuze, “At any time that we try to think of the difference that 
produces distinct terms, we tend to label it, identify it and subordinate it once again to 
common sense and representation” (p. 14).  Instead of allowing the five aspects of this 
ontology to solidify, Deleuze and Guattari would entreat us to think and act 
rhizomatically, treating the qualities as inspiration for new connections, experiments, and 
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questions.  Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a body without organs may offer a new lens 
through which one could examine the aforementioned ontology. 
 As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that the body 
without organs makes up the body.  Colebrook (2002) elaborates, “The body without 
organs is the life we imagine as underlying our forms of organization” (xxi).  What would 
happen if, rather than using the five aspects—cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, 
and striving—of the above ontology as a form of organization, they served as elements of 
the difference out of which beings form?  In other words, what if the five facets 
functioned as aspects of a body without organs?  Figure 4.3 illustrates a reimagined 
visualization of these five facets.  Rather than residing in an organized manner, they lie 
intermingled in a chaotic arrangement.  This visualization emphasizes the difference and 
disorganization indicative of a body without organs.   
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Figure 4.3. Reimagined visualization of proposed ontology. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that their concept of the body without 
organs opposes not organs, but the “organization of the organs called the organism” (p. 
158).  Imagining these five qualities as a body without organs means working backwards 
from the organism to the diversity that forms the organism; rather than moving from 
cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving to the organism, Deleuze and 
Guattari challenge us to disorganize the organism in order to reveal the complex 
interactions of its constitutive difference.  Yet, they acknowledge that the body without 
organs functions as a limit that humans can never reach.  They assert the importance of 
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the process of creating a body without organs, rather than the body without organs itself.  
Likewise, I posit the above ontology as a process of moving from a simple and organized 
understanding of humanity to a complex and confused one.   
As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari use the body without organs as a 
philosophical figuration rather than a metaphor.  St. Pierre (1997) distinguishes between 
philosophical figurations and metaphors, asserting: 
A figuration is not a graceful metaphor that provides coherency and unity to 
contradiction and disjunction … A figuration is no protection from disorder, since 
its aim is to produce a most rigorous confusion as it jettisons clarity in favor of the 
unintelligible. (pp. 280-1)   
Like the body without organs, a philosophical figuration of humans as integrated 
cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and striving beings should not unify or simplify 
our complexity.  Instead, through this ontology, I aim to complicate long-held ideas about 
human existence, disrupting the way in which we understand ourselves and others.  This 
ontology should not provide a fully ordered framework but rather an unsettled chaos out 
of which new understandings and connections might form.
50
 
 Like the body without organs, this new ontology should pose more questions than 
answers.  These questions might include: How do people differ cognitively, bodily, 
emotionally, socially, and with their strivings from each other and from themselves from 
moment to moment, day to day, and year to year?  How might contemplating humans as 
disorganized and chaotic lead to nuanced understandings about the complex 
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the same color, a disorganized and evolving framework.  As noted earlier in this chapter, Deleuze and 
Guattari favor chaos over systems of organization.  Writing from a place of chaos, however, may minimize 
opportunities for new thinking and action.    
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interrelationships of our multiple qualities?  How might conceptualizing ourselves and 
others as evolving multiplicities create new insights about the nature of musical and 
educative experiences?  How would focusing on this proposed ontology change teaching 
and learning?  I assert that the proposed ontology should encourage complexity, 
complicating rather than simplifying our understanding of when and who we are.  Doing 
so allows Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of time and difference as well as the ongoing 
question of “When are we?” to remain in the forefront. 
Summary 
Using Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of multiplicities and becoming, I posit that 
humans are integrated cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and striving beings.  These 
five inseparable qualities continually change, working together in ever-evolving ways.  
Like Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a body without organs, these five aspects can 
serve as an underlying difference from which beings form.  I pose this ontology as a 
means of emphasizing complexity, hoping that it will evoke more questions and 
connections.  I will further address the possibilities for these ideas, music, and education 
in chapters 6 and 7.  
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Chapter 5 
WHERE ARE WE? 
It was one of the first warm days after months of an especially bitter Pennsylvania 
winter.  The trees were just beginning to bud, and the smell of moist grass swirled in the 
intermittent sun-soaked breeze.  An avid gardener and bird watcher, my fourth grade 
teacher decided to take our class outside for an hour.  As our small bodies relaxed 
beneath a dogwood tree, the teacher led the reading lesson as she did every afternoon.  
Yet, our surroundings made the quotidian instruction memorable.   
In chapter 4, I assert that humans are cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and 
striving multiplicities.  These changing multiplicities exist in places.  In one sense, 
humans are themselves places.  Flay (1989) explains, “The ‘I’ refers to primordial place, 
to a special place among places, to something continuous with and yet radically different 
from all other places” (p. 8).  I experienced the reading lesson differently from my 
position on the ground than I would have in our classroom, and “I” continued to change.  
As my classmates, teacher, and I walked from our classroom to the space outside of our 
school, we ourselves—our own distinct places—individually moved and altered.   
In addition to being individual places, humans exist in layers of places.  My 
elementary school’s location in a suburban section of a Mid-Atlantic state, as opposed to 
an urban area in the American Northwest or a rural section in the American Southwest, 
enabled a comfortable outdoor lesson at that time of year as well as ultimately affected 
multiple aspects of my elementary school experience.  In addition to interfacing with the 
physical markers of our immediate location, such as the grass and heat, my fellow 
students and I experienced other markers from multiple places.  For example, the content 
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and pedagogy occurring within the school depended on practices and places including the 
decisions of the local school board, the teaching and learning occurring at the colleges 
that the teachers and administrators attended, and the discourse and decisions within the 
buildings that house textbook writers and publishers.  My fellow students and I also felt 
the influence of interactions and resolutions occurring within state and national boards of 
education.   
Additionally, the practices within my elementary school did not exist apart from 
or uninfluenced by those within places throughout the world.  My school teachers 
exhibited an interest in national and global affairs, often asking us about current events, 
based on their knowledge of such events gleaned from local and national media sources.  
Since humans’ locations continually integrate with the inseparable qualities of our 
multiplicities, in addition to asking “Who and when are we?” it is important to explore 
the question “Where are we?” 
 The process of bricolage involves looping various ideas through a point of entry 
text (POET).  In this chapter, the question “Where are we?” serves as the POET, through 
which I will loop the work of Deleuze and Guattari as well as place philosophers and 
other authors.  Figure 5.1 illustrates my bricolage mapping in this chapter.  I begin by 
drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas about striated spaces and smooth spaces, 
ultimately asserting their integrated nature.  Second, I use the writings of contemporary 
place philosophers to explain the significance of place in humans’ lives.  Third, I argue 
that the symbiotic relationship between globalization and localization affects how 
members of contemporary societies construct (and are constructed by) and experience 
places.  Finally, I explain how Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of nomads and maps 
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might illuminate potential ways in which people can interact with their multiple local and 
global places.   
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Figure 5.1.  Bricolage mapping of chapter 5. 
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Striated Space and Smooth Space 
As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) write at length about 
spaces, distinguishing between “striated” or sedentary spaces and “smooth” or mobile 
spaces.  They explain that striated spaces occur when structures such as walls, enclosures, 
and roads between enclosures bound and divide places.  Such limitations restrain 
movement and variability and separate objects, people, and ideas into restrictive 
categories (p. 381).  While certain physical environments lend themselves to being 
striated spaces, the interactions within such locations can either reinforce or challenge 
their striated nature.  For example, the walls of music classrooms and studios and the 
practices within them can form striated spaces, separating the musicking within their 
limits from musical experiences beyond their borders.   
Using the philosophical figurations of the desert, steppe, ice, and sea, Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980/1987) contrast striated spaces with smooth spaces that lack limitations.  
Smooth spaces emphasize diversity, change, and evolving journeys (p. 478).  While some 
environments may naturally enable the creation of smooth spaces, people can also 
construct smooth spaces within striated physical environments.  For instance, people 
create smooth spaces when they challenge preexisting boundaries such as classroom 
walls and the perceived barriers between schools and communities.  Smooth spaces might 
form when music educators connect with other teachers in their buildings, perform 
concerts in diverse locations accessible to varying people, and invite local musicians into 
their classrooms.   
Smooth spaces, however, can quickly return to striated ones.  Deleuze and 
Guattari contrast the “work” that takes place in striated space with the “free action” 
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occurring in smooth spaces (p. 490).  “Work” involves the replication of standardized 
actions while “free action” consists of evolving and variable practices.  For example, a 
music educator who traditionally teaches classical music but decides to connect her 
students with a local Taiko drumming ensemble forms a smooth learning space that both 
challenges school walls and homogenous musical practices.  However, if that same 
teacher allows her Taiko drumming instruction to fall into preset patterns from week to 
week and year to year, she has replaced “free action” with the repetition of “work,” again 
forming striated space.  The teacher also supplants smooth space with striated space if 
she continues teaching only Taiko drumming and neglects other forms of musicking, or if 
the Taiko drumming practices within her classroom become disconnected from those in 
the local community. 
While Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) indicate the importance of smooth 
spaces, they also emphasize the symbiotic nature of striated and smooth spaces.  They 
explain that turning smooth space into striated space “is an operation that undoubtedly 
consists in subjugating, overcoding, metricizing smooth space, in neutralizing it, but also 
in giving it a milieu of propagation, extension, refraction, renewal, and impulse without 
which it would perhaps die of its own accord” (italics theirs, p. 486).  In other words, 
despite the tension between smooth spaces and striated spaces, smooth spaces need a 
degree of order and codification in order to continue.  Without striated spaces, there 
exists nothing to smooth.  Bringing diverse musical practices and wanderings into a 
classroom inevitably alters and standardizes such endeavors; the music teacher engaging 
her students in Taiko drumming changes those practices, eventually creating new 
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repeated patterns within her classroom.  Yet, such processes enable Taiko drumming and 
other forms of musicking to propagate.   
While Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) writings about striated spaces and 
smooth spaces serve as midpoints from which and through which I choose to loop ideas 
in the bricolage process of this document, they are also are problematic for this document 
for two reasons.  First, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) use the philosophical figuration 
of a nomad
51
 to explain how people might create smooth spaces.  However, in this 
project, I am interested in how people continually assign meanings to their surroundings.  
Second, Deleuze and Guattari assert that striated spaces are “relatively global” and 
smooth spaces are “relatively local.”  However, in this project, I am interested in how 
humans exist simultaneously in multiple locations.  In the following two sections, I will 
address these issues by combining Deleuze and Guattari’s writings with those of place 
philosophers and other authors.  
Space to Place 
In the second scene of Das Rheingold, the first of four operas in the Ring Cycle, 
the Valhalla theme resonates throughout Wagner’s signature brass section as Wotan, king 
of the gods, stares approvingly at his newly-constructed home.  In the opening of 
Gotterdammerung, the fourth opera in the Ring Cycle, a messenger warns Wotan’s 
daughter that Valhalla teeters on the edge of destruction as a now emaciated Valhalla 
leitmotif sounds beneath the singing.  Throughout the Ring Cycle operas, the alterations 
of the Valhalla leitmotif coincide with changes in and to Valhalla and the characters’ 
evolving understandings of and interactions within their home.  The places in which the 
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characters reside and the ways in which those characters make and remake meaning out 
of those transforming places is central to Wagner’s gesamtkunstwerk.52  
Although Deleuze and Guattari rarely elaborate on the relationship between 
people and spaces, location is fundamental to humans’ existence.  Yet, the ubiquitous 
nature of place makes identifying a person apart from place an impossible task.  How do 
we know ourselves and others apart from the environments we inhabit?  Can you 
envision yourself eating, reading, teaching, or musicking apart from specific locations?  
Can you envision yourself apart from place?  Place is fundamental to human existence 
and experience; in fact, one cannot imagine a world without place (Casey, 1993, p. ix).  
Yet, the pervasive nature of place and the integral, multi-faceted, and changeable role it 
plays in human experiences makes understanding place a challenging endeavor.  As 
Cresswell (2004) states, “Place is not just a thing in the world but a way of understanding 
the world” (p. 11).  In this section, I examine how contemporary place philosophers write 
about the interplay of places, individuals, and societies. 
Cresswell (2004) distinguishes between spaces and places, explaining that spaces 
become places when humans “invest” spaces with meaning (p. 10).  He writes, “We see 
attachments and connections between people and place.  We see worlds of meaning and 
experience” (p. 11).  Places form through humans’ conscious and unconscious 
interactions with and appraisals of their surroundings.  As Stauffer (2012) explains, 
“Places become places, in other words, in the lived experiences and interpretations of 
people who act and interact within them, and through the human meanings that are 
associated with them” (italics hers, p. 436).   
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 “Total work of art.”  See, for example, Donington’s (1974) explanation of the bird-song, nature, Rhine 
water, and Valhalla motives.  
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Forman (2002) elaborates on the exchange between space and place, writing, 
“The active process of making spatial sites significant—or the active transformation of 
space into place—involves the investment of subjective value and the attribution of 
meanings to components of the socially constructed environment” (p. 28).  Through the 
conscious or unconscious assignment of value, humans change spaces, like those 
portrayed in maps and architectural drawings, into meaning-laden places.  For teachers 
and students, the four walls of a music classroom change from a space to a place as they 
form meaningful relationships with and within their surroundings. 
The idea of “authorship” provides another way of describing how spaces become 
places.  Bennett (2000) explains that individuals “author” the places in which “collective 
identities are lived out" (p. 64).  Like the novelist who transfigures empty pages into 
fanciful worlds, humans author their environments by consciously or unconsciously 
turning spaces into meaning-filled places.  In the Ring Cycle, alterations of place motives 
coincide with characters’ ongoing authorship of places ranging from the Rhine to the 
forest.  For example, the original triumphant statement of the Valhalla theme aligns with 
Wotan’s initial authoring of the newly built Valhalla as a place of grandeur and joy, a 
place with meanings that change over time in conjunction with the thinking and actions 
of the characters.  Similarly, classrooms do not come ready-made with meaning; instead, 
inhabitants author those locations through their engagements with and within them. 
While individuals invest places with unique meanings, a given society’s shared 
meanings influence each person’s authorship.  Cresswell (2004) explains, “Place is often 
seen as the ‘locus of collective memory’—the site where identity is created through the 
construction of memories linking a group of people into the past” (p. 61).  For instance, 
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American children come to understand that adults expect different actions to occur in 
museums than in sporting arenas or churches or school classrooms.  While each child 
may author a given place in a slightly different way, her meaning-making occurs 
inseparably from her family’s and society’s values and practices.  Accordingly, Stauffer 
(2009) explains that place is simultaneously individual and collective (p. 177).  Places 
form, proliferate, and alter through the meanings invested in them by both individuals 
and groups. 
Individual and collective authoring of places occurs unceasingly over time.  
Students and teachers do not simply assign meaning to classrooms on the first day of 
school and then retain those significations throughout the year.  Humans’ evolving 
understandings of and experiences within places cause them to continually construct their 
multiple locations.  In the poem “Little Gidding,” T.S. Eliot writes: 
We shall not cease from exploration  
And the end of all our exploring  
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time.
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This process of perceiving, investigating, and assigning value to one’s environments 
occurs perpetually throughout a human’s life.  Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the 
continually differing chaos and flux that constitutes existence.  Similarly, because 
humans’ exploration never ends, we can never definitively “know” a given place; rather, 
individuals continually author places as they encounter and reencounter them.   
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Ongoing individual and collective authorship involves conscious or unconscious 
cognition, emotions, and embodied practices.  In other words, humans come to 
understand places through their experiences.  Cresswell (2002) explains, “Place is both 
the context for practice—we act according to more or less stable schemes of perception— 
and a product of practice—something that only makes sense as it is lived” (p. 26).  For 
instance, the individual and collective experiences of students, teachers, and community 
members within music classrooms enable ongoing authorship of those places. 
Cresswell explains both how places serve to structure humans’ practices and how 
individuals continually author places in unique ways. The practices reproduced within 
certain places serve as structures of significance through which humans understand their 
worlds.  Because human practices constitute places and such practices are notoriously 
difficult to alter (Bourdieu, 1972/1977), places have a tendency to remain constant over 
time.  For example, the freshmen in the high school band I taught followed the example 
of the current seniors, who had followed that of the upperclassmen before them, 
including when, where, and how they acted and even how they enacted the practice of 
band.  Everyone from the new members to the alumni of the band would put percussion 
equipment and sousaphones in the assigned spots that they had held for decades without 
me asking them to do so.  As noted above, such limits and repeated practices indicate 
what Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) describe as striated spaces.  
However, just as post-structuralist writers emphasize the death of the author and 
birth of the reader (Barthes, 1967), place philosophers such as Casey (1997, 2009) and 
Cresswell (2002, 2004) foreground the continually changing experiences and meaning-
making of a place’s inhabitants.  Places themselves serve to structure humans’ practices 
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while concurrently individuals continually author and rewrite places.  As Massey (1991) 
explains, “Places are processes” (p. 29).  Similarly, Cresswell (2002) posits, “Places are 
never complete, finished or bounded but are always becoming—in process” (p. 18).  Such 
variability relates to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) assertions about smooth spaces.   
While Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) insinuate the value of smooth spaces 
over striated ones, they emphasize the interconnected nature of striated and smooth 
spaces (p. 474).  Just as individuals and societies exist as simultaneously stagnant and 
fluid, places also remain constant and change.  Cresswell (2002) summarizes this duality, 
asserting, “Place as practice and practice as placed always relies on the symbiosis of 
locatedness and motion rather than the valorization of one or the other” (p. 26).  In the 
high school band room in which I taught, the practices that students engaged in and the 
meanings that they constructed remained fairly constant for years.  Yet, a close 
examination reveals that current students did undertake different actions and forms of 
authorship than their predecessors.     
At any one time, humans exist not just in a single place, but in multiple, 
interconnected places.  As noted above, Geertz (2001) explains that humans reside not in 
single cultures but in “infolding ones, boxes within boxes” (p. 253).  Similarly, Massey 
(1991) explains that a sense of place "can only be constructed by linking that place with 
places beyond" (p. 29).  Stauffer (2009) elaborates: 
Each individual is situated in places that not only overlap, connect, and nest with 
that person’s experiences, but that also overlap, connect, and nest with and within 
the places of other individuals, groups, societies, and cultures.  We are, therefore, 
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also multiply situated or multiply placed, even though we may not know or be 
conscious of this condition. (p. 177) 
Individuals and groups exist at the continually changing confluence of diverse places.   
Massey (1991) and Stauffer (2012) note that humans’ multiple places include 
local places and global places.  For example, as I watched the Metropolitan Opera’s live 
broadcast of Wagner’s Das Rheingold at a movie theater in Phoenix, Arizona, I 
experienced the unique features of that particular theater and the local environment of 
Phoenix.  As a native of Pennsylvania who had spent nine years in Massachusetts and had 
attended multiple performances at the Metropolitan Opera, I was aware of the place of 
New York City, where the production was occurring in real time.  I also possessed an 
awareness of the places from across the globe from which the opera singers and 
orchestral musicians originated, and the places throughout the United States and around 
the world in which the broadcast also was happening.  Because of my prior experiences 
of places and in places, I likely experienced the opera and my current places on that day 
differently than fellow watchers in the theater who had never left Arizona or those who 
had grown up in New York City and now lived in Arizona.   
Humans exist not in a single place but in multiple, interconnected places.  
Exploring the nuanced relationships between global and local places serves a crucial role 
in understanding the interplay between multiplicities and places. 
Global, Local, Glocal 
In the twenty-first century, examining one’s multiple places involves interrogating 
the interrelationships between globalized webs and localized experiences.  Gruenwald 
(2003) explains that place “foregrounds a narrative of local and regional politics that is 
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attuned to the particularities of where people actually live, and that is connected to global 
development trends that impact local places” (p. 3).  The integration of local and global 
places influences and constructs humans’ identities, values, experiences, and 
relationships.   
Globalization 
At three in the morning, without leaving her bed, a sleepless Minnesotan woman 
watches a YouTube video of Chinese senior citizens performing a Lady Gaga tune.  
When her computer screen freezes, she uses her smart phone to Google and then call 
Dell’s helpline, enabling a teenager from India to help her fix the problem.  A few hours 
later, the drowsy woman relishes her invigorating Tanzanian coffee while scrutinizing the 
value of the Yen, reading about Libya’s election results, and Skyping her boss in 
Chicago.   
As globalization allows for easier and more frequent interactions with disparate 
individuals and groups, humans can and do connect in more ways with more culturally 
varied and geographically divergent peoples and practices than ever before.  Scholte 
(2008) explains that although various writers have defined globalization as 
internationalization, liberalization, universalization, and westernization, fundamentally, 
“globalization involves reductions in barriers to transworld social contacts” (p. 1478).  
Because of globalization, the Minnesotan woman can interact easily with people in 
diverse geographical locations.  Such interactions, however, can range from thoughtless 
and superficial to sensitive and deep.  For instance, the Minnesotan woman may have no 
idea that her coffee comes from Tanzania, or she may specifically buy Fair Trade coffee 
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from a group that makes charitable donations to organizations engaged in social justice 
work within that country.   
The Minnesotan woman’s approach to her Tanzanian coffee relates to what 
Appiah (2006) calls “cosmopolitanism,” a term he uses both to elucidate aspects of 
globalization and to offer an ethical framework for humans’ global interactions.  He 
defines the two ideals of cosmopolitanism as “universal concern and respect for 
legitimate difference” (p. xv).  Elaborating, Appiah argues that humans have obligations 
to those beyond their own kin, localities, and nations, and that valuing others means 
respecting variability rather than aiming for unified forms of societal organization or 
modes of living (p. xv).  From a cosmopolitan perspective, the Minnesotan woman has a 
responsibility to value the humanity and wellbeing of everyone from her family and boss 
to the Chinese performers, Indian technician, Tanzanian coffee growers, and makers of 
her computer and cell phone while simultaneously respecting each as a diverse individual 
in a unique society.  The Minnesotan woman acts in a cosmopolitan manner when she 
contemplates how her practices affect people in diverse location through the world.    
Authors frequently emphasize the centrality of economics in globalization 
narratives (Friedman, 2005; Wells, Shuey & Kiely, 2001; Wolf, 2004).  For example, the 
Minnesotan woman’s global interactions rely on the movement of goods, such as coffee, 
and forms of capital, such as the Yen and the American dollars she paid for her computer.  
However, in addition to economies and economic endeavors, globalization influences, 
propagates, and disrupts diverse aspects of society, ranging from foreign policy to 
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education to cultural practices.
54
  As demonstrated by the Minnesotan woman’s ability to 
watch the Chinese singers imitating and transforming Lady Gaga’s music and musical 
practices on YouTube, globalization also interfaces with artistic practices.  Despite the 
obvious relationship between globalization and culture, Jones (2010) asserts, “Much 
mainstream thinking about globalization lacks explicit attention to cultural issues” (p. 
212).  According to Jones, Arjun Appadurai holds a place as one of the most prominent 
and long-standing thinkers about culture and globalization (p. 210).   
Appadurai (1990) focuses on various types of flows
55
 that enable the movement 
of practices and products of specific cultures from one place to another.  He posits the 
roles of ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes, and ideascapes in 
mediating the relationship between culture and globalization.  He defines ethnoscapes as 
the landscape of people, such as tourists and migrants, technoscapes as the global 
configuration of technology, and finanscapes as global capital.  The Minnesotan woman 
savored a beverage originally imported through ethnoscapes, connected to Chicago, 
China, and India through technoscapes, and valued the Yen because of finanscapes, 
While both mediascapes and ideascapes utilize images, Appadurai (1990) asserts 
that mediascapes emphasize the electronic production and dissemination of information 
through avenues such as newspapers, magazines, television and film.  For instance, the 
Minnesotan woman enjoyed entertainment from China via the mediascapes of Chinese 
television and YouTube.  In contrast, ideascapes center on “the ideologies of states and 
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 Appadurai (1990) approaches the notion of flows from a modernist perspective that contrasts Deleuze 
and Guattari’s (1980/1987) variable and evolving explications of flows.  Appadurai’s writing is 
problematic because he neither accounts for individuals’ unique interpretations of flows nor for the 
constant changing and mixing of flows.  Still, I offer Appaduria’s assertions about flows as a middle from 
which I encourage readers to grow along diverse paths.      
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the counter-ideologies of movements explicitly oriented to capturing state power or a 
piece of it,” including ideas about democracy, freedom, rights, representation, and 
welfare (p. 299).  While the Minnesotan woman may not have directly interfaced with 
ideascapes that morning, she learned about a Libyan government made possible by the 
ideascapes that helped to spread democracy to the Middle East.
56
   
These five types of flows clearly overlap and integrate; the Minnesotan woman 
could not purchase Tanzanian coffee absent the finanscapes of global trade, technoscapes 
that connect producers and consumers, mediascapes that make drinking coffee 
fashionable, and ideascapes that enable a stable Tanzanian government.  Appadurai 
(1990) explains, “These are not objectively given relations which look the same from 
every angle of vision, but rather . . . they are deeply perspectival constructs, inflected 
very much by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of 
actors” (p. 296).  For example, while the Tanzanian coffee company may view their 
international trade solely in terms of finanscapes, leaders of some African governments 
may worry that their citizens’ interactions with foreigners reinforce ideascapes potentially 
detrimental to their power.   
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) explication of striated spaces as “relatively 
global” (p. 494) shares characteristics with Appadurai’s flows.  They assert that long-
distance vision, a constancy of orientation, points of reference, and a central perspective 
indicate striated places (p. 494).  Likewise, fixed lines, such as flight patterns and internet 
cables, and points of reference, such as GPS coordinates, create the striated spaces that 
allow for exchanges via ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financscapes, mediascapes, and 
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ideascapes.  The absence of such markers and points of reference would inhibit global 
flows of people, objects, and information as well as the formation of smooth spaces; 
striated spaces enable globalization.  In critiquing the unequal exchanges inherent in 
capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) briefly note the existence of overarching 
movements within the world economy, positing four types of flows: matter-energy, 
population, food, and urban.  They add that despite such circulations, capitalism prohibits 
many beneficial flows, such as those “that would make it possible to feed the world” (p. 
468).   
Although the movement of people, goods, and information has occurred for 
millennia, Appadurai (1990) focuses on disjunctures in contemporary flows, arguing that 
“people, machinery, money, images, and ideas now follow increasingly non-isomorphic 
paths” (p. 301).  For instance, he explains that while the Japanese may adopt ideas and 
export goods, they are generally closed to immigration; in contrast, the Swiss and Saudis 
accept populations of “guestworkers,” creating diasporas of groups such as Turks and 
Italians.  While migrant Turks tend to maintain ties with their home-nations, others, such 
as South Asian workers, may not.  In other words, flows to and from Japan, Switzerland, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other places are markedly diverse.  Appadurai explicitly links 
these ideas to culture, stating, “Global cultural process today are products of the infinitely 
varied mutual contest of sameness and difference on a stage characterized by radical 
disjunctures between different sorts of global flows and the uncertain landscapes created 
in and through these disjunctures” (p. 308).  As new media and media platforms come 
into existence, tourism becomes popular in currently remote areas, and world markets and 
politics evolve, global flows will continue to change, influencing cultural processes.     
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Through these global flows, cultural artifacts and practices move to disparate 
places.  Subsequently, diverse individuals and groups can alter and combine products and 
practices.  For example, Forman (2002) writes: 
It should also be acknowledged that under certain conditions the broad sweep and 
transnational circulation of contemporary culture industries have the potential to 
introduce new cultural forms and artists to a much wider audience base, to 
contribute to the panoply of cultural voices in dialogue on a global stage, and to 
provide the basis for unforeseen, hybrid interactions. (p. 21)   
Such mixing and hybridization allow for people throughout the globe to engage in new 
forms of practices.
57
  However, such change raises questions about the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of globalization. 
Proponents view globalization as the inevitable result of a world linked by 
transportation, digital media, and commerce, asserting that it can lead to efficient 
resource utilization, intra-culture sharing and hybridization, and the spread of “good” 
ideas (Friedman 2005; Hochschild, 1998; Nederveen Pieterse, 2009; Wolf, 2004).  Yet, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) deplore globalized capitalism’s “axiom” of “unequal 
exchange” (p. 486), and other critics argue that globalization leads to increased poverty 
(Guttal, 2007; Lane, 2008; Madeley, 2009), violence (Naím, 2009), and problems such as 
the conflict between environmental protection and heightened energy demand (Lane, 
2008).  Likewise, although many might view cultural dissemination and hybridization 
positively, such actions can negatively affect people’s actions.  For example, writers have 
lamented globalization’s reduction of cultural diversity (Ambirajan, 2000), 
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disproportionate allotment of intellectual rights (Baltzis, 2005), and hegemonic 
relationships between cultural industries and consumers (Ambirajan, 2000; Baltzis, 2005; 
Hochschild, 1998).  Any explanation of the interplay of culture and globalization must 
take into account both potential possibilities and problems.   
In contemporary society, culture cannot exist apart from or unchanged by 
globalizing flows.  Appadurai’s (1990) five types of global flows provide a framework 
for understanding how the practices and products of a given culture move to and from 
diverse locations.  Acknowledging, investigating, and questioning the effects of 
globalization and global flows on artistic practices involves pondering the possible 
negative consequences of such interactions. 
Localization 
Although the writers above tend to address globalization without specifically 
noting its interrelationship with local practices, other authors have articulated connections 
between localization and globalization, positing that the local practices create, reinforce, 
and alter globalization.  Such interactions occur simultaneously in two directions: 
localized practices become globalized and globalized practices become localized.  
Examining this concurrent interplay may offer a nuanced view of both globalization and 
localization. 
Think of a musical style or practice that has spread across the globe.  Where did it 
originate?  What local conditions enabled it to form?  Practices that become globalized 
begin locally.  De Sousa Santas (2006) writes that “globalization presupposes 
localization,” explaining, “There are no global conditions for which we cannot find local 
roots” (p. 397).  While genres of music such as hip-hop, jazz, prog rock, and reggae have 
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spread throughout the globe, they all have roots in localized musicking.  For example, 
Dixieland jazz musicking developed in the local place of New Orleans through the blend 
of brass bands, French Quadrilles, ragtime, and blues unique to New Orleans in the early 
twentieth century, then spread to and was transformed in other local places.   
At the same time, globalized practices may integrate with local customs.  Escobar 
(2001) asserts that globalization influences but does not exclusively produce local 
practices (p. 141).  Appadurai (1990) also notes this relationship, writing; 
Globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization  
(armaments, advertising techniques, language hegemonies, clothing styles and the  
like), which are absorbed into local political and cultural economies, only to be 
repatriated as heterogeneous dialogues of national sovereignty, free enterprise, 
fundamentalism (etc.). (p. 307) 
In other words, localization occurs as a result of individuals’ and communities’ particular 
integration of globalized products and processes. For instance, while globalization may 
spread once-localized Western popular music throughout the world, musicians in various 
countries interpret such music in diverse ways, often mixing it with local musical 
practices.
58
  While localization may occur when people alter practices not directly 
influenced by globalizing flows, the pervasive influence of globalization on twenty-first 
century societies makes such alterations increasingly uncommon.   
Exploring the question “Where are we?” involves investigating the ongoing 
combinations of homogeneity and heterogeneity.  This continual mixing of uniformity 
and variation relates to the interplay of globalization and localization.  Deleuze and 
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 See, for example, Levy (2004) and Watkins (2004).  I will discuss the relationship between localization, 
globalization, and musicking in more detail in chapter 6.  
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Guattari’s (1980/1987) concepts of territorialization, reterritorialization and 
deterritorialization offer additional insight into humans’ evolving locations. 
As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) concepts of 
territorialization and reterritorialization relate to their concept of striated spaces; 
territorialization and reterritorialization cause the stagnation and uniformity indicative of 
striated spaces, obstructing lines of flight.  In contrast, their concept of deterritorialization 
relates to their concept of smooth spaces; deterritorialization creates the mobility and 
diversity that suggest smooth spaces. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that deterritorialization occurs in 
specific locations (pp. 381-2).  For instance, as local musicians engage with globalized 
music and musical practices, they deterritorialize those practices, altering them in light of 
their local traditions.  Conversely, practices become territorialized through globalizing 
forces that propagate homogeneity and temporary stagnation.  For example, as any given 
genre of music moves throughout the globe, it promotes a degree of uniformity in the 
musical engagement of diverse people.  
The idea of cosmopolitanism offers another way of understanding the symbiotic 
relationship between local and global.  For example, Hansen (2011) writes, 
“Cosmopolitanism conflicts not with local culture as such but with the view that culture 
can only survive inside a bubble” (p. 65).  In contemporary societies, both globalization 
and localization influence people’s everyday activities, understandings, and values.  It is 
therefore problematic and limiting to view either globalization or localization 
independently of one another.  In the following subsection, I explore the possibilities of 





How might one further understand and articulate the interconnected nature of 
globalization and localization?  Robertson (1995) uses the term “glocalization” to explain 
their interrelationship.  He states, "It is not a problem of either homogenization or 
heterogenization, but rather the ways in which both of these tendencies have become 
features of life across much of the late-twentieth-century world” (italics his, p. 27).  
Likewise, twenty-first century societies exhibit this concurrent proclivity towards both 
standardization and variation.  Glocalization occurs as global flows allow for the mass 
spread of products, practices, and ideas while diverse individuals, communities, and 
nations interpret and assign value to such items and actions in light of their unique, 
divergent histories.   
Khondker (2004) attributes the first English usage of the term “glocalization” to 
Robertson, a sociologist at the University of Pittsburg (p. 3).  Robertson (1995) asserts 
that he adapted the word from Japanese, elaborating that the idea of “glocalization” 
developed from the Japanese word dochakuka, which designates the adaptation of 
farming techniques to local conditions (p. 28).  The term became part of Japanese 
business jargon in the 1980s.  Robertson (1995) explains: 
The idea of glocalization in its business sense is closely related to what in some 
contexts is called, in more straightforwardly economic terms, micromarketing: the 
tailoring and advertising of goods and services on a global or near-global basis to 
increasingly differentiated local and particular markets. (p. 28)   
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Since Robertson’s original usage, “glocalization” has appeared in the work of researchers 




Robertson (1995) elaborates on his understanding of “glocalization” and why the 
term resonated with him.  He writes: 
The notion of glocalization actually conveys much of what I myself have 
previously written about globalization.  From my own analytic and interpretive 
standpoint the concept of globalization has involved the simultaneity and the 
interpenetration of what are conventionally called the global and local, or—in 
more abstract vein—the universal and the particular. (p. 30)   
The above writings on globalization and localization demonstrate the problematic nature 
of addressing either process in isolation.  The term “glocalization” more adequately 
describes the movement and transformation of goods, practices, and ideas in twenty-first 
century societies. 
How might exploring the question “Where are we?” using the concept of 
glocalization relate to Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about space?  As noted above, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) assert the global, homogeneous nature of striated 
places and the local, heterogeneous nature of smooth places, ultimately asserting their 
symbiotic nature.  For example, the striated spaces of technoscapes and mediascapes 
allow Lady Gaga’s music to spread throughout the globe.  Her songs follow the 
consistent paths of the television and internet cables that enable globalization.  When 
these works reach local smooth spaces, diverse people and groups, ranging from bassoon 
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 See, for example, Giulianotti and Robertson (2007), Liu (2011), Rao (2009), and Rhedding-Jones (2002). 
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quartets and college marching bands to SKRILLEX and Screamo bands, deterritorialize 
and reinterpret, ultimately reterritorializing them through their own repeated practices.
60
  
Just as striated spaces and smooth spaces constantly meet and transverse one another, 
glocalization occurs at the nexus of globalization and localization. 
Using the term “glocalization” emphasizes an understanding of globalization and 
localization as interconnected rather than independent, allowing for an intricate 
conceptualization of the complex web of influences and interactions in which humans 
reside.  Glocalization can be viewed as the integration of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1980/1987) concepts of striated global places, with their consistently oriented 
landmarks, and smooth local places, with their continually varying points.  Likewise, 
glocalization highlights the ongoing movements of territorialization, deterritorialization, 
and reterritorialization.  Contemporary musicking exists within, is affected by, and 
influences our glocalized world.
 61
   
Nomads with Maps 
 
 While glocalization integrates with the experiences of almost all humans, people 
can choose to understand and act within their glocalized places in diverse ways.  As noted 
in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari offer the concepts of nomads and maps to elucidate 
possibilities for humans’ interactions with their multiple environments.  In this section, I 
begin by explaining how people might utilize Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about 
nomads to engage with their glocalized environments.  Next, I articulate how Deleuze 
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 I will further address the relationship between glocalization and musicking in Chapter 6. 
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and Guattari contrast tracings and maps, asserting the potential advantages of mapping 
one’s multiple places. 
Nomads 
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) philosophical figuration of nomads 
emphasizes journeying rather than destinations.  As noted in chapter 3, they call nomads 
“vectors of deterritorialization,” explaining that nomads inhabit and augment smooth 
spaces (p. 382).  Forming smooth spaces requires crossing, challenging, or eliminating 
preexisting boundaries and emphasizing diversity and movement.  For instance, nomadic 
music teachers might challenge borders between various disciplines, genres of music, and 
types of musical engagement.  For music educators in a glocalized society, such 
boundaries also include divides between classroom musicking and that of students’ 
multiple local and global communities.   
When I think back to my days as a middle school band and general music teacher 
in Boston, I realize my lack of nomadic wandering; my practices were consistent with 
someone moving in striated spaces.  I knew little about the diverse musical cultures that 
flourished in the towns I passed through on my daily thirty-minute commute between my 
starting point, my apartment, and my ending point, the school where I taught.  Each day I 
traced and retraced the same well-worn path in my car, the same repertoire list in my 
band rehearsals, and the same placeless curriculum in my general music classroom.  
While I played oboe in a local community orchestra, regularly attended Boston 
Symphony Orchestra performances, and occasionally enjoyed jazz brunches or live 
concerts near my apartment, I chose to remain disoriented, unaware of much of the 
variegated musical landscape that surrounded me.  My ignorance of my local musical 
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surroundings caused me to miss many potential musical experiences, insights, and 
understandings.  By tracing only my own musical interests rather than wandering among 
and mapping those of students and community members, my students and I missed 
opportunities to learn about, explore, and interact with local musicians and musical 
practices.   
Deleuze and Guattari explain that nomads live between destinations, focusing on 
coming and going rather than arriving and remaining (p. 380).  What might have 
happened if my students and I had wondered among our local community’s musical 
practices?  Our nomadic expeditions might have led me to discover musicking that we 
could explore.  For instance, drawing on the musical interests of students, we might have 
found a member of local Irish group who would talk to or lead workshops with my 
general music classes and bands.  As a result of my nomadic journeying, I might have 
also decided to substantially alter my own practices, changing my striated classroom full 
of stagnation and homogeneity into a smooth space teeming with movement and 
heterogeneity based on local musical engagement.  For instance, the band students and I 
might have explored the music of the local Haitian community or the general music 
students and I could have composed pieces based on themes from that year’s Boston 
Symphony Orchestra repertoire.   
Nomads embrace ongoing journeys rather than end results.  As Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980/1987) explain, “The life of the nomad is the intermezzo” (p. 380).  
Thinking nomadically about place involves not only wandering among places but 
emphasizing the joy of movement rather than stopping points.  A nomad would not 
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replace one stable set of practices with another, but rather continue embarking on new 
musical and educative journeys. 
Tracings and Maps   
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) concepts of tracings and maps offer another 
way of thinking about how people might interact with their glocalized surroundings.  
According to Deleuze and Guattari, tracings select and isolate, reproducing prior 
conceptions of reality and minimizing life’s complexities (p. 13).  A traditional “map” of 
a local town actually functions as a tracing; it takes a complex environment and 
reproduces parts of it as stagnant lines and symbols.  In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987) conceive of maps as being continually produced and constructed (p. 21).  
Like cartographers exploring lands unknown to their home societies, people walking 
within towns while closely observing their surroundings create evolving maps.   
Maps relate not to abstract ideals or prior conceptions of society, but to the 
moving tip of each individual’s time cone.  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) write, 
“What distinguishes a map from a tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an 
experimentation in contact with the real” (p. 12).  In contemporary societies, mapping 
involves wandering, investigating the interconnected practices of local and global 
communities.   
For example, what would happen if a band director encouraged his or her students 
to search for the “Holst Second Suite in F” on YouTube?  My own explorations yielded 
517 videos originating from at least a dozen different American states as well as the 
countries of Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  The groups included high school, university, 
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community, and professional bands as well as unique performances such as a single 
young woman who made a multitrack recording of herself playing all of the piece’s 
instrumental parts.
62
  I also found other assorted nomadic renditions of Holst’s Second 
Suite in F including numerous brass quintets, a graduate tuba-euphonium quartet, a 
saxophone quartet, a clarinet choir, and a solo drummer.
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Mapping our local and global environments means looking for both geographic 
diversity and varying musical practices.  While many of these groups sought to produce 
tracings by performing the piece in a traditional manner, others mapped Holst’s “Second 
Suite in F” by imagining it with new instrumentation or by making unique stylistic 
choices.  Such practices contrast the stagnation and replication inherent in tracings.  In 
addition to encouraging students to seek out how others have interpreted familiar music 
and musicking differently, a nomadic music educator might facilitate experiences in 
which students create their own unique versions of existing works or collaborate with 
others from their local and global communities in order to create hybrid performances or 
new musical pieces or practices. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of nomads and maps offer new possibilities for 
engaging with humans’ multiple places.  Becoming a nomad means wandering, 
experimenting, and emphasizing musical and educative journeys over destinations.  
Becoming a cartographer involves problematizing space, inquiring into the evolutionary 
nature of life and music, and gaining an awareness of the constantly changing musical 
happenings of our local and global communities. 








Humans’ ongoing construction of places occurs inseparably from their practices 
as well as their understandings of themselves and their environments.  Drawing on the 
writings of Deleuze and Guattari as well as place philosophers, I assert the centrality of 
place in human life and note the symbiotic nature of striated spaces and smooth spaces.  
In twenty-first century societies, asking “Where are we?” involves exploring how 
globalization, localization, and glocalization interplay with places as well as the 
continually-evolving practices and meaning-making within them.  Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts of nomads and maps offer understandings about how people might choose to 
interact with their glocalized world.  I further examine the relationships between places, 
music, and education in chapters 6, 7, and 8.  
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Chapter 6 
WHEN IS MUSIC? 
“I believe that the only excuse for being musicians, for making music in  
any fashion, is to make it differently, and to perform it differently, and to 
 establish the music’s difference vis-à-vis our own difference.”  Glenn Gould 
 
When teaching my eighth grade general music students about John Cage, I would 
always begin by “performing” 4’33” and then asking them whether or not what they 
heard was music.  Although I almost always received a resounding “no” along with 
confused and frustrated explanations, I found the process of having students define music 
engaging, educative, and enlightening for both them and me.  Yet, as such an exercise 
demonstrates, any attempt to define music almost always leads to a definition too narrow 
to encompass the great wealth of human musical endeavors or too broad to be useful in 
anything other than a philosophical argument.  Changing the question from “What is 
music?” to “When is music?” yields drastically different results.   
Through their writing, Deleuze and Guattari accentuate the role of temporality 
and difference in existence.  Likewise, asking “When is music?” emphasizes existence as 
continual processes, drawing attention to musical experiences
64
 rather than artistic works.  
Cage himself noted the importance of focusing on life’s ephemeral nature; in a 1982 
interview with reporters from National Public Radio, he explained how in his youth he 
used to gather and sell mushrooms to gourmet restaurants, stating, "That's one of the 
beautiful things about hunting mushrooms. . . . They grow up and they're fresh at just a 
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 I am using the term “musical experience” rather than “aesthetic experience” because the term “aesthetic” 
historically implies a “critique of taste” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2000).  Additionally, Dewey (1934) 
explains that the term “esthetic” often refers to perception and enjoyment of art and therefore contrasts the 
term “artistic,” which often refers to the production of art (p. 46).  While musical experiences encompass 
aesthetice experiences, musical experiences may also encompass experiences beyond those traditionally 
defined as aesthetic.   
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particular moment, and our lives are actually characterized by moments" (NPR Music, 
2012).  Musicking occurs in and over time, with each individual experiencing his or her 
engagement uniquely.  
Answers to “What is music?” naturally converge while answers to “When is 
music?” tend to diverge into narratives shaped by our prior experiences, future 
aspirations, and current time and location.  The question “When is music?” allows a 
student to not experience music when engaging with 4’33”, Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9 
in D minor, or “Gahu”65 one day, only to find herself immersed in such musicking on 
another day.  Dewey (1934) notes the inseparability of past and present, explaining: 
To see, to perceive, is more than to recognize.  It does not identify something 
present in terms of a past disconnected from it.  The past is carried into the 
present so as to expand and deepen the content of the latter. (p. 24)   
Similarly, Deleuze uses Bergson’s time cone66 to explain how the past exists in the 
present.  All of our past actualizes with each passing moment of music.   
Additionally, to answer the question “What is music?” a person must use his or 
her cognitive faculties to distinguish and articulate music from other auditory 
experiences.  Defining 4’33”, Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9 in D minor, or “Gahu” as 
music requires cognitive appraisals, reasoned logic, and the linguistic skills to articulate 
one’s thoughts.  Such cognition often excludes, limits, or minimizes other aspects of 
human multiplicities and their interconnectedness with musical experiences.  For 
instance, definitions of music cannot completely capture the evolving emotions resulting 
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from the intense improvisations in “Gahu” or the embodied experience of dancing to such 
a piece.   
Asking “When is music?” leads to questions about the ontology of musical 
experiences.  The question “What is musical experience?” emphasizes the past, 
objectifying active and evolving musical experiences and neglecting humans’ unfolding 
relationships with them.  In contrast, the question “When is music?” foregrounds the 
continuum of past and present as well as questions the tendency towards objectification.  
Although any attempt to define the nature of a musical experience inevitably makes that 
experience stagnant, in this chapter I keep the question of “When is music?” rather than 
“What is a musical experience?” at the forefront.   
Nelson Goodman’s (1978) famous question “When is art?” inspired my choice of 
the question “When is music?”  Goodman explains, “If attempts to answer the question 
‘What is art?’ characteristically end in frustration and confusion, perhaps—as so often in 
philosophy—the question is the wrong one” (p. 57).   He adds that authors often confuse 
the question “What is art?” with the question “What is good art?” (p. 66), asserting, “The 
real question is not ‘What objects are (permanently) works of art?’ but ‘When is an object 
a work of art?’—or more briefly … ‘When is art?’” (p. 66-7).  This emphasis on 
ephemeral and variability aligns with Deleuze and Guattari’s key principles of time and 
difference. 
Goodman’s further explications of the question “When is art?,” however, contrast 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy in four important ways.  First, Goodman answers his 
question by offering five “tentative symptoms of the aesthetic,” all of which assert the 
importance of symbols: syntactic density, “where the finest differences in certain respects 
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constitute a difference between symbols;” semantic density, where artists provide 
symbols for minute differences; relative repleteness, where many aspects of a symbol 
hold significance; exemplification, where symbols literally or metaphorically serve as 
samples of properties; and multiple and complex reference, where symbols interact in 
multiple ways (p. 67-8).  In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the difference and 
uniqueness of art, arguing against symbols and definition.  Colebrook (2002) explains 
that for Deleuze: 
It would be a mistake to interpret art for some actual hidden meaning—what the 
author wanted to say, or the message coded in a text—as though art were a 
worldly sign that just led us from one thing to another (from picture to meaning).  
Art gives us material signs: this redness in all its singularity and specificity, which 
is not tied to any actual thing or meaning but presents us with the very possibility 
or potential of colour, the power to be red in this way. (italics hers, pp. 90-91)   
Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on difference and singularities contradicts Goodman’s 
articulations of the similarities between artistic works. 
Second, Goodman’s emphasis on symbols centers on the cognitive aspect of 
artistic experiences.  Cognition is necessary in order to identify, interpret, and understand 
symbols.  In contrast, as noted in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari assert the importance of 
sensation in art.  Third, while Goodman acknowledges that asking “When is art?” 
necessitates ongoing questioning about an object’s function, he maintains the categories 
of art and non-art, writing, “The Rembrandt painting remains a work of art, as it remains 
a painting, while functioning only as a blanket; and the stone from the driveway may not 
strictly become art by functioning as art” (p. 69).  Ultimately, Goodman asserts the stable 
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identity of the painting or rock regardless of its momentary position.  In contrast, Deleuze 
and Guattari argue against all stable identities, instead positing the constant fluctuation of 
all existence.  For Goodman, the question “What is art?” is secondary to the question 
“When is art?”  In a world based on the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, “When is art?” 
is the only question.   
Lastly, Goodman’s elaborations revolve around artistic objects rather than 
processes.  While his writing does not strictly contradict the notion that “When is art?” 
could apply to performers, composers, and listeners, he does not acknowledge such 
possibilities.  Conversely, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of art highlights 
composition and ongoing engagement with artworks and artistic processes.   
Although Goodman’s question led to the title of this chapter, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s key principles of time and difference as well as the human ontology posited in 
chapter 4 and explorations of place posited in chapter 5 guide the discussion below.  
Asking “When is music?” presumes the existence of a conscious participant who 
determines, through a combination of thoughts, emotions, internal bodily sensations 
and/or external bodily movements, and past and present social experiences whether and 
how and in what ways he or she is experiencing music.  The participant’s strivings and 
multiple evolving places, including the confluence of local and global practices, also 
interplay with his or her musical experiences.    
Bricolage mapping involves continually looping divergent ideas through a point 
of entry text (POET).  In this chapter, the question “When is music?” serves as the POET 
through which I loop the work of Deleuze and Guattari and the ontologies posited in 
chapters 4 and 5 as well as the writings of other authors.  Figure 6.1 illustrates my 
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bricolage mapping in this chapter.  I begin by examining how inseparably cognitive, 
embodied, emotional, social, and striving multiplicities engage with music.  Second, I 
posit that musicking involves conscious or unconscious striving towards a combination of 
consistency and chaos.  Third, I examine conceptions of place, including striated spaces, 
smooth spaces, and glocalization, in musical experiences.  Finally, I assert that music 
occurs when we as cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and striving beings emplaced 
in glocal environments engage in musicking.   
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Figure 6.1.  Bricolage mapping of chapter 6. 
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Multiplicities 
In chapter 4, I drew on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) concept of 
multiplicities to propose a human ontology based on the inseparability of cognition, 
embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving.  Multiplicities, Deleuze and Guattari assert, 
exist as symbiotic interactions between their inseparable qualities.  These integrated 
aspects of human ontology play a central role in musical experiences.
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As noted in chapter 1, cognition dominates contemporary music education 
discourse and practice.  The 1994 National Music Standards illustrate the problematic 
nature of current conceptions of musickers and musicking.  These standards make no 
mention of the words “emotion” or “body” and only obliquely reference musickers’ 
sociality through “performing in groups” and “understanding music in relation to … 
culture” (Consortium, 1994).  Likewise, one need only read the articles in the Journal for 
Research in Music Education to see the emphasis placed on music cognition separate 
from humans’ other qualities, a trend that has persisted for decades (Schmidt & Zdzinski, 
1993).  Furthermore, although authors such as Bowman (2004), Elliott and Silverman 
(2012), Fiske (2012), Goble (2010), and Pabich (2012) have posited the integrated nature 
of humans’ multiple aspects of being, many contemporary critiques of music education 
continue to reproduce a human ontology based almost exclusively on cognition.
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In this section, I examine literature related to musical experiences and human 
cognition, embodiment, emotion, and sociality.  My goal is neither to provide a complete 
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 I address striving tangentially in this section; I address it in more detail in the following section, entitled 
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 See, for example, Allsup (2003), Benedict (2007), Jorgensen (2003), Kratus (2007), Regelski (2005), and 
Woodford (2005).  
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review and critique of literature addressing each aspect’s relationship to music nor to 
elucidate contradictions between authors’ writings in one section with those in another.69  
Given the difficulty of discussing four human qualities simultaneously, these authors 
generally address no more than two at a time.   
This section follows the same order as the “Multiplicities” section in chapter 4.  I 
begin by considering the integration of cognition and embodiment during musicking.  
Next, I interconnect emotion with cognition and embodiment, noting how the three 
qualities integrate during musical experiences.  Lastly, I posit that musicking includes the 
interplay of human sociality, cognition, embodiment, and emotion.  As in chapter 4, I ask 
the reader to keep the integration of cognition, embodiment, emotion, and sociality in 
mind throughout this section.  In the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari, I offer the interplay 
of musical experiences and these four inseparable qualities as a complicated middle that I 
encourage readers to further disturb and connect.   
Cognitive and Embodied 
 In chapter 4, I describe how Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Shusterman (1999, 
2008, 2009, 2011) explain the necessity of understanding human cognition as inseparable 
from embodiment.  Despite the writings of such researchers, Bowman and Powell (2007) 
note the absence of body in contemporary music discourse, writing, “Classical aesthetic 
theory has a kind of centrifugal force that persistently draws away the body that is 
arguably the center of most people’s musical experience, and gravitates toward 
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 For example, I explicate Davies’ (1994) theories on music, emotion, and cognition in one subsection and 
Bowman’s (2004) writings on music, cognition, and embodiment in another subsection.  Davies’ writings 
on cognition negate the role of the body that is emphasized in Bowman’s.  It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to address the multitude of contradictions and relationships between the views of the authors I 
utilize in this section.  I acknowledge that such problems and contradictions exist. 
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experience that is abstract, mindful, cognitively distinguished, and trustworthy” (p. 
1089).  Bowman (2004) asserts the need for “An embodied account of musical 
cognition,” stating: 
The body is not something to be transcended in musical experience, something 
whose presence serves us as a kind of inverse index of musical value.  It is not 
only indispensable in, but constitutive of all experience and cognition that rightly 
claim musical status. (p. 35)   
In this subsection, I explain how writers have applied the work of Lakoff and Johnson 
and Shusterman to musical experiences as well as examine how the inseparable mind-
body creates, perceives, and interacts with various acts of musicking. 
As noted in chapter 4, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) posit that humans come to 
understand abstract concepts through their embodied worldly experiences.  Using the 
work of Lakoff and Johnson, Bowman (1998, 2000) offers a detailed account of how 
humans’ embodied knowing applies to various musical concepts and experiences.  For 
instance, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) explain that humans use spatial metaphors to 
distinguish between categories, often envisioning them as containers with an interior and 
exterior.  Bowman (2000) draws on these metaphors to explain how ideas such as being 
“in” a key or “out of” a key relate to embodied experiences.  He elaborates, “Each of 
these fundamentally musical phenomena—timbre, gesture, groove, movement, growth, 
and attenuation—are bodily mediated, corporeal acquisitions” (p. 50).   
 Using their knowledge of the inseparability of mind and body, musicians can 
refine their practices and alter their musicking.  Through his proposed discipline of 
somaesthetics, Shusterman (1999) emphasizes the benefits of improving the body 
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through active reflection.  Writers such as Määttänen (2010) and Holgersen (2010) have 
applied Shusterman’s writings to musical practices.  For instance, Määttänen writes that 
the “main message of somaethstics to musicians and music educators is that it is good to 
develop one’s reflective bodily awareness and to keep one’s body in conditions by 
training it” (p. 65).  
Holgersen (2010) offers a different interpretation, positing how Shusterman’s 
degrees of body consciousness coincide with various forms of musical engagement.  As 
noted in chapter 4, Shusterman describes four levels of body consciousness: corporeal 
intentionality, primary consciousness, somaesthetic perception, and somaesthetic 
reflection.  Holgersen explains that musical experiences in the first level, corporeal 
intentionality, might include listening to music when sleeping, while those in the second 
level, primary consciousness, might include hearing background music that may invoke 
certain emotions or singing along with music without awareness of one’s actions.  He 
adds, “Trained musicians reading music, playing an instrument, or identifying a piece of 
music by ear, activities that require explicit awareness but not necessarily analytic 
reflection” reflects the third level, somaesthetic perception, while composing, 
improvising, or “correcting wrong notes” with an “awareness of one’s own awareness,” 
intentionality, and analytical reflection occur in the fourth level, somaesthetic reflection 
(p. 35-6).  All of these examples presuppose an inseparable mind-body unit as 
fundamental part of musical experiences.  Focusing on the four levels of body 
consciousness during musicking might bring awareness to the integration of the mind and 
body and perhaps enhance one’s practices and musical experiences. 
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  While Holgersen’s examples possess a Eurocentric bias, other music educators as 
well as ethnomusicologists have noted the central role played by the integrated mind-
body in the engagement with a variety of musics.  American ethnomusicologists have 
written about the integration of cognition and embodiment during musicking, often 
choosing to include dance when they facilitate ethnomusicology ensembles.  For 
instance, Locke (2004), a collegiate teacher of Ghanaian drumming, explains, “African 
performance asks for group-oriented, mind-body intelligence rather than a self-oriented, 
visual-analytical approach,” adding, “New students should experience physical sensations 
as directly as possible, with minimal filtering through familiar concepts of music theory” 
(p. 175).  Kisliuk and Gross (2004), ethnomusicologists who teach central African 
BaAka, combine dance and music to create an “embodied study of aesthetics” (p. 249).  
Similarly, education professor Kimberly Powell (2004) explains the multiple 
relationships between movement and sound in taiko drumming, writing, “Kata is a visual 
form of movement that is inseparable from the playing of taiko, dating back to an 
aesthetic convention originating in a form of Japanese court music that accompanied 
certain dances” (p. 185).  The integration of mind and body holds a paramount place in 
many forms of musicking.   
Although few authors note the role of listeners’ mind-bodies in endeavors with 
Western art music, Shusterman (2010) uses the concept of mirror neurons to explain how 
listeners actively interpret the visual cues of musicians.  As noted in chapter 4, 
neuroscientists have proposed the existence of mirror neurons in order to account for why 
the brains of people watching the movements of others react in part as if they were 
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performing the same motions.
70
  For example, if I observe someone throwing a ball, my 
brain in part responds as if I had thrown the ball.  Shusterman applies mirror-neuron 
research to musicking, stating: 
Seeing a performer using her body to play a piece is thus very likely to engage 
motor neural pathways involved in performing those movements, so that the 
observer, if she has a keen somaesthetic sensibility and is very attentive, can get a 
feel in her body of the motor qualities of the performers’ movements she 
observers. (p. 103)   
The combination of listening to and viewing musickers, therefore, invokes a mind-body 
experience similar to that of performing.  For instance, if I see someone play a phrase on 
a piano, my body responds in part as if I were performing at the piano.  Yet, in the 
general music and band classes that I taught, students’ bodies went almost completely 
unnoticed.  Had I contemplated the integration of body and mind, I might have drawn 
students’ attention to how the musicking of others might integrate with their bodies as 
well as created more opportunities for them to engage their mind-bodies while 
participating in various forms of musicking.   
The interconnection of cognition and embodiment constitute part of evolving 
human multiplicities.  The above writers explain the complex and multi-layered aspects 
of an inseparable mind-body engaged in musicking.  Examining the question “When is 
music?” involves exploring how the mind-body interplays with humans’ understandings 
of musical concepts and engagement in musical experiences.   
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Cognitive, Embodied, and Emotional 
Humans’ mind-bodies unceasingly integrate with their emotions, including during 
musical experiences.  Maus (2010) explains:  
It is not rare for people to feel that music has some kind of powerful physical 
effects on them, that it causes, for instance, a desire to dance, or bodily sensations 
associated with emotional responses, such as chills or a melting feeling. (p. 13) 
Since the time of the Greeks, Western philosophers have articulated, critiqued, and 
offered opinions about the interconnection of cognition and emotion during musical 
experiences.  While authors ranging from Plato and Aristotle to Hanslick and Gurney 
dismiss the emotions felt while hearing music as an unfortunate or insignificant 
byproduct of a cognitive musical experience, philosophers such as Langer and Meyer 
have acknowledged and celebrated the role of emotion in musical endeavors (Bowman, 
1998).   
As noted in chapter 4, Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) indirectly acknowledge 
the relationship between emotion and cognition during what they call “artistic activity,” 
writing, “Art thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through affects and percepts” 
(p. 66).  Deleuze and Guattari, however, do not directly assert the integration of emotion 
and the mind-body during artistic experiences.  The work of other writers adds nuance to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas about the role of sensation in musicking.   
In chapter 4, I note how neuroscientists such as Damasio (1999) and Ekman 
(1994) define the existence of emotions in terms of bodily responses, noting the 
inseparability of emotion and the body.  Researchers such as Averill (1980), Damasio 
(1999), and Lakoff and Johnson (1999) explicitly challenge the divide between cognition 
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and emotion, asserting that emotion does not exist apart from cognition.  It follows that 
emotion and the mind-body function inseparably during musical experiences.  Below I 
build on the work of the aforementioned authors, detailing how musicking involves the 
integration of the mind-body and emotions.  Exploring the question “When is music?” 
involves interrogating how cognition, embodiment, and emotion interplay during musical 
experiences. 
 “In joy and sorrow I was ever drawn to it,” sings Dietrich Fischer Dieskau as his 
head lifts peacefully upwards and his eyes gaze into the distance with intense sorrow and 
longing.  The piano plays onwards, and Dieskau’s head sinks, his eyes fall and contract, 
and his face tightens while he recollects passing the same tree in the dead of night.
71
  As I 
experience Dieskau’s performance of “Der Lindenbaum” from Schubert’s Winterreise, I 
feel a range of emotions, the muscles in my face and body relaxing and tightening with 
the musical lines.   
Scientists such as Lundqvist, Carlsson, Hilmersson, and Juslin (2009) have 
measured the muscle activity of people listening to music.  Their research revealed that 
happier popular music induced markedly different physiological changes, such as greater 
skin conductance and lower finger temperature, than sadder music.  While a person’s 
own unique experiences affect his or her individual emotional-embodied responses to 
musicking, the aforementioned research demonstrates that similarities can occur within 
listeners of the same or similar cultures.   
When making or listening to music, people can also share similar embodied-
emotional experiences.  In chapter 4, I note that researchers such as Coulson (2004) and 
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Sogon and Makoto (1989) argue that humans can surmise the emotions of others by 
observing their bodily postures.  Drawing on these ideas, Molnar-Szakacs and Overy 
(2006) assert that mirror neurons enable humans listening to music to partially 
understand, through their bodies, the emotions of performers.  They state, “According to 
the simulation mechanism implemented by the human mirror neuron system, a similar or 
equivalent motor network is engaged by someone listening to singing/drumming as the 
motor network engaged by the actual singer/drummer” (p. 236).  In other words, when 
mind-bodies hear sounds produced by another human, they partially react as if they 
themselves had produced the sounds.  As I listen to Dieskau’s singing, my mind-body 
reacts in part as though I were singing; the mirror neurons linked to the physical actions 
that would engage if I were singing sorrowfully engage as I hear the emotion in 
Dieskau’s voice.  Likewise, as I listen to the Billie Holiday’s sultry singing or the joyful 
musicking of The Beatles, my integrated mind-body and emotions respond partly as 
though I were making such sounds.   
Since emotions occur inseparably from the mind-body, experiencing embodied 
sensations allows humans to partially understand the emotions of another musicker.  
Molnar-Szakacs and Overy (2006) explain that when listening to music, signals move 
from a person’s mirror neuron system, via the anterior insula,72 to the limbic system.  
They write: 
The anterior insula forms a neural conduit between the mirror neuron system and 
the limbic system, allowing this information to be evaluated in relation to one’s 
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own autonomic and emotional state contributing to a complex affective response 
mediated by the limbic system. (p. 237)   
While listening, our bodies come to feel the sensations and emotions, mediated by our 
own physical and emotional state, that we associate with the production of those sounds.   
 Researchers have tended to study the interconnection of emotion and embodiment 
during music listening alone.  Yet, other musical practices, ranging from performing to 
composing to DJing, also involve listening.  It follows that similar emotional-embodied 
reactions, such as changes in skin conductance and mirror neuron activation, occur during 
diverse musical practices.  For example, during a gamelan session, a kempul player may 
initially feel calm and happy, his heart rate slowing and the corners or his mouth turning 
upwards.  Subsequently, his attention may turn to the excited, high-pitched sounds of the 
peking player, engaging his mirror neurons and causing his mind-body and emotions to 
react in part as though he was producing such notes.  
Contemporary music philosophers such as Robinson (2005) instead focus on the 
integration of emotions and various cognitive understandings.  Robinson notes that when 
listening to music, “I may be moved by the beauty and craftsmanship of the music, as 
well as temporarily bewildered, then pleasantly surprised and delighted by the clever 
harmonic, melodic, and rhythmic development” (p. 411).  Familiarity with musical 
conventions implies cognition and occurs as a result of repeated experiences with specific 
musical practices.  An instrumental cadenza in a concerto, an extended tabla 
improvisation, an elongated rock guitar solo, or a prolonged silence before the closing 
gong of a gamelan piece all serve to create suspense.  Regardless of their knowledge of 
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specific terminology, people familiar with the conventions of each genre may feel 
emotions as their cognitive expectations become fulfilled or disrupted.   
 Cognitive evaluations apart from the music itself also interplay with emotions.  
For instance, audience members watching a performance of 4’33” given by a smiling 
performer would likely feel differently than those watching a dour pianist.  Damasio 
(2003) asserts, “The emotional patterns result from the reaction to the person playing, to 
how the music is being played” (p. 199).  Likewise, Robinson (2005) posits that the 
emotions of the singer, apart from the structure of the music, can move listeners (p. 411).  
Kivy (1999) expands this notion, using it to explicate why people might identify music as 
happy or sad but yet feel unmoved.  He posits that “music the listener takes to be 
mediocre,” though potentially expressive, fails to stimulate the listener’s emotions (p. 
12).  While I might identify the opening of Beethoven’s Symphony no. 6 in F major or a 
Black Eyed Peas’ tune as happy, I may not feel any emotion or feel a very different one 
resulting from a performance I identify as out of tune.  Cognition and emotion work in 
harmony throughout musical experiences, inclusive of a multitude of other aspects of the 
event. 
The complicated interrelationship between humans’ mind-bodies and emotions 
exists in a state of constant flux.  Musical practices interconnect with complex 
physiological-emotional changes within participants’ mind-bodies as well as serve as a 
means of communicating and sharing embodied emotional experiences from one 
individual or group of individuals to another.  Humans experience music when sounds 
interplay with their integrated mind-bodies and emotions.   
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Cognitive, Embodied, Emotional, and Social 
The eighth grade students’ experience of Cage’s 4’33” provides an example of 
the integrated role of sociality, cognition, embodiment, and emotion in musical 
experiences.  Students’ past musical socialization integrated with their initial cognitive, 
embodied, and emotional reactions to the work, leaving them confused and unable to find 
value in the piece.  In the following weeks, in conjunction with reading information about 
Cage, watching YouTube videos of him, having lively debates, and listening to and 
recreating other Cage compositions, many students had musical and educative 
experiences.  Through their integrated cognitive, embodied, emotional, and social 
endeavors with their peers and me, students experienced musicking unavailable to them 
prior to such engagements.   
In chapter 4, I detail how scholars have demonstrated that the interplay of human 
sociality and cognition interfaces with practices ranging from metaphor creation to 
perception to reasoning.
73
  I also explain how writers such as Shusterman (2011) 
articulate the integration of human sociality and embodiment.  Additionally, in chapter 4  
I describe how researchers such as Averill (1980), Damasio (1999), and Lazarus (1994) 
assert that human sociality interconnects with humans’ emotional reactions and 
expressions.  In this subsection, I draw on the work of these authors as well as other 
writers to describe the integration of cognition, embodiment, emotion, and sociality 
during musical experiences and to further explore the question “When is music?” 
In their various writings, scholars such as Pierre Bourdieu (1993) and Christopher 
Small (1998) have included questions and theories about the interplay of cognition and 
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sociality in arts experiences.  While both Bourdieu and Small explain that artistic works 
and practices become valued through social interactions, Bourdieu centers on production 
and consumption while Small emphasizes the role of ritual.  Below I detail their writings 
related to various aspects of the arts and the integration of cognition and sociality. 
 Bourdieu (1993) explains that humans socially construct the value of artworks,
74
 
writing, “The work of art is an object which exists as such only by virtue of the 
(collective) belief which knows and acknowledges it as a work of art” (p. 35).  This 
shared value occurs through and further reinforces the creation of artistic fields in which 
those in power determine the value of art and artistic practices.  Bourdieu (1993) explains 
that different parties’ understandings of their fields’ traditions and codes enables 
production and consumption within an artistic field.  In regard to production, he explains 
that artistic competence depends on the artist’s ability to master the complexity and 
subtlety of existing systems, using them as a point of departure or rupture.   
Bourdieu specifically notes the role of powerful people and establishments in the 
artistic process, stating, “The public meaning of a work in relation to which the author 
must define himself [sic] originates in the process of circulation and consumption 
dominated by the objective relations between the institutions and agents implicated in the 
process” (p. 118).  For example, Cage studied with the renowned academic composers 
Henry Cowell and Arnold Schoenberg, building on and breaking from their work.  
Cage’s academic training and relationships with those in power enabled him and his work 
to become valued within conservatories and schools of music.  
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Bourdieu also addresses the interplay of sociality and cognition from another 
viewpoint, elaborating on how listeners’ past and present social experiences affect how 
they understand music.  He asserts that listeners constantly “decipher” artworks, although 
they do overtly recognize this process, through familiar cultural codes (p. 215).  For 
instance, while people with minimal academic musical knowledge generally lack the 
cultural codes necessary to decipher 4’33”, those in positions of power at schools of 
music throughout the United States and beyond have deemed the piece worthy of study; 
by familiarizing collegiate music students with the work of Cage, institution leaders have 
enabled his works to become part of academic music culture.  Having attended and 
graduated from such institutions, music educators understand aspects of academic music 
culture and may choose to pass them on to the students they teach.  In this way, the 
valuation and transmission of musical works is an ongoing socio-cognitive process, at 
least for the kinds of Western art music practices to which Bourdieu refers.      
Bourdieu (1993) wrote his aforementioned work prior to the widespread use 
technological innovations, such as the Internet, that enable people greater access to 
diverse types of musicking.  Miller (2011) explains that contemporary digital media 
allow for increased interactivity between disparate people and with different, changeable 
musical products and practices.  While arts institutions and leaders continue to endow 
artistic works and practices with value, the average person can increasingly participate in 
ascribing value to music and musical practices through actions such as hitting the 
“thumbs up” button under music on YouTube or reposting music on Facebook.  The 
Internet allows for more diversity in live and recorded music as well as more 
opportunities for musical participation.  For example, consumers of a 2007 Nine Inch 
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Nails album could remix the tracks on Ableton,
75
 and participants in online communities 
such as the Banjo Hangout can engage with music and musical practices through forums, 
videos, and lessons.
76
  While individuals could engage in such musicking prior to the 
Internet, the Internet enables more people access to musicking with fewer barriers, such 
as the cost of lessons.  The ever-increasing use of interactive technologies does not 
directly negate the theories proposed by Bourdieu, but its presence offers new 
possibilities for the social-cognitive aspect of musical experiences.   
While Bourdieu emphasizes how the integration of cognition and sociality 
interfaces with the valuation of art, Small (1998) focuses on how humans’ social-
cognitive nature affects interactions between participants during musicking, asserting: 
Since how we learn which relationships are of value and which are not is a matter 
of our experience, it is to be expected that although each person has his or her 
own ideas of relationships, those held by members of the same social group, 
whose experiences are broadly similar, will also tend to be broadly similar and in 
that way serve to reinforce one another. (p. 131) 
While Small typically writes about the integration of sociality and cognition during large-
scale musical events such as symphony concerts, the eighth grade general music students’ 
engagement with 4’33” also elucidates the socio-cognitive aspect of musicking.  Given 
the variation in the social dynamics between my multiple eighth grade classes, it was 
unsurprising that each class understood the piece differently; even within single classes, 
individuals engaged with 4’33” uniquely.  Each student’s rapport with me as a teacher, 
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valuation of school, and peer relationships likely affected the ways in which he or she 
experienced, interfaced with, and came to value 4’33”.  While I offered each student the 
same initial experience with 4’33’ and cognitive information about Cage as well as 
subsequent experiences, students’ individual and collective social experiences led to 
differing valuations of his work within and between classes. 
 Small (1998) also implies the integration of sociality and cognition in writings 
about musical rituals.  He explains that ritual “is a means by which we experience our 
proper relation with the pattern which connects” (p. 130).  This feeling of connection 
leads to social definition and self-definition as well as an inculcation of the values of a 
specific social group (p. 133).  Through musical rituals, we engage in an ongoing process 
of coming to know and understand ourselves and our societies.  Small argues: 
Those taking part in a musical performance are in effect saying—to themselves, 
to one another, and to anyone else who may be watching or listening— This is 
who we are,” adding that performances articulate the relationships those taking 
part desire to exist rather than those that really exist. (italics his, p. 134)   
People come to know and understand a society’s accepted relationships and their selves 
and roles within society in part through ritual musical endeavors.
77
    
 Human multiplicities’ cognition and sociality exist inseparably from their 
embodiment.  The integration of these three qualities plays a prominent role in Small’s 
(1977) descriptions of musical practices.  He argues that musical experiences never take 
place apart from the embodied, social reality of those participating in the performance, 
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and that those involved experience in and through their bodies the ideal relationships
78
 
enacted through musicking.  For example, during contemporary performances of Cage’s 
music in Western concert halls, audience members’ mind-bodies generally respond with 
the same stillness as they would during an orchestral symphony.  While a novice 
audience member might be tempted to laugh or comment during 4’33”, the 
overwhelming social pressure of a concert hall makes such actions unlikely.  Yet, 
Bowman (2004) notes that the interplay of music and human embodiment and sociality 
often goes unnoticed, stating that skill and taste “are forged from and build upon 
corporeally-grounded experience: ritualized patterns of action through which cultural 
possibilities become natural inevitabilities” (p. 45).  Participants at Western classical 
concerts contemplate their silence and stillness no more or less than attendees at a rock 
concert think about their movements, singing, and cheering.  The socio-embodied rituals 
accompanying various types of musical experiences often go unnoticed. 
 Through their critiques, authors such as O’Toole (1994) and Gould (2008) have 
problematized the socialization of the body in traditional Western art music experiences.  
O’Toole (1994) focuses on the social-embodied aspects of a Western choral rehearsal, 
explaining that members’ bodily positioning, in which everyone stands facing towards 
the director, creates docility and discourages contact between choir members who view 
each other only peripherally.  The socialized actions of participants’ bodies enable 
specific musical practices while limiting or minimizing others.  Gould (2008) focuses on 
the social-embodied experiences of collegiate music students, writing, “Virtually all 
students entering university music programs become complicit in [symbolic violence 
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related to education] as they quite willingly give up control of their bodies to their 
omniscient music teachers and conductors” (p. 36).  The conscious or unconscious 
willingness of students to allow others to control their mind-bodies provides them entry 
into a community of mind-bodies socialized in particular ways.  The ongoing integration 
of sociality and embodiment affords for some and not for others various types of 
engagement in Western art music, ranging from rehearsals to private lessons to solo and 
ensemble performances.    
 In addition to integrating with embodiment, human sociality interfaces with our 
emotions during musical experiences.  For instance, while recently walking down the 
aisle of a grocery store, I heard the song “I Swear” by the group ALL-4-ONE, and my 
mind immediately recalled my first middle school dance.  As I listened to the song, I 
contemplated the sentimentality of the lyrics, the simple chord structure, and the overly 
dramatic and uninventive saxophone solo.  Yet, I couldn’t help but feel happy; that song 
reminded me of the joy I felt as my friends and I put on makeup in the school bathroom, 
the thrill of socializing with new people in a dark room with minimal adult supervision, 
and the excitement of dancing with a boy for the first time.  My emotion at the grocery 
store occurred inseparable from the past social, embodied, and cognitive circumstances I 
linked to that song.   
Music often evokes emotions tied to past, present, and anticipated future 
individual and communal events.  Robinson (2005) argues that the recollection of 
personal memories during a musical engagement can evoke certain emotions (p. 411).  
As my experience in the grocery store revealed, my emotions occurred inseparable from 
my past cognitive-embodied-social experiences.  Small (1998) goes further, asserting the 
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centrality of such emotional experiences, which rely on both past socio-emotional 
experiences and present circumstances, to musical practices.  He contends that because 
music helps humans to experience a society’s ideal relationships,79 the arousal of desired 
emotions is “the sign that the performance is doing its job” (p. 137).  For instance, the DJ 
at the middle school dance likely aimed to evoke controlled joy and excitement as well as 
certain movements.  Likewise, those programming the music at political rallies, 
graduations, and religious ceremonies aspire for participants to draw on past socio-
emotional experiences and to feel particular kinds of emotions and act in certain ways. 
 The descriptions above are from Western perspectives.  Since different societies 
and subgroups construct varying sets of ideal relationships through their musical 
practices, it follows that communities express emotions differently as well as use diverse 
terms and theories to articulate the emotions evoked through their musicking.  As 
Robinson (2005) notes, “The emotions that music evokes in us are labeled in pretty 
different ways, depending partly on cultural norms of various sorts” (p. 405).  Higgins 
(2008) offers examples of this notion, explicating traditional theories of the emotions 
associated with artistic experiences in Indian and Japanese cultures.  She explains how 
the rhetoric of emotions associated with the arts differs markedly in these societies from 
that of Western societies, which traditionally name a more limited number of emotions.
80
  
Higgins writes, “Both Indian and Japanese aesthetics offer analyses of the emotions 
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involved in aesthetic experience
81
 that acknowledge their refinements and differentiate 
them from ‘garden variety’82 species” (p. 107).  She elaborates that philosophers of 
Indian aesthetics posit that artists aim for the audience to experience one of the eight 
basic rasas, “the essential flavors of emotion,” including erotic, comic, pathetic, furious, 
heroic, terrible, odious, marvelous
83
 (pp. 110-110).  While someone growing up in India 
would likely have had socio-emotional experiences that enable him or her to distinguish 
between terrible and odious emotions in Indian music, as an outsider to Indian society, I 
would likely be unable to distinguish between the two.  As I heard “I Swear” in the 
grocery store, my emotional experiences occurred through my cognitive-embodied-social 
understanding of emotion.  Had I grown up in a different country, even if I recognized the 
tune, I likely would have understood and experienced the music differently, including the 
emotions that are part of that experience.   
 Just as bodies are socialized, norms for the expression of emotion during musical 
experiences develop through human sociality.  For instance, Davies (1994) explains how 
the Western concert tradition restrains listeners’ expression of emotions during 
performances: 
There are conventions allowing for the expression of strong emotions at concerts 
at particular moments (such as at the end of the piece), but they deal with 
expressions of approval.  Such conventions may be violated, as in the riot of 
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disapproval that greeted the first performance of The Rite of Spring, but they are 
powerful constraints for all that. (p. 306)   
Such emotional restraint clearly contrasts the clapping after improvisations at a jazz club 
or the exuberant singing and shouting at a rock concert.  Even within my classroom, the 
middle school students seemed reluctant to break from the reserved behavior indicative of 
concert halls and school classrooms while listening to 4’33”.   
 Performers also confront varying restraints and freedoms for norms of embodied 
emotional expression.  For example, those in the violin section of an orchestra generally 
move their bodies less while playing than a solo violinist performing a concerto, who 
may show her emotions through her swaying and facial expressions.  Classical Indian 
musicians may also show emotions through their facial expressions and head movements, 
but their bodies generally remain still.  In contrast, a master Ewe drummer may express 
emotion through powerful full-body motions.  These various musical engagements 
demonstrate the inseparability of human cognition, embodiment, emotion, and sociality. 
Summary 
Addressing the question “When is music?” necessitates questions about when and 
who are musickers.  Combining the writings of the above authors demonstrates that 
musical experiences occur inseparable from a complex, integrated, and constantly 
evolving combination of cognition, emotion, embodiment, and sociality.  Along with 
striving, the ongoing interconnections of these qualities interface with each individual’s 
musical experiences during each passing instant.  Elucidating the relationship between 
music and human cognition, embodiment, emotion, and sociality complicates rather than 




One evening while studying drumming in rural Ghana, I sat by candlelight under 
a thatched-roof pavilion and took in the sounds of the night.  Like so many previous 
evenings, I could hear the sound of live drumming coming from a neighboring village.  
Perhaps the drummers and villagers sought to celebrate a wedding, mark a funeral, or 
evoke the gods to possess human bodies in a lively voodoo ceremony.  Yet, on this 
particular evening I could also hear the musical expressions of members of a second 
neighboring village playing out in a very different way; this village rang with the sounds 
of recorded popular music, which I could only assume were produced by a large stereo 
system linked to some form of gas-powered generator.  For the first time in my life, I 
realized that I was hearing change.  A nearby city, within a twenty minute drive of these 
villages, had electricity, and I began to suspect that within a couple of years, if not 
sooner, power lines would connect all of the surrounding villages.  Even with electricity, 
live drumming would continue to occur in this region, and it would inevitably compete 
with, mix amidst, and ultimately be changed by the sounds from radios, CDs, and mp3s.   
In chapter 4, I use Deleuze and Guattari’s multiple conceptions of becoming as 
inspiration for a fifth inseparable aspect of human ontology that I call “striving.”  
Although Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that multiplicities and becoming are 
the “same thing” (p. 249), they tend to use becoming to emphasize temporality.  In order 
to elaborate on the unique, temporal, nature of striving, I address striving in a separate 
section rather than in the above “multiplicities” section. 
Earlier, I posited four statements about striving: striving is an inseparable quality 
of human ontology; striving is fundamentally directionless; humans often direct, either 
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consciously or unconsciously, their strivings towards various simultaneous processes 
and/or goals; striving occurs in time, thus emphasizing the temporal nature of existence.  
As explained in chapter 4, striving occurs in integration with the other four aspects of 
human ontology.  While human musical experiences may involve conscious or 
unconscious striving primarily focused on human cognition, embodiment, emotion, or 
sociality, all musicking necessitates the inseparability of these five qualities.   
In this section, I draw on my experiences that evening in Ghana to examine the 
interplay of musicking and striving.  I begin by explaining how the temporal nature of 
human striving interconnects with artistic experiences.  Subsequently, I utilize Deleuze 
and Guattari’s collaborative definition of becoming to argue that during musicking, 
humans concurrently strive for a combination of consistency and chaos.   
Temporality 
In chapter 3, I explain how Deleuze and Guattari adopt Bergson’s cone to assert a 
conception of time in which the past and future exist, as the virtual, in each present 
moment.  If the past exists in each moment, then musical endeavors can never exactly 
replicate prior ones; time causes each one to occur in a unique manner.  For example, 
although the Ghanaian drummers utilized similar patterns each evening, I experienced the 
musicking differently with each passing night.  During every event, my past experiences 
existed virtually in the present, causing me to experience each musical moment uniquely.  
While humans may strive to engage in musical performances or rituals similar to those in 
which they have previously taken part, humans’ musical strivings exist as ongoing 
temporal processes and thus never replicate completely.   
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Deleuzean scholars such as Colebrook (2002) and Szekely (2012) have elaborated 
on how temporality affects and inevitably alters strivings during artistic experiences.  
Colebrook explains: 
Art is not the repetition of the same: it is not the production of endless sequels, 
copies, or imitations.  We wouldn’t refer to an Elvis impersonator, for example, as 
the next Elvis. . . . The student sitting in the academy faithfully copying the old 
masters is not repeating Monet. (p. 92)   
In other words, while artists may strive to imitate past artists, they never strive to become 
those artists.  All strivings exist not as copies but as individual processes; striving occurs 
in time, accentuating human temporality.   
As noted in chapter 3, May (2003) explains that for Deleuze, the essence of time 
is difference.  While humans cannot engage in musicking without actualizing their prior 
musical practices, they still experience difference in each present moment.  For instance, 
Szekely (2012) explains that while musicians may strive to commune with famous jazz 
players: 
This too is a process of becoming. . . . The pedagogical value and goal of 
imitation would not be sameness, but rather a thoughtful preservation of 
difference, a change and growth that results from the confrontation with, and 
integration of, another music or musical voice. (p. 172)   
Focusing on the temporal nature of humans’ musical strivings emphasizes the question 
“When is music?’ and illuminates the difference inherent in each moment of a musical 
experience.   
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Consistency and Chaos 
 As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that becoming 
does not happen when one behaves or thinks in a way consistent with a state or country’s 
dominant majority.
84
  They give names to becomings, such as becoming-woman and 
becoming-animal, in order to emphasize that the person becomes something other than 
the majority, arguing, “There is no becoming-majoritarian; majority is never becoming.  
All becoming is minoritarian” (p. 106).  While I argue that striving can occur in any 
direction, examining striving in light of Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative 
conceptualization of becoming may enable nuanced understandings about the interplay of 
striving and musical experiences.  Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas, I assert that 
all musicking involves striving for a combination of consistency and chaos.
85
     
I have chosen the words “consistency” and “chaos” rather than “majoritarian” and 
“minoritarian” because the divide between majoritarian and minoritarian in contemporary 
musicking lacks obvious definition.  For instance, while classical music may function as 
majoritarian within schools of music, it seems difficult to argue that a student who 
regularly listens to songs on the Billboard Top 100 list is becoming minoritarian.  The 
fact that popular music holds a dominant position of power outside of academia obscures 
the divide between “majoritarian” and “minoritarian” musicking.   
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) use the words “consistency” and “chaos” 
throughout their writings.  For example, they explain that the word “consistency” relates 
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 Majority in this sense is defined not by number but by power. 
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 As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that becoming is involuntary.  In 
contrast, as explicated in chapter 4 and noted at the start of this section, I assert that humans can direct their 
striving towards various ends and processes.   
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to “consolidations of very heterogeneous elements” (p. 335).86  In other words, 
consistency involves the grouping and ordering of disparate components.  Consistent 
practices occur when the same forms of organization repeat over time.  In contrast, 
Deleuze and Guattari explain “chaos” as “the forces of raw and untamed matter upon 
which Forms must be imposed in order to make substances” (p. 338).  Chaos involves 
disrupting preset orderings and embracing the difference underlying existence. 
Although the temporal nature of strivings eliminates the possibility of exact 
musical repetition, musickers can still strive for consistency from one musical experience 
to the next.  For example, as I sat listening to the musicking in the Ghanaian village 
without electricity, I initially strived for consistency, looking for similarities between the 
patterns I heard at the moment and the ones which I had heard on other occasions.  
However, as the recorded music from the village with electricity entered my soundscape, 
I strived for chaos, listening to how the live and recorded music intermingled with the 
familiar rhythms and imagining new possibilities for my future musicking.  Viewing 
musical strivings as occurring towards consistency and chaos complicates individuals’ 
musicking.  For example, a student who only listens to popular music strives for chaos if 
she entertains a new genre of music or engages with popular music differently.  
While people may primarily strive for consistency during a given musical 
experience, because repeated actions occur differently each time, their experiences 
inevitably include elements of chaos.  Likewise, while a person may primarily seek chaos 
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 Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) contrast the “plane of consistency” with other planes, writing, “In 
effect, consistency, proceeding by consolidation, acts necessarily in the middle, by the middle, and stands 
opposed to all planes of principle or finality” (p. 507).  Like many of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, the 
“plane of consistency” is complex and evolves throughout their writings.  It is beyond the scope of this 
document to address it in detail. 
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through his or her musicking, because the past actualizes in each passing moment,
87
 the 
present always includes elements of consistency.  Figure 6.2 illustrates that all musical 
experiences involve striving for both consistency and chaos simultaneously.  Point A 
illustrates that while at any given moment a person may primarily strive towards 
consistency while musicking, she concurrently (consciously or unconsciously) strives for 
chaos.  At another moment, the same person, illustrated by point B, may primarily strive 
for chaos while musicking, although such striving still occurs inseparably from her 
striving for consistency.  Just as smooth spaces are constantly being returned to striated 
spaces and vice versa, so do consistency and chaos exist symbiotically.   
 
Figure 6.2.  Striving for consistency and chaos while musicking.  
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 See the discussion of Bergson’s time cone in chapter 3.   
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 Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987), however, posit an ontology of existence based 
not on a fixed position but rather on mobility and difference.  Drawing on this notion, I 
assert that for each individual, consistency and chaos are fluctuating processes rather than 
stable endpoints.  For instance, while my journey to Ghana occurred because I primarily 
strived for chaos that challenged my then current conceptions of musicking, as I slowly 
grew comfortable with Ewe drumming, I began to strive primarily for consistency from 
one musical experience to the next.  In Figure 6.3, I illustrate the evolving nature of 
consistency and chaos by replacing the straight lines in figure 6.2 with undulating ones.  I 
also replace the dots in figure 6.2 with rhizomes in order to highlight human 
multiplicities’ own ongoing growth and change.   
        
 




Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) do not posit a dichotomy between being 
majoritarian and becoming-minoritarian.  Similarly, I assert that all musicking involves 
an integration of striving for consistency and chaos.  One cannot define where striving for 
consistency or chaos begins or ends.  Rather, as illustrated by Figure 6.4, consistency and 
chaos continually interconnect.  In Figure 6.4, the rhizomatic multiplicities move through 
time and space as they strive for consistency and chaos.   
 
 
Figure 6.4.  Striving for the integrated processes of consistency and chaos.  
 
Examining ways in which writers have detailed humans’ strivings primarily 
towards either consistency or chaos is problematic because it neglects the integrated and 
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evolving nature of these processes.  Yet, such explorations illuminate diverse possibilities 
for musical strivings along diverging paths.  When strivings primarily towards 
consistency or chaos go undiscussed, humans risk unconsciously propagating limited 
forms of musical engagement.    
One way in which musickers strive for consistency is by engaging in practices 
aimed at replication and stability.  For instance, some groups attempt to imitate prior 
ways of performing a given piece of music.  Using the writings of Foucault, Mantie 
(2009) examines how the discourse in the Canadian Band Journal and Canadian Winds 
(CBJ/CW) promotes striving for consistency in wind band performance.  He writes, “If 
there is one truth claim beyond reproach in CBJ/CW, it is that the goal of the activity of 
large ensemble music making is for the conductor to faithfully and responsibly interpret 
and realize the composer’s creation” (p. 201).  Accurate interpretations and recreations 
rather than innovation serve as the driving force behind such ensemble directors’ 
practices.   
Humans’ striving for consistency can also involve musical endeavors linked to 
and constitutive of rituals that propagate a society’s practices and values.  Since Deleuze 
and Guattari (1991/1994) assert that the past actualizes in the present, the repetition of 
such practices can have a powerful impact on the present moment.  For example, Radocy 
and Boyle (2003) list ceremonial activities as one of the applications of music in 
contemporary society, explaining, “Virtually all types of ceremony, be they religious, 
military, state, athletic, or commercial, incorporate music in some way” (p. 44).  In such 
contexts, participants often strive to maintain past practices and beliefs through their 
musical engagement.  Similarly, Merriam’s (1964) categories of musical functions 
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include enforcement of conforming to social norms, validation of religious rituals, 
continuity and stability of culture, and integration of society.  In each of these cases, 
musickers strive for consistency by replicating preexisting forms of musicking in the 
hopes of propagating specific actions and values.  
 Striving for consistency is not limited to practices associated with specific 
musical repertoires or settings.  In fact, works that composers originally wrote in order to 
strive primarily for chaos are now performed and heard by those primarily striving for 
tradition and stability.  Small (1997) explains that while Beethoven intended the 
inaugural performance of his Symphony No. 5 in C minor to be “a powerful revolutionary 
event, whose musically revolutionary sound-relationships formed a metaphor for the 
transformation of social relationships,” contemporary performances of the work provide 
“a sense of reassurance that society’s relationships are as they have been and will remain 
so” (p. 11).  Yet, all listeners of classical music do not necessarily strive for the same 
integration of consistency and chaos.  Those who go to hear Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5 
in C minor in a quiet, motionless section of a concert hall likely seek a different 
experience than those who engage actively from “tweet seats” or those who listen while 
picnicking on the grass at Tanglewood, relaxing at home, or playing in the orchestra.  
Musicians engaging in any practice can strive primarily for consistency or chaos.  
For instance, I attended the 2003 Summer Sanitarium Tour, which included artists such 
as Limp Bizkit, Linkin Park, and Metallica, at a stadium in Philadelphia.  At the time, I 
perceived that Metallica primarily strived for consistency, remaining relatively 
motionless onstage in a style that seemed to not have changed since the 1980s, while Fred 
Durst, from Limp Bizkit, primarily strived for chaos, improvising words and walking 
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throughout the crowd.  A single performance, however, does not reveal whether members 
of Metallica might act differently the next evening or whether Fred Durst might have 
used the same words and motions in previous performances.  Watching these performers 
over several evenings and tours may illuminate the ways in which they strived for the 
integration of consistency and chaos. 
 As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987; 1991/1994) emphasize 
striving for chaos over consistency, promoting innovative artistic practices that challenge 
preset forms.  According to Colebrook (2006), Deleuze and Guattari note the role of 
difference and the unknown in art, asserting that “The depiction of art, mime, dance or 
play within art is therefore an image of life's power to create what is not given - an image 
of the virtual, of futurity, of time” (p. 85).  Similarly, Greene (1995) asserts how 
engagement with art can lead to social transformation, writing, “The arts offer 
opportunities for perspective, for perceiving alternative ways of transcending and of 
being in the world, for refusing the automatism that overwhelms choice” (p. 142).  Artists 
primarily strive for chaos when they create or engage in practices that challenge current 
conceptions of existence.   
When people engage in musicking in response to striving for chaos, it may also 
serve as a harbinger of broader social or political movements.  Kaplan (1990) explains 
that artistic practices often serve as indicators or anticipations of substantial social 
change.  Likewise, Colebrook (2002) argues that for Deleuze, “Affect, as presented in art, 
disrupts the everyday and opinionated links we make between words and experience” (p. 
23).  While contemporary classical musicians such as Cage disrupt daily practices 
through everything from silence to amplified cacti, popular musicians such as Madonna 
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and Lady Gaga use lyrics, costumes, and staging to challenge ideas such as gender roles.  
Musickers engage in these various experiences while striving for their own unique 
integration of consistency and chaos.   
In summary, musicking involves the integration of striving for consistency and 
chaos.  Given the temporal nature of strivings, each act of musicking carries a unique and 
evolving balance of striving for consistency and chaos for each changing participant.  As 
noted above, striving occurs inseparably from humans’ other qualities.  Asking “When is 
music?” involves exploring how inseparably cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and 
striving beings engage in musical experiences. 
Emplaced 
 
In the summer of 2011, I spent two weeks at the Kodály Music Seminar in 
Kecskemét, Hungary.  In the evenings, my fellow students, originating from 33 countries, 
frequently hosted musical gatherings in one of the hotel rooms.  They often played 
American popular music, with each member contributing stylistic elements from his or 
her home country.  For instance, one evening my fellow students began a rendition of 
“Brown Eyed Girl” with a Panamanian on guitar, two Columbians adding Latin 
American rhythms on improvised claves and a guiro, an Israeli violinist providing unique 
harmonies, and an American trumpet player improvising short jazzy riffs.  This 
experience offers an example of how place influences, alters, and creates contemporary 
musical practices.  Each musician drew on the musical culture from his or her place of 
origin and combined their musicking in ways that could not have occurred absent their 
prior and immediate places. 
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The question “When is music?” presupposes a multiply-placed person who can 
engage with sounds.  In chapter 5, I articulate the significance of place in human life, 
noting that contemporary society necessitates defining places as glocal
88
 constructions.  
Musical experiences occur in places, and in the twenty-first century, glocal forces 
influence both the ongoing construction of places and the musical practices that occur 
within them.  Contemporary musicking therefore occurs at intersection of continually 
evolving glocal places.  Addressing the question “When is music?” means inquiring into 
the ways in which places figure into constructing, delimiting, and freeing musical 
practices.   
 In this section, I first explain how Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about striated 
spaces and smooth spaces might apply to global, local, and glocal musicking.  Second, I 
posit the importance of the symbiosis between localization and globalization in 
contemporary musical experiences, looping Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of 
territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization with ethnomusicologists’ 
research.  Throughout this section, I utilize Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of nomads 
and maps to offer further conceptions of how people might musically engage with their 
multiple environments.   
Global 
As explained in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) distinguish between 
“striated” or bounded, sedentary, and limiting spaces and “smooth” or proliferating, 
mobile, and variable spaces.  They further posit a relationship between smooth and 
striated spaces and local and global spaces, defining striated spaces as “relatively global,” 
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 “Glocal” refers to the confluence of localizing and globalizing forces. 
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containing consistently oriented points, and smooth spaces as “relatively local,” with 
landmarks in continuous variation (p. 494).   
As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that in striated 
space, a line exists between two points (p. 480).  Writers describing global flows of 
culture often rely on striated conceptions of place, utilizing the specific points of 
reference and central perspective similar to those which Deleuze and Guattari posit as 
indicators of global striated space.  For example, in chapter 5, I detail Appadurai’s (1990) 
five types of global flows: ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes, and 
ideascapes.
89
  In each of these flows, people, objects, or ideas move from one point to 
another via striated spaces.   
My experience at the Hungarian hotel with my fellow students exemplified 
striated spaces indicative of at least four of these globalizing flows.  Contemporary travel 
enabled by ethnoscapes allowed me and my fellow students, primarily middle class 
young adults, to journey from 33 countries to a rural Hungarian town.  Finanscapes 
allowed us to pay for our instruction and buy food and drink, exchanging our diverse 
currencies for the Hungarian forint.  Mediascapes had enabled the song “Brown Eyed 
Girl” to spread throughout these countries, such that people from diverse places knew the 
song.  Technoscapes facilitated the posting and sharing of pictures and videos from that 
evening on Facebook.   
The work of ethnomusicologists and other music researchers may further 
elucidate how contemporary global striated spaces enable music and musical practices to 
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 Appadurai (1990) defines ethnoscapes as the landscape of people, technoscapes as the global 
configuration of technology, finanscapes as global capital, mediascapes as the production and 
dissemination of images, and ideascapes as images and ideas linked to movements involving states or the 
capturing of state power.   
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proliferate throughout the world.  For example, Stokes (1997) explains how various audio 
and digital media transcend spatial boundaries, an idea Lum (2008) demonstrates in 
describing how children in Singapore listen to CDs by North American groups such as 
the Bee Gees and the Carpenters.  Lum adds that these children dance, sing, and 
improvise to music from television programs such as a Chinese, Malay, and Tamil drama 
series, an Australian children’s program, Japanese cartoons, and American shows from 
networks such as Disney, Nickelodeon, and Cartoon Network.   
People create striated spaces in order to facilitate the physical movement of 
people, objects, and ideas from point to point, city to city, and continent to continent, 
simultaneously enabling music and musical practices to spread.  For instance, Meinhof 
and Kiwan (2011) explain how musicians throughout Africa physically migrate to 
Europe, converging in cities such as Paris and London; such cities serve as hubs from 
which their music can then spread throughout Europe and beyond.  Goertzen and Azzi 
(1999) offer a more specific example, crediting trips made to Paris by the singer and 
songwriter Carlos Gardel with popularizing tango music in Europe (p. 68).   
The spread of tango and other forms of music, however, does not occur absent 
smooth spaces welcoming of such musicking.  For instance, Brown and Dillon (2007) 
note the possibilities technology provides for real-time musical interactions with 
geographically diverse people, writing, “Networked musical environments allow 
cyberspace to become a 'venue' where improvisers can participate in a musical dialogue, 
perform solo, or listen to the performances of others” (p. 107).  In other words, while 
Internet lines make possible striated spaces linking disparate locations, when musickers 
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connect through such technologies, the integration of their ideas and practices can create 
smooth spaces full of variability, innovation, and ongoing change.   
In twenty-first century society, music and musical practices proliferate and 
change through the integration of striated and smooth spaces.  Take, for example, the 
movement and alteration of rap music in conjunction with the 2011 Arab Spring protests.  
Rap music originally spread to places such as Egypt and Tunisia through striated 
globalized networks.  Protestors became nomads who mapped their local environments 
and created smooth musical spaces by altering globalized rap to meet their immediate 
circumstances.  National Public Radio reporters (2011) stated, “Songs are rapped in both 
English and Arabic, and international collaborations have helped to spread the music over 
the Internet, via Facebook and YouTube.”  Striated global networks in turn enabled 
protestors’ revolutionary rap music to flow throughout the world, thus facilitating the 
formation of local smooth spaces. 
While global music propagation relies on combinations of striated globalized 
flows, smooth spaces can form within such networks and as a result of such exchanges.  
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) assert that smooth spaces often form at the local level.  
As noted in chapter 3, they write, “The earth does not become deterritorialized in its 
global and relative movement, but in specific locations, at the spot where the forest 
recedes, or where the steppe and the desert advance” (pp. 381-2).  While globalized 
exchanges can create smooth spaces, such spaces often occur when globalized music and 




Examining musicking at the local level reveals various ways in which humans can 
produce both striated musical spaces and smooth musical spaces.  For instance, at the 
Kodály seminar, our musical endeavors depended on our constructions of spaces as either 
striated or smooth.  Although singing occurred frequently in our choir rehearsal room, I 
never once heard anyone engage in non-classical musicking within its walls; our choir 
room functioned as a striated space.  Likewise, my fellow students and I constructed the 
hotel hallways as striated spaces, perhaps listening to our iPods while walking through 
them but otherwise remaining silent within their borders.  In contrast, behind the closed 
doors of our hotel rooms, people engaged in kinds of music and various and various ways 
of musicking, including singing, playing instruments, and participating in the 
aforementioned musical gatherings.  Like Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) example 
of the striated spaces of agricultural grids that contain smooth growing spaces, the 
striated walls of the hotel rooms allowed for the smooth, celebratory spaces within them.  
Those at the musical gatherings became nomads who deterritorialized the conventional 
quiet of the hotel room while they wandered among and combined diverse musical 
practices.   
Such smooth musical spaces are indicative of what Jorgensen (2003) terms “soft 
boundaries.”  She explains, “Boundaries are soft in the sense that actors in musical events 
move easily from one role to another, or ideas and practices meld from one to the other” 
(p. 24).  Within our hotel rooms, my fellow students and I moved fluidly between the 
roles of singers, instrumentalists, and listeners while we blended diverse musical styles 
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and practices.  Humans’ continual construction of spaces as primarily striated or smooth 
limits or frees those locations for various types of musicking. 
While interpretations of places can restrain or liberate musicking, simultaneously, 
music and musical practices define local places.  Humanities professor Andy Bennett 
(2004) explains that music plays a central role in the “narrativization” of place, meaning 
“the way in which people define their relationship to local, everyday surroundings” (p. 2).  
Similarly, ethnomusicologist Martin Stokes (1997) asserts, “Music is socially meaningful 
not entirely but largely because it provides means by which people recognise identities 
and places, and the boundaries which separate them” (p. 5).  For example, I identified 
local places such as the choir room and hotel hallways in part because of the musicking 
that occurred in each location.   
Children, like adults, come to recognize locations by their music as well as 
engage in specific kinds of musicking within certain places.  Campbell (2010) 
investigated how children engage in musical endeavors in their homes as well as in 
school yards, cafeterias, school buses, music classrooms, non-music classrooms, and toy 
stores, with each place facilitating different musical practices.  While each place imposed 
some constraints on children’s musicking, some environments were more overtly striated 
or smooth than others.  For example, Campbell details the primarily striated space of a 
teacher-directed, Orff-based elementary music class, noting the precision with which the 
teacher articulated the aims, segmented the song, and assigned students to instruments 
(pp. 54-60).  This teacher treated Orff pedagogical techniques as a tracing that she strictly 
reproduced rather than a map that evolved and related to students’ musical locations 
beyond the classroom.  In contrast, Campbell notes the great variability of musical 
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activity, ranging from the singing of commercial jingles while playing hopscotch to 
improvised raps to hand-clapping songs to movement-based singing games, in the smooth 
space of an elementary school playground (pp. 23-29).  Like my fellow students and me 
at the Kodály seminar, these children learned through their experiences that striated 
spaces separated different forms of musical engagement.  Within certain limited spaces, 
such as hotel rooms and playgrounds, children and adults may embark on nomadic 
journeys, creating smooth musical spaces by combining and altering musical genres and 
practices.  
This creation of striated boundaries and smooth musical spaces occurs in diverse 
locations with varying genres of music.  For example, Small (1977) explains how 
Western concert halls: 
place the sounds in a building or other space built or set aside for the purpose and 
carefully insulated to keep the sounds of everyday life from entering—and also 
perhaps to keep the sounds from escaping into the world—while the performers 
are placed on a platform, apart from the audience. (p. 25)   
Such striated separation contrasts the potentially smooth spaces created by the musicking 
of a parading marching band or an orchestra at an open-air festival, where other sounds 
and musicking may also occur and where walls do not bind and limit sounds.   
In addition to the striated spaces occurring when, for instance, musicking inside 
concert halls becomes separated from the life outside of concert halls, the music 
performed can exemplify varying degrees of striated or smooth space.  For example, 
performing the traditional repertoire of the Western musical cannon at symphony 
orchestra concerts may promote a striated space full of homogeneity and replication.  In 
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contrast, programming pieces by contemporary composers or the introduction of 
alternative practices for listeners, such as tweeting while listening,
90
 may create smooth, 
heterogeneous spaces.   
While smooth practices often occur locally, they regularly intersect with striated 
global flows.  Bennett (2000) illustrates this interconnectedness through his description of 
how three different Frankfurt subgroups interpreted, appropriated, and altered German 
rap.  One group, Germany’s ethnic minority youth who felt like outsiders in their own 
country, viewed German rap negatively, instead favoring “alternative forms of local hip 
hop culture which actively seek to rediscover and . . . reconstruct notions of identity tied 
to traditional ethnic roots” (p. 144).  In contrast, a second group of primarily Turkish 
rappers integrated traditional Turkish musical styles with African-American rap to send 
defiant messages against their German bosses constituted.  A third group marked 
themselves by romanticizing in rap an association with the hardships of African-
American experience (pp. 144-146).  Bennett summarizes these diverse local utilizations 
of rap music, stating: 
In the social context of Frankfurt am Main then, collective notions of hip hop and 
its significance as a mode of cultural expression are governed by a range of 
differing local factors which have, in their turn, given rise to a number of 
distinctive localised variations in the formation of hip hop authenticity.  It 
follows, therefore, that if notions of hip hop authenticity are intimately bound up 
with forms of local knowledge and experience then, in the context of other urban 
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 A number of professional orchestras have experimented with enabling concertgoers sitting in designated 
seats to send tweets during performances.  See, for example,  http://www.chron.com/ 
entertainment/article/Spotlight-shines-on-social-media-in-the-tweet-3964347.php. 
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and regional locations with differing social circumstances and conditions, 
versions of hip hop culture and debates concerning its authentic usage will be 
based around a rather different range of social and aesthetic criteria. (p. 150) 
The various ways in which each of these subcultures appropriated rap reflect the 
variability and flux indicative of smooth spaces.  While rap spreads through striated 
global spaces, rap participants can act as nomads who form evolving smooth local spaces. 
Glocal 
As noted in chapter 3, instead of dichotomizing striated spaces and smooth 
spaces, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) emphasize their reciprocal nature, asserting, 
“Smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated 
space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space” (p. 474).  Likewise, in 
chapter 5, I explain how localization and globalization occur symbiotically, using 
Robertson’s (1995) term “glocalization” to denote their ongoing interrelationship.  It 
follows that local and global musicking function reciprocally to create glocalized musical 
practices.  As Bennett (2000) notes, musickers rework global music commodities, 
ascribing them meaning linked to their local settings (pp. 54-5).  For instance, at the 
Kodály seminar, my fellow students and I engaged in musicking made possible by 
glocalization, creating a smooth local space by ascribing unique local meanings to a song 
that had spread via global striated spaces. 
As I explicate in chapters 3 and 5, Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of 
territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization, closely relate to their 
concepts of striated and smooth spaces.  Deleuzean scholars explain that territorialization 
and reterritorialization necessitate fixity, stability, and the forming of habits, while 
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deterritorialization emphasizes variability, change, and the breaking of habits (Colebrook, 
2006; May, 2005; Lambert, 2005).  These concepts may offer further insight into the 
simultaneous localization and globalization that occurs during the glocalization of music 
and musical practices.   
Ethnomusicologists frequently write about the essential features of glocalization 
without using the term.  For example, Béhague (2006) notes local and global influences 
on Brazilian popular music, Goertzen and Azzi (1999) explore how people in Indiana 
engage with tango music, and Webb (2004) examines how musicians in Bristol, United 
Kingdom made unique use of a combination of genres such as reggae, hip hop, funk, 
jazz, punk, film soundtracks, and alternative rock.  In each of these instances, music 
enters local places via global networks, territorializing the soundscape of each location.  
The musickers within each locality deterritorialize the globally transmitted music, 
altering it to make it their own.  Through repeated practices, musickers reterritorialize the 
once new music into a relatively stable set local genre, temporarily blocking lines of 
flight, only to undergo deterritorialization via new local or global interactions.   
Other examples of glocalization include the utilization and alteration of Western 
popular music by musicians in Bulgaria and South Africa.  Levy (2004) describes how 
the new genre of chalga combines local Bulgarian traditions with “contemporary 
western-derived pop music techniques” (pp. 43-44), and Watkins (2004) articulates how 
minstrels in Cape Town, South Africa combine the melodies from American and British 
popular songs with local rhythms and tinny banjos, guitars, and cellos.  Again, local 
musicians deterritorialize globalized music and musical practices, making smooth spaces.  
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Eventually, through their local interactions, they reterritorialize new music and musical 
practices which in turn spread via global striated spaces.  
 A limited number of music writers utilize the term “glocalization” to describe and 
analyze musical practices similar to those detailed above.  Authors write specifically 
about various glocalized elements in Zimbabwean popular music (Turino, 2003), the 
American hip hop underground (Harrison, 2006), Latin American popular music 
(González & Knights, 2001), and Turkish rap (Solomon, 2006).  For instance, Solomon 
writes: 
While such accounts have focused on how local actors have re-interpreted and 
locally emplaced the objects and genres of global popular culture—how Afro-
American rap music and hip-hop youth culture are locally emplaced in Tokyo, 
Istanbul, and Sydney, for example—comparatively less attention has been paid to 
the other side of the glocalization coin: how locally significant issues and 
discourses are adapted to and embodied in these globally circulating cultural 
forms. (p. 59) 
Music practices that spread throughout the globe become localized by members of unique 
communities while simultaneously the practices of individual communities propagate 
through globalized networks.   
Manabe’s (2006) detailing of how Japanese youth alter the content and language 
conventions of American rap in order to make it their own offers an example of how 
musical glocalization occurs.  She explains that in contrast to the commonplace American 
rap topics of poverty, discrimination, and identity, Japan’s relative homogeneity in race 
and socioeconomic class led to rap topics such as the “joys, sorrows, and banalities of 
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middle class life” (p. 4).  In this way, Japanese rappers deterritorialize American rap 
conventions, imbuing rap with subject matter relevant to local living conditions.  Given 
the nature of Japanese syntax, rappers also have to alter typical Japanese word ordering to 
enable the rhyming indicative of American rap.  Manabe describes how Japanese rappers 
often choose to “break the syntactical rules of Japanese to place a key word, such as the 
subject, at the end of the line” (p. 8).  The convention of rhyming using English syntax 
territorializes American rap; Japanese rappers deterritorialize American rap, maintaining 
the rhyme scheme but breaking its reliance on standard sentence structure.  The imitation 
and propagation of these new patterns, such as placing subjects at the end of lines, blocks 
lines of flight and reterritorializes such music as Japanese rap.    
Those exploring glocalized musicking must note the potential problems of such 
interactions.  For example, Bradley (2012) writes, “Music education reproduces this 
epistemological tyranny through the absorption of indigenous musical forms and the 
imposition of Western musical concepts onto other musicking practices” (p. 416).  In 
other words, when musicians and music educators reframe diverse musical practices 
through Western vocabulary and concepts, they subjugate those practices and reinforce 
dominant Western ideologies and actions.  Embracing glocalized musicking means 
actively working against systems of oppression and respecting diverse musical practices 
as unique and valuable in and of themselves.   
Musical experiences do not exist apart from or uninfluenced by humans’ multiple 
places.  Glocalization affects and often delimits the creation of new music, performance 
and reinterpretation of existing music, and divergent and convergent meanings that 
people around the globe derive from musical endeavors.  In twenty-first century societies, 
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examining the question “When is music?” means acknowledging the role of glocalization 
in the territorialization, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization of musical practices. 
Complicating 
In this chapter, I assert that music occurs when cognitive, embodied, emotional, 
social, and striving beings interact with the musical practices in glocalized places.  Such 
ongoing interactions in, with, and through music foreground temporality and diversity, 
necessitating a focus on the question “When is music?” rather than “What is music?”  
Small (1977) echoes these ideas, writing that art “is essentially a process, by which we 
explore our inner and outer environments and learn to live in them” (italics his, pp. 3-4).  
By drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) philosophical figuration of a Body 
without Organs,
91
 I aim to illuminate how such an ontology of musicking can complicate 
rather than simplify understandings of musical experiences.   
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that the body without organs opposes 
organization, instead emphasizing continual process and difference.  When musicking, 
humans’ cognition, embodiment, emotions, sociality, and strivings constantly integrate.  
Like the body without organs, musickers’ multiple aspects exist in a state of ongoing 
process, opposing stagnation and organization.  While humans might primarily strive for 
consistency or chaos during musicking, the qualities of consistency and chaos mix and 
intertwine along with the evolving musicker.  Human musicking also exists at the 
juncture of localization and globalization, simultaneously creating, reinforcing, and 
altering local and global musical practices. 
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In chapter 4, I utilized a rhizome to create a figure showing the inseparability of 
human cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving.
92
  In Figure 6.5, I build 
on this image, showing that humans as integrated cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, 
and striving beings engage in musicking.  The arrows between “consistency” and “chaos" 
indicate that while humans may primarily strive for consistency or chaos when 
musicking, the processes of consistency and chaos exist in ongoing integration.  
Musicking also occurs inseparably from and in constant interaction with humans’ local 
and global environments.  To illustrate the constant interconnectedness of these places 
during musicking, I surround the rhizome with the word “glocal.”   
                                            
92
 See figure 4.2. 
214 
 
Figure 6.5. Musicking. 
 
 
As noted in chapter 3, St. Pierre (1997) explains that philosophical figurations aim 
to disturb, producing confusion rather than order.  In Figure 6.5, I posit a philosophical 
figuration of musical experiences.  Examining how musical experiences involve multiple 
integrated qualities unsettles often unquestioned assumptions about musicking.  For 
example, such an ontology of musicking challenges the notion that musical endeavors 
can exist apart from the integration of cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and 
striving or that local and global locations do not interplay with musicking.  In light of this 
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ontology of musicking, asking “When is music?” sets into motion ongoing process of 
complicating.  I address complicating in detail in chapter 8. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I explained the importance of engaging with the question “When 
is music?” rather than the question “What is music?”  I then detailed how humans’ 
cognition, embodiment, emotions, and sociality integrate during musical experiences.  
Subsequently, I asserted that although humans may primarily strive, consciously or 
unconsciously, towards consistency or chaos when musicking, all musical endeavors 
involve an integration of striving for both consistency and chaos.  Musicking involves the 
inseparability of cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving.   
Lastly, I explicate that music happens in places, and both striated spaces and 
smooth spaces play a significant role in humans’ musical experiences.  In twenty-first 
century societies, musicking occurs in places existing at the nexus of local and global 
influences.  In summary, music occurs when inseparably cognitive, embodied, emotional, 
and striving multiplicities engage with consistency and chaos through evolving musical 
practices in their glocal places.  In chapter 8, I draw on these ideas, exploring how they 
might serve an integral role in rhizomatic philosophizing in music education. 
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Chapter 7 
WHEN IS EDUCATION? 
 “Six times a night,” Eleanor Duckworth replied when, after giving us the 
assignment to keep a moon journal, a student asked her how many times we should 
observe the moon each week.  All forty of us master’s students looked around the 
classroom trying to ascertain whether she was serious as well as whether or not any of us 
would actually do as we were told; given that Duckworth required that we take her class 
as pass/fail rather than for a letter grade, we knew that intrinsic rather than extrinsic 
motivation would guide our engagement.  Over the next three months, class members 
spent hours standing outside and looking at the moon, sitting inside and discussing our 
moon journals, and playing with flashlights and Styrofoam balls in order to simulate the 
moon’s movements.  During one of our last classes, as I watched one of the other groups 
joyfully puzzle over the Styrofoam balls, I had an epiphany: “A waxing half moon will 
always reach its apex around 6 p.m.,” I thought to myself.  As I walked back to my 
apartment, I felt overjoyed and extremely empowered; I had cracked one of the moon’s 
secrets.  I didn’t need a teacher to verify that I was right; I knew I was right, and that I 
would never see the moon the same way again.  To this day, every time I look at the 
moon, I think about its shape and position in the sky, still curious about the finer details 
of its movement. 
No easy formula exists for determining whether or not students have engaged in 
an educative experience.  My peers and I did not feel that education occurred at many 
times during our moon explorations.  In fact, some of my fellow students ended the 
semester without having had what they considered as educative experiences.  While an 
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individual can sometimes articulate through words and bodily actions whether or not he 
or she is experiencing education at any given point in time, students may realize that 
education has happened and continues to happen only after they have left the classroom.  
After taking Duckworth’s class, I bought a telescope that I use to deepen my moon 
observations and a journal to record the locations of Jupiter’s four Galilean moons.  My 
experiences in Duckworth’s class engendered in me a continuing curiosity about the night 
sky and empowered me to take ownership of my own learning. 
The question “What is education?,” like the question “What is music?,” elicits 
convergent answers either too specific to encompass all educative experiences or too 
broad to distinguish educative experiences from other experiences.  For instance, 
according to the Oxford English Dictionary (2000), the word “education” comes from 
“educere,” meaning “to bring out, elicit, develop, from a condition of latent, rudimentary, 
or merely potential existence.”  Dewey (1938/1998) distinguishes between educative and 
mis-educative experiences, asserting that educative experiences have continuity and lead 
toward more growth while mis-educative experiences arrest and distort growth (pp. 25-
6).  While potentially useful, such definitions of education and educational experiences 
could encompass experiences that teachers and students may not consider educative.   
What would Deleuze and Guattari say about such definitions?  Shunning stagnant 
proclamations of any variety, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) posit an existence based 
on mobility and diversity, emphasizing educational processes rather than goals.  Cole 
(2011) explains, “Deleuze does not allow one to remain still, or in certitude, but sets up a 
type of restlessness, a questioning and expansive mode in education” (p. 2).  While I may 
not experience education when looking at the moon one day, as my past experiences 
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actualized on another day, I might have a deep learning experience while engaged in the 
same activity.  The quality of ongoing engagement rather than the actions in and of 
themselves distinguishes educative experiences from other experiences.  Asking “When 
is education?” emphasizes a dynamic view of existence and educative experiences.   
As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze (1990/1995) argues that educative materials and 
practices have value for a given person at a specific place and time, but not for all persons 
at the same moment or in the same ways.  He asserts that when confronted with a book, 
“The only question is ‘Does it work, and how does it work?’ How does it work for you? 
If it doesn’t work, if nothing comes through, you try another book” (p. 8).  Similarly, in 
writing about instructing college students, Deleuze (1990/1995) explains, “Nobody took 
in everything, but everyone took what they needed or wanted, what they could use” (p. 
139).  Educational experiences occur differently for every person, with each individual 
changing in unique ways as a result of his or her engagements.   
Bricolage mapping involves continually looping a point of entry text (POET) 
through diverse ideas.  The question “When is education?” serves as the POET for this 
chapter, through which I loop the work of Deleuze and Guattari, the ontology of being 
posited in chapter 4, the ontology of place asserted in chapter 5, and the work of various 
education philosophers and other writers.  Figure 7.1 illustrates my bricolage mapping for 
this chapter.     
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Figure 7.1.  Bricolage mapping of chapter 7. 
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In this chapter, I first use the human ontology posited in chapter 4 to detail how 
inseparably cognitive, embodied, emotional, and social multiplicities engage with 
education.  Second, I posit that education involves conscious or unconscious striving 
towards a combination of consistency and chaos.  I explore how acknowledging humans 
as striving emphasizes the temporal nature of educative experiences and elucidates that 
such experiences interface with striving towards an integration of consistency and chaos.  
Third, I assert how the place philosophies posited in chapter 5 illuminate aspects of 
teaching and learning in a glocalized world.  Fourth, I combine the initial three sections 
to argue that educators continually complicate themselves, their students, and their 
content.  Lastly, I assert that teaching is an ethical act that involves ongoing consideration 
of multiple possibilities.   
Multiplicities 
In order to explore the question “When is education?,” we might begin by asking 
“Who and when are teachers and students?”  In chapter 3, I explain Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1980/1987) concept of multiplicities, noting that they assert that 
heterogeneous terms in symbiosis constitute multiplicities.  I build on these ideas in 
chapter 4, eventually asserting an ontology of humans as inseparably cognitive, 
embodied, emotional, social, and striving multiplicities.   
In this section, I posit that education occurs through ongoing interactions of 
students’ and teachers’ cognition, embodiment, emotion, and sociality.  As noted in 
chapters 3 and 6, while Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) equate multiplicities with 
becoming, they use becoming to highlight the temporal nature of existence.  Since 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming rather than multiplicities inspired my 
concept of striving, I chose to address striving in a separate section.   
 I begin by discussing cognition in integration with embodiment, emotion, and 
sociality instead of in isolation.  In each of three subsections centered primarily on 
cognition and one other quality, I note additional interrelationships whenever possible.  
Given that cognition, embodiment, emotion, and sociality work inseparably from one 
another, this division is problematic because it does not directly acknowledge their 
integrated nature.  However, examining these qualities in pairs or groups of three allows 
for continual contemplations about their interconnection with educative experiences.  In 
the final subsection, I offer how cognition, embodiment, emotion, and sociality might 
integrate during teaching and learning. 
Embodied 
My body, working inseparably from my cognition, emotion, and sociality, played 
a prominent role in my moon explorations.  During Duckworth’s class, we often went out 
into a parking lot or onto the roof deck to observe the moon.  Likewise, our solo nightly 
moon explorations required our bodies to move from our homes to open spaces from 
which we could scan the sky.  While inside the classroom, Duckworth engaged us with 
materials such as flashlights and Styrofoam balls; our bodies moved freely about the 
room as our hands manipulated the objects and our eyes perceived changes in the light.  I 
came to know the moon through embodied experiences inseparably linked to my 
cognition, emotions, and sociality.   
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Yet, the body remains largely absent from education discourse and practice.
93
  
Mourning the mechanization of students’ bodies within schools, Dewey (1916/2011) 
asserts, “The nervous strain and fatigue which result with both teacher and pupil are a 
necessary consequence of the abnormality of the situation in which bodily activity is 
divorced from the perception of meaning” (p. 79).  With the exception of Duckworth’s 
class and a few others like it, my body has sat immobile and ignored throughout much of 
my primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling.  Likewise, as a teacher, I neglected to 
acknowledge my students’ bodies except to mandate that they remain still and upright or 
move in certain ways to produce the sounds I (not they) desired. 
 Deleuze (1968/1994) implies and at times openly acknowledges the importance of 
the body in his writings on learning.  As noted in chapter 3, one of his most substantive 
commentaries on education involves a story about a person learning to swim: 
When a body combines some of its own distinctive points with those of a wave, it 
espouses the principle of repetition which is no longer that of the Same, but 
involves the Other—involves difference, from one wave and one gesture to 
another and carries that difference through the repetitive space thereby 
constituted. (p. 23)   
In this description of an educative experience, Deleuze highlights the swimmer’s body.  
Rather than asserting an image of education based on a body subservient to its mind, 
Deleuze emphasizes the body without mention of the mind.  Morss (2000) summarizes 
Deleuze’s interplay of body and education, writing, “Deleuze directs our attention to that 
which is patent, hidden in plain sight. We are reminded that children’ s bodies, the 
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subject-matter of so much educational practice, are assembled and re-assembled in many 
and varied ways” (p. 198).  For Deleuze, students’ changing bodies play an important 
role in educative experiences. 
As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze (1968/1994) also notes the role of the teachers’ 
bodies in education.  He asserts, “We learn nothing from those who say: ‘Do as I do’.  
Our only true teachers are those who tell us to ‘do with me’” (p. 23).  His distinction 
between “as” and “with” offers teachers’ mind-bodies a prominent role alongside 
students’ mind-bodies rather than in a powerful position elsewhere.  Such a description 
emphasizes the integration of humans’ sociality and mind-bodies during educative 
experiences.  
In addition to functioning inseparably from sociality, the mind-body enables 
educative experiences involving understandings of abstract ideas.  As noted in chapters 4 
and 6, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) assert that humans come to know concepts through the 
construction of embodied metaphors.  For instance, humans comprehend the abstract 
concept of “thinking” through the embodied metaphor of object manipulation.  These 
embodied metaphors enable us to envision communicating as sending objects, 
understanding as grasping objects, and memory as a storehouse for objects (p. 24).   
Dewey (1916/2011) also emphasizes the role of the “union of the mind and body 
in acquiring knowledge,” specifically advocating that teachers draw upon students’ 
embodied experiences outside of the classroom (p. 166).  He states, “Before the child 
goes to school, he [sic] learns with his hand, eye, and ear, because they are organs of the 
process of doing something from which meaning results” (p. 79).  Students enter 
classrooms having learned about the world through their senses.  For instance, prior to 
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Duckworth’s class, my fellow students and I had all used our bodies to explore natural 
phenomena.  Through formal education, students can build on prior understandings and 
experiences made possible through their mind-bodies.   
 Dewey’s (1916/2011) and Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) writings about the 
inseparability of cognition and embodiment generally align with Shusterman’s analytic 
dimension of somaesthetics.  Shusterman (2004) suggests three “dimensions” of 
somaesthetics on which teachers can focus: analytic somaesthetics, pragmatic 
somaesthetics, and practical somaesthetics.  He explains, “Analytic somaesthetics 
describes the basic nature of our bodily perceptions and practices and their function in 
our knowledge and construction of reality” (p. 53).  Educative experiences may occur 
when learners become aware of different facets of their mind-body integration.   
Shusterman (2004) explains that his second dimension, pragmatic somaesthetics, 
“is the dimension concerned with methods of somatic improvement and their 
comparative critique,” and his third dimension, practical somaesthetics, deals with 
“somatic care . . . through reflective, disciplined, demanding corporeal practice aimed at 
somatic self-improvement” (pp. 53-54).  Developing a specific tone on the trumpet or 
improving the tone on a pitch at the bottom of one’s vocal range requires both an 
intention to change the mind-body and the ongoing work of altering the mind-body, as 
well as attention to the sound.  By focusing on the pragmatic and practical dimensions of 
somaesthetics, teachers can facilitate educative experiences that enable students to gain 
an understanding of and the reflective capacity to change their mind-bodies. 
How have music educators explained the role of the body in teaching and 
learning?  Bowman and Powell (2007) assert the role of the body in music education 
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experiences, stating, “The body in a state of music . . . is a tautology . . . because if music 
is foundationally a corporeal event, it makes little sense to talk about music in language 
that suggests music could ever be anything but that” (p. 1101).  In other words, speaking 
or teaching or writing about music without direct attention to humans’ bodies neglects 
that musicking does not occur absent one’s mind-body.   
Instructional methods such as Dalcroze, Kodály, and Orff offer possibilities for 
acknowledging the integration of mind and body during musicking.  In the Dalcroze 
method, teachers assist learners in developing a group of aural and kinesthetic images 
that they can both translate into symbols and perform (Mead, 1996).  For instance, 
students might learn to translate walking around a room with their feet keeping the macro 
beat and their hands tapping the micro beat into performing subdivision on an instrument 
and understanding subdivisions within Western musical notation.  Similarly, in the 
Kodály method, using the Curwen hand signs
94
 while singing solfége syllables builds a 
kinesthetic connection between sound and syllable (Choksy, 1988).  Teachers engaged in 
Orff pedagogy may take a different approach, drawing directly on movement.  They 
emphasize the basic elements inherent in music, dance, and speech and aiming for a unity 
of word, music, movement (Warner, 1991).  For example, students might use their mind-
bodies to improvise rhythms to a dancer’s motion or respond through dance to others’ 
musical improvisations.   
While Bowman and Powell (2007) praise the role of the body in such methods, 
they also offer three critiques.  First, although these methods use the body for learning 
performance skills, they do not address the role of the body in listening experiences.  
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Second, in current American music education, these methods are primarily intended for 
young musicians; the body may lose its prominence after students outgrow them.  Lastly, 
these methods advance pedagogical techniques rather than advocating a theoretical basis 
for the mind-body connection in musical experiences (p. 1091).  In other words, music 
educators generally use such methodologies to prepare students for other forms of 
musicking, such as singing in choirs or playing instruments, in which participants’ bodies 
move little and the integrated nature of mind and body is rarely addressed.   
 Examining the question “When is education?” includes focusing on the body and 
its inseparability from cognition, emotion, and sociality during educative experiences.  
Dewey (1916/2011) asserts the value of bridging the divide between students’ mind-body 
experiences outside school with those in the classroom, and Shusterman (2004) posits 
that educators assist students in actively reflecting on and altering their mind-bodies.  
While some music teachers may address the question “When is education?” by arguing 
that methods such as Dalcroze, Kodály, and Orff focus on the mind-body and enable 
educative experiences, music education discourse rarely explores how the mind-body 
interfaces with practice.  
Emotional  
In chapter 4, I explain that emotion plays an integral role in many aspects of the 
human experience, including the ability to reason (Damasio, 1999; Lakoff and Johnson, 
1999).  During my own moon explorations, my emotions ranged from sadness and 
frustration at not making progress to the extreme joy of finally having a breakthrough.  
My daily emotional states as well as those of my classmates and teacher inevitably 
influenced and altered my learning experiences.  Yet, Gruenwald (2002) mourns that 
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traditional models of schooling preclude students from “experiencing [life] passionately” 
(p. 529).  Given that humans’ emotions exist inseparably from their cognition, 
embodiment, and sociality, one cannot engage in a comprehensive examination of 
educative experiences or take up the question “When is education?” without investigating 
the role of emotions. 
The knowledge I gained through my moon explorations developed in integration 
with my emotions.  Whitehead (1929) posits “romance” as the first stage of mental 
growth, preceding the stages of “precision” and “generalization.”  He writes, “Romantic 
emotion is essentially the excitement consequent on the transition from the bare facts to 
the first realizations of the import of their unexplored relationships” (p. 29).  Directly 
acknowledging the inseparability of emotion and cognition, Whitehead adds, “There is no 
comprehension apart from romance” (p. 43).  Similarly, in the book Using Humor to 
Maximize Learning: The Links between Positive Emotions and Education, Morrison 
(2008) asserts the inseparability of emotion and cognition, positing that teachers improve 
learning when they foster joyful classrooms.  On the nights when walking outside to view 
the moon became a chore, my thinking progressed little.  In contrast, as I while watching 
my fellow students joyfully play with Styrofoam balls and flashlights, I had a cognitive 
breakthrough. 
Pleasant emotions, however, are not the only ones present during learning; 
education also occurs when unpleasant emotions integrate with cognition.  Boler (1999) 
explains that emotions such as anger and fear can arise during educative experiences, 
especially when students question cherished beliefs, and argues that educators should 
recognize and welcome such discomfort in their classrooms.  For example, music 
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students might feel discomfort when they investigate the sexist images in a contemporary 
music video.
95
  Individual embodied emotions interface with educative experiences, 
regardless of whether or not learners are cognizant of the evolving process. 
Using the work of Deleuze and Guattari, Cole (2011) asserts the value of drawing 
attention to students’ emotions during educational endeavors, explaining that such 
attention can lead to “pedagogic epiphanies.”  He writes, “High regard should be placed 
on the emotional and affective matters that can influence the teaching and learning of 
intellectual matters in groups” (p. 71).  Cole provides multiple examples of how teachers 
can engage students in dialogue about emotions.  For instance, he proposes that in a unit 
on To Kill a Mockingbird, teachers have students “write and perform monologues and 
dialogues from the perspectives of the characters in the novel that articulate reactions to 
the affects of racist language” (p. 26).  Similarly, Cole suggests that in a unit on 
Frankenstein, teachers could have students reflect on the monster’s emotional states or 
how they feel when they read about the monster (p. 111).  Expanding Cole’s ideas to a 
music classroom, music educators might ask students how they feel while listening to, 
performing, or composing music or have students explicate the possible emotions of the 
characters in songs, operas, musicals, or program music.   
 The varying embodied emotions exhibited by a teacher or student also integrate 
with the mind-bodies of other class members.  As noted in chapter 4, when viewing 
others’ bodily expressions and actions, humans’ mirror neurons activate, allowing them 
in part to experience the emotions of others (Iacoboni, 2009, p. 665).  As I watched the 
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excitement on a few of my fellow students’ faces while they explored the materials, my 
mirror neurons activated, and I felt excitement as well, even from my observing position.   
 Researchers studying motivation have also noted the inseparability of cognitive 
choices and emotion for individuals, sometimes as they see themselves and learning in 
relation to others.  For example, Pekrun, Elliot, and Maier (2006) researched the 
motivation of German and American college students.  They found that the choice of 
mastery goals, aimed at improving one’s competence, is a predictor of enjoyment, hope, 
and pride, while the choice of performance-avoidance goals, aimed at not performing 
more poorly than others, is a predictor of anxiety, hopelessness, and shame.  Teachers’ 
attitudes and actions may promote or inhibit students’ adoption of specific goals and thus 
the emotions that occur inseparably from such cognitive choices.  For instance, a music 
teacher who uses solo and small group performances in front of the class primarily as an 
opportunity for detailed feedback may promote mastery goals and the associated 
emotions, while a teacher who uses such activities primarily as a means of giving a public 
numerical rating may promote performance-avoidance goals and the associated emotions.   
 While these writers focus on the integration of cognition and emotion, exploring 
“When is education?” also involves developing an awareness of the integration of mind-
bodies and emotions during educative experiences.  As noted in chapter 4, Shusterman 
(2004) explains that the discipline of somaesthetics assumes the inseparability of mind 
and body.  He explains that somaesthetics “can inform us of our feelings and emotions 
before they are otherwise known to us, and thus it can help us better manage those 
feelings and emotions so that they do not interfere in our learning efforts” (p. 56).  He 
gives the example of a student who, because of his awareness of changes in his breathing, 
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understands that he is anxious, angry, or uneasy and can now explore options for reacting 
to those emotions.  Similarly, a string student who learns to recognize that anxiety 
associated with playing a technically challenging passage produces tension in his arms 
can form strategies to relieve the anxiety and tension.   
 While all educative experiences involve emotions, the emotional nature of 
musicking provides music educators a unique opportunity to assist students in exploring 
their emotions.  McConkey (2012) describes the relationship between elementary music 
teachers’ own emotional competencies as well as their ability to recognize students’ 
emotions, including those occurring during musicking, and their practices.  Similarly, 
Edgar (2012) found that high school instrumental music teachers provided emotional and 
social support through strategies such being aware of students’ emotions and social 
interactions, listening to students, and modeling healthy interactions.  These practices rely 
on the integration of human cognition, embodiment, and sociality during musically 
educative experiences.   
 Like musical experiences, educative experiences involve emotions.  Investigating 
the question “When is education?” involves an awareness of humans’ changing emotions, 
recognizing that individuals will each have different emotional responses within a 
specific learning environment.  Given the emotional nature of musical experiences, music 
classrooms offer a unique space for engaging with emotions and their interconnections to 





 In Duckworth’s class, my explorations occurred inseparably from my immediate 
social environment as well as the larger cultures in which I have grown up and resided.  
Dewey (1938) notes the importance of human sociality in educative experiences, writing: 
We live from birth to death in a world of persons and things which in large 
measure is what it is because of what has been done and transmitted from 
previous human activities.  When this fact is ignored, experience is treated as if it 
were something which goes on exclusively inside an individual’s body and mind. 
(p. 39)  
Human sociality, in integration with cognition, embodiment, and emotion, interfaces with 
educative experiences in multiple ways. 
In writing about the relationship between a teacher and a swimmer, Deleuze 
(1968/1994) focuses on how social interactions interface with educative experiences.  As 
noted earlier, in the story, Deleuze distinguishes between the phrases “Do as I do” and 
“Do with me,” emphasizing the latter (p. 23).  Through individual social interactions, the 
teacher exhibits his or her cognitive choices and embodied actions, influencing the 
learner’s education.  Dewey (1916/2011) summarizes the integration of social 
interactions and educative experiences, explaining, “Certain capacities of an individual 
are not brought out except under the stimulus of associating with others” (p. 165).  My 
understanding of the moon occurred not in solitude, but in collaboration with my peers 
and teacher.  Given a different teacher or group of fellow students, my investigations 
would likely have developed along alternative paths. 
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 Human sociality simultaneously exists in large-scale cultural webs.  For instance, 
societal constructs would affect the way Deleuze’s hypothetical swimmer interacted with 
his or her teacher.  In some societies, the student might remain silent while swimming, 
while in others, teacher and student might engage in dialogue; some cultures might find it 
acceptable for the teacher to offer a suggestion by touching the swimmer’s shoulder, 
while others would find such contact inappropriate.  The teacher’s and student’s societal 
context would determine the probability and social acceptability of these and other 
interactions.  Each time individual educative experiences either conform to or defy such 
existing norms, they reinforce or challenge large-scale social structures. 
Overarching social norms influence education practices and values, propagating 
variations between people from different subgroups and in diverse locations.  Dewey 
(1916/2011) details this idea, writing: 
The subject matter of education consists primarily of the meanings which supply 
content to existing social life.  The continuity of social life means that many of 
these meanings are contributed to present activity by past collective experience.  
As social life grows more complex, these factors increase in number and import. 
(p. 107)   
As members of a society, humans constantly interact, propagating behaviors, ideas, and 
values from one person to the next.  Educative experiences occur in integration with 
one’s immediate social environment as well as large-scale social webs.   
 Music educators have considered and problematized these layered social 
interactions.  Writers such as O’Toole (1994)96 have articulated how authoritarian social 
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interactions affect members of large music ensembles while authors such as Allsup 
(2003) and Green (2008) have detailed how collaborative, informal learning practices 
interface with educative experiences.  For instance, Green (2008) asserts that the 
autonomy and enjoyment of an in-school popular music project led “disaffected” students 
to exhibit increased engagement and initiative (p. 146).  These students’ individual social 
interactions with teachers and peers integrated with their cognition and emotions during 
educative experiences.   
Individuals’ musically educative experiences occur inseparably from overarching 
socially-constructed norms and values.  For instance, while Green (2008) implemented 
informal learning practices in certain music classrooms in England, such instruction 
would not necessarily meet the needs of community members asserting the creation of 
traditional church choir singers or town band members as the purpose of music programs.  
Likewise, societal beliefs about the value of classical, jazz, or popular music integrate 
with perceptions of and engagement in musicking within school classrooms.  Students 
coming from families or communities placing little value on classical music may be less 
likely to participate in elective classes that emphasize such music. 
Musically educative experiences occur within multiple layers of social 
interactions.  Further, human sociality exists inseparable from cognition, embodiment, 
and emotion during educative experiences.  Exploring the question “When is education?” 
involves drawing attention to the complexity of human sociality and its ongoing 
interconnection with humans’ other qualities.  
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Cognitive, Embodied, Emotional, Social 
 During educative experiences, human cognition, embodiment, emotion, and 
sociality function inseparable from each other.  As I watched the moon from the walking 
path near my apartment, my body perceived the light of the moon while my mind 
contemplated its shape and position.  Concurrently, my emotions ranged from the slight 
fear of standing alone on a dark path to the exhilaration and joy of breathing the cool 
October air while being lost in thought and wonderment.  I engaged in these explorations 
because my overarching social webs had led me to value graduate work and, despite the 
fact that Duckworth’s class was pass/fail, my individual class interactions made me want 
to actively engage in our assignments.  While the limits of language necessitate a prose 
description of these four qualities that reads linearly, the qualities function inseparably 
and simultaneously during educative experiences. 
 While I was not cognizant of it at the time, as I reflect back on my teaching, I can 
recall moments in which I observed the integration of students’ cognition, embodiment, 
emotions, and sociality during educative endeavors.  For example, I remember a lesson 
with seventh grade general music students during which they worked in small groups to 
distinguish between images of Classical and Baroque architecture, and then applied their 
understandings to music listening examples.  The students’ emotions integrated with their 
bodies and cognition as they excitedly debated the pictures.  Their sociality enabled them 
to learn from each other while their cognition helped them draw on prior experiences.  As 
I played the musical recordings, the integration of each student’s four qualities enabled 




In addition to being cognitive, embodied, emotional, and social multiplicities, 
humans are also continually striving.  As explained in chapter 4, my concept of striving 
builds upon Deleuze and Guattari’s evolving conception of becoming and functions as a 
fifth inseparable quality of human ontology.  I posit four statements about striving: 
striving is an inseparable quality of human ontology; striving is fundamentally 
directionless; humans often direct, either consciously or unconsciously, their strivings 
towards various simultaneous processes and/or goals; striving occurs in time, thus 
emphasizing the temporal nature of existence.  Teachers and students enter the classroom 
with multiple strivings that inevitably play a role in the type and quality of their educative 
experiences.  While individuals may strive, either consciously or unconsciously, toward 
educative experiences that are primarily cognitive, embodied, emotional, and/or social, 
all education involves multiplicities’ five integrated qualities. 
In chapter 6, I detail how the temporal nature of human striving relates to the 
question “When is music?” and use Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative definition of 
becoming to argue that when musicking, humans strive, either consciously or 
unconsciously, for the integration of consistency and chaos.  Likewise, in this section, I 
first articulate how the temporal nature of striving relates to the question “When is 
education?”  Second, drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative definition of 
becoming, I assert that educative experiences involve striving for a mixture of 





As my classmates and I observed the moon, our own explorations advanced in 
varying directions; day after day we found ourselves possessing more questions than 
answers.  Whenever someone posited a theory or began to talk with assurance, 
Duckworth quickly posed further questions, directing the student’s attention back to the 
process of exploration.  Outside of Duckworth’s classroom, I continued to ponder the 
moon’s location throughout each passing week, striving for educative experiences 
through my ongoing explorations.  My striving for understandings about the moon 
existed in time and over time, enabling my educative experiences.  
Education, like music, occurs as a product of previous moments that one may or 
may not have defined as musical or educative.  While a person may not consider her first 
experience with John Cage’s 4’33” musical, because of that initial experience, she may 
label subsequent encounters with 4’33” and other soundscapes musical.  Similarly, while 
I may not have considered the first time I recorded my observations of the moon 
educative, that endeavor enabled me to have future educative experiences.   
Positing striving as an integral quality of human ontology leads to an emphasis on 
the fluctuation and variability mandated by temporal existence.  Freire (1970/2000) 
explains how such a conception can relate to education, writing, “Problem-posing 
education affirms men and women as beings in the process of becoming—as unfinished, 
uncompleted beings in and with a likewise unfinished reality” (p. 84).  These becomings 
interconnect, spread, and change with each educative experience.  As Dewey (1916/2011) 
asserts, “Growing is not something which is completed in odd moments; it is a 
continuous leading into the future” (p. 34).  While I did not observe the moon every day 
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or even every week, my individual and collective investigations enabled me to grow over 
the course of the semester and beyond.   
 Deep educative experiences, like profound musical ones, often occur as a result of 
sustained conscious or unconscious striving over time.  As noted in chapter 3, Deleuze 
and Guattari (1991/1994) draw on Bergson’s image of time as a growing cone, positing 
that the past and future actualize in the present.  While I had moments of learning 
throughout many of Duckworth’s classes, my most profound educative experience came 
only after months of engagement with the moon.  During my epiphany, my past moon 
explorations actualized, integrating with my present circumstances.  John Moffitt’s poem, 
“To Look at Any Thing” summarizes the relationship between time, sustained 
engagement, and deep understanding.  Moffitt writes: 
To look at any thing 
If you would know that thing, 
You must look at it long: 
To look at this green and say, 
'I have seen spring in these  
Woods,' will not do -- you must  
Be the thing you see: 
You must be the dark snakes of 
Stems and ferny plumes of leaves, 
You must enter in 
To the small silences between 
The leaves,  
You must take your time 





Our understandings of the woods, or any other object, action, or idea, develop through 
ongoing engagement resulting from conscious or unconscious strivings integrated with 
human cognition, embodiment, emotion, and sociality.   
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 Sustained striving also plays a role in educative experiences in music.  For 
instance, Greene (2001) explains the necessity of continual engagement with music, 
arguing that Mozart quintets don’t “reveal all they have to reveal naturally or 
automatically” (italics hers, p. 20).  In other words, one engagement, or even two or three 
engagements, with a Mozart quintet illuminates only parts of the piece; deep educative 
experiences take time and occur through sustained exploration.  Regardless of whether 
our musicking involves listening, performing, composing, or other activities, ongoing 
strivings allow for nuanced musical understandings and experiences.   
In addition to being cognitive, embodied, emotional, and social beings, humans 
strive, either aimlessly or towards various processes and/or goals.  Focusing on striving 
accentuates human multiplicities’ temporal and fluctuating nature.  While educative 
experiences can occur at any time, they often become deeper through sustained striving.   
Consistency and Chaos 
 In chapter 6, I assert that musickers strive for the integration of consistency and 
chaos.  The difference that constitutes time necessitates that all musical experiences occur 
uniquely, while the actualization of the past in each present moment requires a degree of 
consistency in a person’s musical endeavors.  Similarly, I posit that educators and 
students, like musickers, continually strive for the integration of consistency and chaos.  
Examining the question “When is education?” involves examining the interplay of 
educative experiences and humans’ strivings. 
 Within American schools, taken-for-granted assumptions about practices and 
structures exemplify how students and teachers, either consciously or consciously, strive 
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for consistency.  Tyack and Cuban (1995) explain that school structures have remained 
largely unchanged for decades, asserting: 
The basic grammar of schooling, like the shape of classrooms, has remained 
remarkably stable over the decades.  Little has changed in the ways that schools 
divide time and space, classify students and allocate them to classrooms, splinter 
knowledge into ‘subjects,’ and award grades and ‘credits’ as evidence of learning. 
(p. 85)   
Likewise, the general arrangements within classrooms, rows of desks and a board at the 
front of the room, as well as bodily placement, the teacher standing in the front and the 
students sitting at their desks, remains consistent in many places and in the images of 
education held by the public.  These long-standing practices and structures constitute the 
rituals of schooling. 
 As noted in chapter 6, musicking often serves as a ritualized endeavor that 
propagates existing practices and values (Kaplan, 1990; Merriam, 1964; Radocy & 
Boyle, 2003; Small, 1998).  Likewise, music educators continue to reinforce centuries-
old conventions, particularly those of music conservatories and military ensembles, while 
minimizing popular music practices and new trends in music production.  For instance, 
Abril and Gault (2008) conducted a survey of secondary school principals and found that 
93% of their schools offer band, 88% offer chorus, and 42% offer orchestra, while only 
20% and 10% offer guitar and music technology courses, respectively.  While striving for 
consistency in and through music education has advantages, such as the propagation of 
musical traditions from one generation to the next, when striving for chaos becomes 
minimized, music educators risk stagnation, homogeneity, and disconnection from the 
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ever-evolving musical practices outside of the classroom.  For example, the principals 
that Abril and Gault (2008) surveyed rated piano, guitar, and music technology as the 
classes they would most like to offer.  Additionally, teachers who primarily strive for 
consistency of musical practices neglect to assist students in developing the skills and 
dispositions to engage with music differently.   
 Writers have proposed alternatives to education based primarily on striving for 
consistency.  For instance, Counts (1969) challenges American educators to remake the 
social order, writing, “To refuse to face the task of creating a vision of a future America 
immeasurably more just and noble and beautiful than the America of today is to evade 
the most crucial, difficult, and important educational task” (p. 55).  While American 
society has evolved since the publication of Counts’ text, vast inequalities persist.  
Similarly, Freire (1970/2000) argues that educators everywhere should empower the 
oppressed to free themselves and their oppressors, in the process reimagining societal 
structures and practices (p. 56).  The reimaging and remaking of society envisioned by 
both Counts and Freire involves striving for chaos by engaging in questions of difference 
rather than focusing on propagating traditions.   
 Deleuze (1994) also advocates for education based primarily on variability.  He 
asserts, “True teachers . . . emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than 
propose gestures for us to reproduce” (p. 23).  Similarly, in writing about his college 
teaching, Deleuze (1995) states, “You give courses on what you’re investigating, not on 
what you know” (p. 139).  Bough (2004) summarizes this position, writing: 
What Deleuze details in his accounts of learning and teaching is . . . the dimension 
of discovery and creation within the ever-unfolding domain of the new.  It is also 
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the dimension of freedom, in which thought escapes its preconceptions and 
explores new possibilities for life. (p. 341)   
While all education contains elements of consistency and chaos, Deleuze challenges 
teachers to strive primarily for the latter.  In addition to striving to replicate and 
regurgitate past content and practices, educators can strive for change, diversity, and 
ongoing exploration.   
 Music education writers have also advocated that teachers and students strive to 
alter existing music education content and practices.
98
  About such strivings, Benedict 
(2007) writes, “If one of the ways liberation is represented is by our desire for our 
students to continue to engage with musical engagements on (a) [sic] meaningful level, 
the space we need to facilitate is liberatory with change and conflict as a given not a goal 
oriented end-point” (p. 27).  From this perspective, chaos in music education is as an 
ongoing process rather than a destination.   
Although teachers and students may primarily strive for consistency or chaos, 
they inevitably experience the integration of consistency and chaos during educative 
experiences.  Dewey (1916/2011) acknowledges this integration as well as the problem of 
education focused on the past, writing: 
A knowledge of the past and its heritage is of great significance when it enters 
into the present, but not otherwise.  And the mistake of making the records and 
remains of the past the main material of education is that it cuts the vital 
connection of present and past, and tends to make the past a rival of the present 
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and the present a more or less futile imitation of the past.  Under such 
circumstances, culture becomes an ornament and solace; a refuge and an asylum. 
(p. 44)   
Striving for consistency by replicating the past in the present becomes problematic when 
educators neglect the potential of striving for chaos, while striving for chaos becomes 
problematic when educators ignore students’ and communities’ pasts.   
Striving emphasizes the temporal nature of educative experiences as well as the 
possibility for deep educative experiences interconnected with sustained striving.  As 
inseparably cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and striving multiplicities, each 
educator and student enters the classroom with strivings directed towards the integration 
of consistency and chaos.  Questioning “When is education?” includes exploring the 
interplay of human strivings and educative experiences.   
Emplaced 
In chapter 5, I detail the role that location plays in humans’ understandings, 
meaning-making, and development.  In chapter 6, I draw on these ideas, asserting that 
one’s places affect musicking and vice versa.  Similarly, educative experiences, like all 
human endeavors, do not occur absent humans’ multiple places.  Asking “When is 
education?” assumes emplaced beings and leads to questions about how places interplay 
with educative experiences as well as how educative experiences might reinforce or 
change places.   
Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) argue that philosophy should connect to the 
diversity of everyday life, and explore the role of place in constraining or freeing action 
(1980/1987).  However, they do not elaborate on the relationship between place and 
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education.  Rather, Deleuzean scholars such as Cole (2011) and Morss (2000) have 
applied such ideas to education, noting the inseparability of place and educative 
experiences.  Cole explains, “The notion of a ‘one size fits all’ conceptual framing for 
education is immediately withdrawn through Deleuze;” instead, “one has to be sensitive 
to context” (p. 1).  Similarly, Morss states, “Deleuze never allows us to forget about the 
real world we also share, and like Nietzsche he accepts the ethical imperative to teach 
others about it” (p. 199).  I posit that integrating Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about 
space with the work of other authors adds detail to the inseparability of education and 
place.  
Place-conscious education foregrounds the relationship between learner and 
location, allowing for and encouraging educative experiences to continue as students 
move within and beyond school walls (Gruenwald, 2003).  For example, while teachers 
and students in all places can engage in moon explorations, location inevitably influences 
and alters different students’ moon observations and interactions.  My experience of 
searching for the ascending moon behind Boston’s variegated skyscrapers as a graduate 
student both shares similarities with and contrasts that of a student living on an expansive 
farm in Iowa or in the mountains of Nepal.   
Additionally, our current technologically-connected world enables unique 
opportunities for rich educational experiences between people in disparate locations, such 
as Boston, Iowa, and Nepal.  For instance, what if students in these distinct locations 
shared their diverse moon experiences?  How might that look?  How would sharing alter 
or extend the educative experience?  At least one teacher from the graduate class with 
Duckworth has used Duckworth’s alumni listserv to seek out teachers from various 
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locations interested in sharing their students’ moon experiences with her class.  Using 
contemporary globalized networks allows students to share their localized moon 
experiences with others, enabling them to engage in collaborative explorations with those 
from around the world. 
In twenty-first century societies, educative experiences occur at the nexus of local 
and global places.  Hansen (2011) asserts the importance of cosmopolitan-minded 
teachers who make educative connections with their multi-layered surroundings.  He 
envisions a teacher who “comes further into the world—as a listening, responsive 
figure—while becoming a representative and spokesperson of the world—as a 
knowledgeable figure for whom the world and its future matters” (italics his, p. 21).  
Such educators continually consider the changing places in which they and the students 
they teach reside and question how they might alter such places. 
In this section, I begin by examining how educators might bridge the divide 
between their classrooms and local communities.  Subsequently, I assert that local 
environments do not function absent globalized webs, detailing how teachers and 
students might interface with their glocalized surroundings.  Lastly, I explain how 
educators could utilize Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of nomads and smooth spaces to 
deepen and extend the question “When is education?” 
Local 
 Educative experiences happen not only in schools but in a multitude of places 
ranging from homes and parks to malls, museums, and community centers, and the 
people within those locations may become teachers who, either consciously or 
unconsciously, facilitate educative experiences.  As Perrone (1991) notes: 
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Any place where something special occurs can be a classroom of consequences—
churches, medical facilities, museums, libraries, factories, food processing plants, 
bakeries, garages, supermarkets, airports, ethnic culture centers, and restaurants.  
And the people who work in these special settings and around the community can 
be seen as teachers also—the carpenter, the baker, the lawyer down the street, the 
salesperson in the grocery store. (p. 41)   
When students, teachers, and community members conceive of schools as bounded 
striated spaces separated from what surrounds them, the practices in schools become 
placeless, disconnected and less relevant, and potentially less meaningful, and 
opportunities for interactions with people beyond the school walls are lost.
99
  When this 
occurs within designated learning environments, education and music education practices 
remain largely placeless (Gruenwald, 2003; Stauffer, 2009).  Asking “When is 
education?” involves questioning how teachers can dissolve the boundaries between and 
among the places of school and the local communities, attending to people and practices. 
 Deleuze emphasizes the relationship between one’s immediate place and learning, 
noting the individuality of educative experiences.  For example, as noted in chapter 3, he 
asks how materials, such as books, function for specific people at a given time and place 
(1990/1995, p. 8).  Each educative experience happens uniquely for a changing 
multiplicity in a specific context.   
Cole (2011) promotes increased interaction between schools and communities.  
Grounding his work in Deleuze’s philosophy, he advocates for the “removal of barriers 
and distinctions between teaching and learning inside and outside of school and 
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university” (p. 70).  Contemporary education philosophers such as Greene (1995) and 
Gruenwald (2003) make similar arguments.  Greene posits that “At least part of the 
challenge is to refuse artificial separations of the school from the surrounding 
environment” (p. 11), and Gruenwald asserts that place-conscious education “aims to 
work against the isolation of schooling’s discourses and practices from the living world 
outside” (p. 620).  Educators conscious of students’ local communities can question how 
they currently reinforce divides between school and community and how they might alter 
their practices to connect the two.  
Music education writers have applied these ideas to music teaching and learning, 
advancing that music educators seek inspiration and guidance from their local 
communities’ musical practices.  For instance, Stauffer (2009) asserts, “Place-conscious 
music education would seek to reconnect schools and communities and lived experience” 
(p. 178).  From this perspective, music educators might investigate and map the music 
practices of their local communities, asking how their classroom practices might interface 
with such activities.  Mapping involves an ongoing investigation into the evolving nature 
of local practices and the formation of continually changing connections between school 
and community musicking. 
This integration of variable local practices and variable music teaching and 
learning remains antithetical to much of contemporary American music education 
discourse and practice.  For example, undergraduate music teacher education programs 
remain largely homogenous, contrasting the great diversity of local traditions in their 
individual communities.  While researchers such as Abril (2009) and Stauffer (2009) 
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suggest ways in which students and teachers can form evolving connections between in-
school musicking and communities, such examples remain rare.   
General music classrooms, choirs, bands, and orchestras across the United States 
still share striking similarities.  While these similarities have advantages, such as 
fostering support for certain kinds of musicking throughout the country, they are 
problematic because they neglect the unique musical practices occurring in individual 
communities and the musical practices of students themselves.  In recent decades, music 
educators have added additional musical practices, such as mariachi, fiddle, and steel 
drumming, to school music programs,
100
 and the National Association for Music 
Education (NAfME) appears to encourage the creation of these ensembles (NAFME, 
2012; Spray, 2008).  Yet, authors of NAfME’s website, statements, and publications 
rarely assert the need to link such ensembles to the musical practices of students’ local 
communities, nor do they question the relevance of long-standing school music practices 
for specific communities and for students themselves.   
 Local places play a central role in human existence, influencing educative 
experiences.  Yet, contemporary American classrooms remain largely homogenous, 
separated from the unique practices of local communities.  Place-conscious educators 
seek ongoing connections, bringing aspects of local life into classrooms and students out 
into their communities.   
Global 
As noted in chapter 5, globalization affects daily life throughout the world, 
constructing, influencing, and altering local places in often unacknowledged ways.  
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Globalization has at least three consequences for place-conscious educators and music 
education practices.  First, fully exploring local places and practices requires an 
understanding of their integration with globalized structures, particularly the rapid rate of 
change brought on by globalizing forces.  Second, facilitating educative experiences for 
students who live in a globalized world requires new skill sets, understandings, 
dispositions, and practices for both teachers and students.  Lastly, a globalized world 
necessitates content that will allow students to interface with their global communities in 
addition to their local ones. 
One cannot examine, consider, or connect with contemporary local practices and 
values without confronting globalization.  Spring (2008) echoes this idea, writing, 
“Research on globalization and education involves the study of intertwined worldwide 
discourses, processes, and institutions affecting local educational practices and policies” 
(p. 330).  Globalization affects not only local educational experiences, but also the local 
communities in which students and teachers reside and in which educational experiences 
occur.  Additionally, globalization causes communities to change quickly, and 
understanding the interplay of globalization and localization means acknowledging the 
instability and variability of contemporary places.  As Hansen (2011) explains: 
One claim discernible in the long conversation on cosmopolitanism and the art of 
living is that it is not possible to ‘choose’ stability.  A person cannot wake up one 
 day and declare, as if it were a speech act, ‘Starting today my life will be stable.’  
 Nor can a community or nation choose stability, especially now under conditions 
 of wholesale change. (p. 49)   
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Educators who interface with their local communities encounter changing places that 
cannot exist apart from globalized influences.   
The pervasive and ever-evolving impact of globalization leads to questions about 
what knowledge and values students might need to function in a globalized world.
101
  
Suárez-Orozco and Qin-Hilliard (2004) state, “Education’s challenge will be to shape the 
cognitive skills, interpersonal sensibilities, and cultural sophistication of children and 
youth whose lives will be both engaged in local contexts and responsive to larger 
transnational processes” (p. 3).  They assert that students should learn practices, such as 
negotiating differences, and dispositions, such as an openness to complexity (p. 3).  
Negotiating, however, does not mean eliminating the unique qualities of people and 
practices.  Hansen (2011) argues that cosmopolitan educators seek to preserve rather than 
limit difference.  He writes: 
Cosmopolitan-minded education assists people in moving closer and closer apart 
. . . precisely through a deepening recognition of what renders each of them a 
distinct person.  Here, closeness derives not from collapsing differences but from 
their sharpened emergence.  This closeness is real, vital, and dynamic. (italics his, 
p. 3)   
Forming evolving educative connections to global communities involves emphasizing 
variability and diversity rather than stagnation and consensus.   
Music educators have elaborated on the understandings and dispositions for 
functioning in a globalized world.  For instance, building on Thomas L. Friedman’s book 
The World is Flat (2005), Beckmann-Collier (2009) posits four dispositions that music 
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educators might assist students in developing: learning how to learn, possessing passion 
and curiosity, playing well with others, and exercising the right sides of their brains.  In 
addition to emphasizing such dispositions, considering globalization also involves 
questioning educative content in and between disciplines.  For example, for decades 
promoters of multicultural education and music education have argued for the inclusion 
of diverse content and practices related to that content in school curricula.
102
  Hansen 
(2011) argues that because all humans are citizens of the world, the multitudes of artistic 
traditions are the inheritances not just of individual cultures but of all people.  Using the 
example of a hypothetical teacher engaging students with flamenco music and dance, he 
writes: 
The teacher conducts herself or himself as if the musical traditions of flamenco 
are not only emblematic of aspects of Spanish culture but are also a world 
inheritance bequeathed to persons everywhere—including in that teacher’s local 
classroom far removed in space and time from flamenco’s origins. (pp. 104-5) 
Hansen (2011) elaborates on how such understandings interface with students’ local 
experiences, writing, “Thus students still live in their local world, but they are no longer 
merely of it” (italics his, p. 105).  Acknowledging a globalized world means engaging 
with content not necessarily present in one’s local or national environment.  
Understanding flamenco or any other practice requires sustained exploration rather than 
superficial, one-time experiences.  Engaging students in deep explorations of musical 
cultures beyond their own enables them to become thoughtful, aware citizens of a global 
society.  By expanding the circle of who students and teachers consider in their educative 
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experiences, they can come to understand previously unknown art and artistic processes, 
viewing people and practices not as distinct from their localities but as inseparably 
connected to them. 
Since globalization enables music to evolve and hybridize with ever-increasing 
speed, educators taking globalization into account no longer conceptualize musical 
content and practices as stagnant.  Davis (2005) advocates that music educators embrace 
different musical traditions while maintaining an awareness that such practices 
continually alter and hybridize.  He summarizes this position, stating: 
Musical futures that include a reengagement with the past fuelled by the musical 
plenitude of the twenty-first century present will encounter the uncanny 
familiarity of a living heritage, one heard anew in the sound of its fractures and 
splits, its joys and its obsessions, as if for the first time. (p. 61)   
Given that globalization continues to accelerate change within local communities, 
flamenco practices and indeed all artistic endeavors develop rapidly, evolving through 
continual interactions.   
 Pondering ways to engage students in investigations of their local communities 
and of the evolving nature of their practices may facilitate further questions and more 
nuanced understandings of globalization and musicking.  The meaningfulness of 
examining the local is akin to what Noddings (2003) asserts as the teaching for “a love of 
place,” adding that “appropriate education for a particular place may play an important 
part in modifying our ideas about globalization” (p. 136).  By exploring and embracing 
their own unique locations, students and educators can question aspects of globalization 
and investigate possible alternatives that might mitigate its potentially harmful impact on 
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local communities.  Such endeavors arise when teachers facilitate the formation of active 
relationships with multiple aspects of students’ localized and globalized environments, 
including its musical dimensions. 
Those teaching and learning music in a globalized world face numerous 
dilemmas.  Bartel (2002) offers a series of questions for music educators living in the 
tension created by globalization:  
So should we in schools doggedly teach multi-cultural approaches to music as if 
nothing is changing? Or do we ‘throw in the towel,’ letting ourselves be 
subjugated by corporate market strategies, and accept the new globalized 
commonality of pop music?  Are we contributing to a globalization of music with 
the globalization of music pedagogy?  Or can we recognize and honour 
uniquenesses while working for inter-cultural understanding?  Can we put people 
ahead of art? (p. 2)   
Music educators wishing to actively engage with their globalized worlds face ongoing, 
complicated decisions about what content and practices to include in their classrooms.  
Only by continually engaging with such questions, and engaging students and fellow 
citizens with such questions, can teachers and students and communities together make 
choices that they believe most benefit their local and global communities. 
Glocal 
As noted in chapter 5, globalization functions symbiotically with localization, 
causing simultaneous homogenization and heterogenization.  Robertson (1995) uses the 
portmanteau “glocalization” to denote these interconnected processes.  Asking “When is 
education?” involves exploring the interplay of globalized and localized places and 
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practices and their role in educative experiences.  Focus on the interplay between local 
and global inevitably leads to encounters with glocalization and its byproducts.   
Few authors have addressed glocalization in education or music education 
directly.  Drawing on my own understandings of glocalization, I posit an example of how 
music educators might facilitate explorations of glocalized musicking.  As detailed in 
chapter 6, my experiences in Hungary exemplify the process of glocalization.  As my 
fellow students sang and played “Brown Eyed Girl,” each added his or her own unique 
musical imprint.  For example, a Columbian student added a Latin American clave 
rhythm while an American student added jazz-inspired riffs and harmonies.   
Reflecting on these experiences, I ponder what might have happened if I used the 
concept of glocalization to engage the students I taught.  For instance, what if the 
students and I asked questions and physically and virtually explored how we, other 
students and teachers, administrators, and community members talked about, sang, 
played along with, and responded to various Western popular songs.  What if the students 
and I had use the Internet to explore how people in disparate locations understood and 
interpreted the same songs, and questioned who was involved, or not involved, in those 
interpretations?  What if we had thought about what local conditions and practices were 
associated with the different transformations we heard?  What if we then made our own 
version of the song?  Such investigations may illuminate musicking practices unique to 
specific places and groups of people as well as the ongoing process of glocalization.     
Asking “When is music education?” in a glocalized world involves 
acknowledging the link between localized and globalized musicking.  Teachers can 
contemplate the content, knowledge, skills, and dispositions students might use to interact 
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musically in their multiple locations.  This questioning, like glocalization itself, 
continually evolves, necessitating ongoing dialog, exploration, and creative thinking and 
action. 
Nomads in Smooth Spaces 
 
Educative experiences grounded in students’ local and global environments have 
the potential to foster ongoing relationships with diverse people.  Perrone (1991) asserts, 
“I believe we owe it to our young people to ensure that they are deeply involved with 
their communities, that they leave us eager to take an active part in the political and 
cultural systems that surround them” (p. 42).  The interplay between places becomes 
problematic, however, if educative experiences in places called schools function only to 
propagate existing places and practices.  Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) concepts of 
striated spaces, smooth spaces, and nomads may help further elucidate the possible ways 
in which educators and students can perceive and engage with their multiple places.   
As explicated in chapter 5, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) define striated 
spaces as stagnant and limited by enclosure and smooth spaces as diverse and variable, 
constantly changing and moving.  Deleuze and Guattari add that nomads reside in smooth 
spaces, making them grow by introducing new practices into them.  Educators become 
nomads when they look for and create possibilities for difference and change within their 
local and global communities, thereby forming smooth spaces of movement and 
questioning.  These nomadic teachers seek out diverse places, practices, and values and 
challenge preexisting boundaries within their communities.  For example, a music 
educator might perform a gamelan concert at a space typically reserved for classical 
music or bring music into places where none previously existed.   
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Educative experiences occur when people wander, either physically or virtually, 
to unknown places, viewing them and their inhabitants in all their complexity and 
variability, thus creating smooth spaces.  For instance, a teacher facilitating learning 
about and with Brazilian music might facilitate engagements with Brazilian musickers 
online, through avenues such as Skype or blogs, seeking out diversity in musical 
understandings, experiences, and values.  Drawing on their local and global explorations, 
students and teachers can create smooth spaces, perhaps reimagining their in-school 
musicking by adding practices such as playing by ear or composing with Ableton.  They 




Given humans’ emplaced existence, asking “When is education?” entails 
exploring the relationship between places and educative experiences.  I argue that 
embracing the concept of glocalization can help people seek out and facilitate educative 
moments linked to students’, teachers’, and community members’ multiple environments.  
Greene (2001) asserts the possibilities for such experiences, stating, “What we want to 
make possible is the living of lyrical moments, moments at which human beings (freed to 
feel, to know, and to imagine) suddenly understand their own lives in relation to all that 
surrounds” (p. 7).  While teachers cannot always predict when such “lyrical moments” 
will occur, facilitating explorations of musical content and practices in connection with 
students’ local and global locations may more readily enable such experiences to happen.  
Educative experiences occur when and as people develop an awareness of and engage 
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with cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and striving beings emplaced in a glocalized 
world. 
Complicating 
 In this chapter, I have elaborated on when cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, 
and striving multiplicities emplaced in a glocalized world experience education.  
According to Deleuze (1968/1994; 1990/1995), educative experiences occur when 
teachers and students embrace difference, change, and diversity.  Bough (2004) explains, 
“By ‘learning’ Deleuze clearly does not mean the mere acquisition of any new skill or bit 
of information, but instead the accession to a new way of perceiving and understanding 
the world,” adding that such engagement “takes us beyond the illusions of habit and 
common sense to the truths of what … Deleuze labels ‘differences’” (p. 328).  Applying 
Deleuze’s (1968/1994) writing to music education, Gould (2007b) writes, “Teaching and 
learning, then, occur not only in doing—not necessarily limited to active playing, 
composing, or listening—but in ongoing thinking, in difference, as well” (p. 25).  Diverse 
educative experiences occur when teachers embrace the complexity and difference 
underlying existence.  While educative experiences can and do happen without defined 
“teachers,” those who call themselves educators have the potential to facilitate such 
experiences.  In this section, I use the word “complicating” as a means of elaborating on 
this idea.  
According to the authors of the Oxford English Dictionary (2000), complicating 
involves folding, intertwining, mixing, and making complex and intricate.  I use the word 
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“complicating” to emphasize ever-changing complexity.104  In education, complicating 
involves looking inward and outward, beyond conventional practices and traditional 
modes of thinking, in order to conceive of humans and the world differently.  I posit that 
exploring the question “When is education?” involves complicating people, places, and 
content. 
Educators can complicate themselves and the students they teach by asking how 
human multiplicities experience education.  Teachers build a deeper and more nuanced 
understanding of their pedagogy when they continually contemplate the integration and 
complexity of educative experiences and cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and 
striving.  For example, educators might ponder, “How does this student’s thinking 
integrate with her past embodied experience?” “How do this student’s emotions interplay 
with his current social interactions with his friends while he engages with this new 
musical concept or educative experience?” or “How do my strivings and emotional states 
interconnect with my facilitation of students’ musical and educative experiences?”   
 Complicating places involves mapping the experiences within one’s classroom 
and local community and investigating how such practices might interface with those in a 
variety of diverse places.  Hansen (2011) posits questions that teachers might consider 
during such explorations.  He asks: 
How are you inhabiting your world?  How are you inhabiting your school and 
classroom?  How to you carry and conduct yourself?  How do you encourage your 
students to engage in ethical work—to carry themselves in ways that draw out 
their aesthetic, moral, and intellectual capability? (p. 46)   
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Such inquiries complicate preexisting education practices limited to the walls of 
classrooms and encourage teachers and students to continually engage with their own 
multiplicities and their glocalized worlds.
105
 
 Teachers can also embrace the complicated nature of their disciplines and selected 
content.  Duckworth (2006) notes the intricacy inherent in any study, writing: 
Why doesn’t Shakespeare just say what he means?  Of course that’s what he is 
doing: “what he means” is complex.  The words he chooses are the best he can 
choose to say what he wants to say.  Poems and stories and paintings and dance 
and music are not just fancy ways of saying what could be said in a sentence. 
(italics hers, p. 133)   
Exploring the complexity of a discipline requires embracing rather than minimizing 
difference.  This may include investigating the connections to other subjects and 
disciplines, qualities of human ontology, and local and global places.   
 Teachers’ complications of content can interplay with their complications of 
students.  Duckworth (2006) writes: 
Just as a the poet seeks to present his [sic] thoughts and feelings in all their 
complexity, and in so doing opens a multiplicity of paths into his meaning, 
likewise a teacher who presents a subject matter in all its complexity makes it 
more accessible by opening a multiplicity of paths into it. (p. 135)   
When educators imagine diverse avenues between multi-faceted and evolving students 
and complex content and when they themselves are open to their own complexity, they 
may succeed in facilitating deeper and more long-lasting educative experiences.  
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 Reimagining educative relationships between beings, places, and content involves 
complicating, understanding each as complex and changing.  As teachers and students 
strive for the integration of consistency and chaos, their connections with each other and 
their subject matter exist in ongoing motion.  Asking “When is education?” involves 
examining the complexity of and imagining possibilities for beings, places, and content 
involved in educative experiences. 
Considering 
Complicating our beings, places, and content is not enough.  One can imagine a 
situation in which a teacher complicates multiple beings, places, and ideas only to return 
to his or her prior practices.  Furthermore, all education exists within socially constructed 
systems of power and ethics.  While complicating students, ourselves, our multiple 
environments, and our subject matter may elucidate such networks and beliefs, 
considering requires openly taking questions of power and ethics into account when 
making educative decisions.  I argue that, in order for education to evolve alongside 
changing beings, locations, and content, educators should consider multiple paths when 
planning and engaging in educative experiences.   
 Considering ourselves and the students we teach as inseparably cognitive, 
embodied, emotional, social, and striving leads to questions about what educative 
experiences we deem most valuable for those changing multiplicities in that time and 
place.  Deleuze (1995) argues for ethics rather than morality: 
Morality presents us with a set of constraining rules of a special sort, ones that 
judge actions and intentions by considering them in relation to transcendent 
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values (that is good, that’s bad …); ethics is a set of optional rules that assess 
what we do, what we say, in relation to the ways of existing involved. (p. 100)   
In other words, acting ethically precludes relying solely on preset rules and values of the 
past, although those may be useful in some respect, and instead involves taking all 
aspects of context and being into account.  Similarly, Dewey (1916/2011) asserts the 
absurdity of teachers setting up their “‘own’ aims as the proper objects of the growth of 
the children as it would be for the farmer to set up an ideal of farming irrespective of 
conditions” (p. 60).  Drawing on prior sections of this chapter, I assert that teachers 
seeking to make ethical educative decisions engage in ongoing explorations of the 
students they teach and the ideas and customs of their local and global environments as 
well as the evolving nature of content and practices.  I use the word “considering” to 
expand on this idea. 
Considering involves not only teachers’ ideas and thinking about possible 
journeys, but also those of students and communities.  Appiah (2006) reminds us that 
living in a world of diverse thinking and practices necessitates considering decisions from 
multiple perspectives.  He states, “When I think about what I should do unto others, is 
what matters whether I’d like it done to me with my actual values and beliefs, or is what 
matters whether I’d like it done to me if I had their values and beliefs?” (p. 62).   
Such considerations involve examining both local values and one’s interactions 
with a globalized world.  Hansen (2011) writes, “From a cosmopolitan perspective, every 
act of rethinking how one holds values mirrors what it means to be open reflectively to 
the world and loyal reflectively to the local (including to one’s values)” (italics his, p. 
18).  Similarly, Appiah (2006) asserts that “cosmopolitan moral judgment requires us to 
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feel about everyone in the world what we feel about our literal neighbors” (p. 157), 
adding that “our basic obligations must be consistent with our being” and “partial to those 
closest to us: to our family, our friends, and our nations” (p. 165).  In educative contexts, 
considering includes balancing the practices of those within our local and global 
environments as well as exploring and thinking critically about the interactions between 
them. 
 Considering involves not only thinking and interacting with life as it currently 
exists, but also imagining how people, places, ideas, and practices might occur 
differently.  Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) challenge educators to create new 
concepts with attention to one’s current context and circumstances (p. 5).  Rather than 
considering preexisting educative content and processes, teachers can consider creating 
innovative forms of education.  May and Semetsky (2008) explain that for Deleuze an 
“ethical education” does not mean learning a set of stable identities or traditional values 
but rather abandoning “asking who it is that we should be” in favor of asking “who it is 
that we might be” (italics theirs, p. 150).  Engaging in an ongoing process of considering 
involves not only asking what educative experiences teachers might repeat or adopt from 
others but also what educative experiences they might invent. 
Asking “When is education?” involves considering the ethical implications of 
teaching and learning.  I assert that part of making ethical choices about classroom 
practices entails considering multiple alternatives, including the possibility of creating 
new concepts, content, and practices.  In addition to asking “When is education?” 
teachers might ponder “When might education be?” considering diverse possibilities for 
educative experiences and choosing to facilitate the learning that they, students, and 
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community members deem most ethical for individual students at specific moments and 
local and global communities.  
Summary 
In this chapter, I began by using the human ontology posited in chapter 4 to detail 
how inseparably cognitive, embodied, emotional, and social multiplicities can experience 
education.  Next, I examined how adding a fifth integrated quality, striving, emphasizes 
the temporal nature of education as well as elucidates how education occur when humans 
strive for the integration of consistency and chaos.  Third, I articulated how educative 
experiences can occur when educators and students interact with aspects of their multiple 
local and global places.  Fourth, by drawing upon the preceding three sections, I asserted 
that teachers should complicate multiplicities, places, content, and practices as well as the 
interactions within and between them.  Lastly, I posited that teachers should engage in 
ongoing considering of multiple paths, including the creation of new concepts, content, 




COMPLICATING, CONSIDERING, AND CONNECTING IN MUSIC EDUCATION 
In the preceding chapters, I use the writings of Deleuze and Guattari and other 
authors to trouble prior conceptions about the nature of beings, places, music, and 
education.  In chapter 4, I posit a human ontology based on the inseparability of 
cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving.  In chapter 5, I assert that 
twenty-first century places exist at the nexus of localized practices and globalized 
systems and continually undergo striation and smoothing.  In chapters 6 and 7, I 
investigate when cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, striving beings emplaced in a 
glocalized world experience music and education.  In this chapter, I explore how the 
aforementioned investigations might relate to each other and music education.   
Figure 8.1 illustrates my bricolage mapping in this chapter.  The complicating and 
connecting sections draw on the question “When and who are we?” that I posed in 
chapter 4 and developed in chapters 6 and 7.  Those same sections draw on the question 
“Where are we?” that originated in chapter 5 and that I applied to musical and educative 
experiences in chapters 6 and 7, respectively.  The considering section in this chapter 
elaborates on the considering section in chapter 7.  By looping through these various 
ideas, I posit the possibilities of rhizomatic philosophizing in music education. 
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Figure 8.1.  Bricolage mapping of chapter 8. 
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As noted in chapter 3, May (2005) asserts that rather than demarking the limits of 
human being and knowing, Deleuze constructs an ontology that explores the question 
“How might we live?” (p. 17).  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) investigate this 
question through various philosophical figurations, such as the rhizome, that encourage 
readers to think differently about existence and its potentialities.  May (2005) asserts that 
for Deleuze, the question of how we might live becomes “‘What connections might we 
form?’ Or, ‘What actualizations can we experiment with?’” (p. 133).  Drawing on these 
questions, I posit that musical and educative experiences occur when multiplicities 
connect with various human qualities as well as with and within their local and global 
places.  
While one can imagine a teacher who primarily facilitates the connections with 
which he or she has familiarity, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) encourage continual 
experimenting with difference.  In this spirit, I suggest that teachers engage in the 
ongoing process of complicating themselves, their students, and their students’ multiple 
environments as a means of exploring and forming diverse connections.  Such 
complications, such moves to complexity, may reveal new insights about students and 
places, thus enabling teachers and students to connect to themselves and their glocal 
surroundings in previously unimagined ways. 
Solely complicating and connecting, however, does not take into account that, as 
noted in chapter 7, education is an inherently ethical endeavor.  One can imagine teachers 
and students who complicate themselves and their environments and connect in diverse 
ways but never contemplate the ethical implications of the skills, values, and dispositions 
inherent in their actions, decisions, and practices.  While I posit the importance of 
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multiple varieties of musical and educative connections, I do not assert that teachers and 
students should simply form random connections.  When the directions and qualities of 
connections go unquestioned, teachers and students limit the potential for new connecting 
and diverse musical and educative experiences.  In order to make meaningful ethical 
choices about what connecting might best facilitate learning for specific individuals at 
given times and places, I suggest that teachers and students consider multiple options, 
including both avenues taken by others and those that they themselves invent.   
In this chapter, I draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about how we might 
live as well as the ideas posited in chapters 4 through 7 of this document to suggest that 
music educators engage in three practices: complicating, considering, and connecting.  I 
use the gerund form of these three words to posit their existence as ongoing rather than 
one-time endeavors.  Through their continual unfolding, complicating, considering, and 
connecting unceasingly overlap and mix.  I begin by examining these processes 
individually and subsequently explore how they might function in continual integration.  
Complicating 
It is easy to see the world as we have always seen it, to see people as primarily 
cognitive, places as stagnant, and music education as it currently exists.  Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980/1987) question this line of thinking, instead asserting the value of 
complexity, variability, and change.  As noted in chapter 3, difference serves a key role in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy.  In contrast to longstanding Western philosophical 
traditions, Deleuze and Guattari posit a world consisting of underlying difference and 
267 
movement rather than constancy and stagnation.  Such an ontology of existence demands 
an ongoing complication of people, objects, places, practices, and ideas.
106
 
Imagine shaking a kaleidoscope and then viewing the colored objects that have 
momentarily settled at its base.  The random arrangement of the integrated objects 
reflected in the mirrors reveals a stable pattern, highlighting certain aspects and 
interrelationships.  The slightest tap, however, sets the pieces in motion, creating different 
perspectives and connections.  Similarly, complicating is an ongoing process, forming 
temporary images of reality that give way to new arrangements and their accompanying 
insights and questions.  
Throughout this document, I use the conceptual framework of bricolage to 
continually complicate prior understandings of humans, places, music, and education.  
Like a person moving a kaleidoscope, a bricoleur looks for new arrangements, returning 
again and again to an object or idea with diverse insights.  In my continual process of 
bricolage throughout the preceding chapters, I seek to complicate rather than simplify 
each Point of Entry Text (questions in titles of chapters 4 through 7) through which I 
loop.  As Kincheloe and Berry (2004) explain, “The structure of bricolage works 
inwardly, playfully, complexly and rigorously” (p. 103).  Bricoleurs seek out complexity; 
rather than settling for singular understandings, they open multiple pathways and form 
diverse connections.  Kincheloe (2005) summarizes that bricolage “exists out of respect 
for the complexity of the lived world.  Indeed, it is grounded on an epistemology of 
complexity” (p. 324).   
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Like bricoleurs, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) embrace an ontology of 
existence based on complexity.  They explore the intricate flows that constitute life by 
creating philosophical figurations, such as multiplicities, rhizomes, nomads, and bodies 
without organs.  As noted in chapter 3, St. Pierre (1997) asserts that philosophical 
figurations produce confusion and disorder rather than coherence and unity.  Instead of 
offering a clearer portrayal of life, Deleuze and Guattari seek to complicate 
understandings and actions.  Complicating involves unceasing motion and an 
abandonment of static conceptions of existence.   
Complicating occurs within and through lived experiences.  As noted in chapter 3, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) write, “A concept lacks meaning to the extent that it is 
not connected to other concepts and is not linked to a problem that it resolves or helps to 
resolve” (p. 79).  Rather than complicating ideas in abstraction, Deleuze and Guattari 
encourage readers to link their thinking to their contemporary endeavors.  Complicating 
is not an intellectual exercise but rather a process integrated with one’s hardships and 
aspirations and leading to new thinking and action. 
Enumerating various aspects of music and education that teachers and students 
might consider complicating contradicts Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on process and 
continual innovation.  To limit one’s complications to a prescribed set of aspects 
minimizes the vast variation that constitutes human multiplicities, places, and musical 
and educative experiences.  However, positing possible qualities and ideas one might 
complicate encourages readers to consider aspects of people, places, and experiences that 
they may not otherwise.  Drawing on the conceptions of multiplicities, places, music, and 
education that I posit in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7, respectively, in this chapter I assert the 
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importance of teachers and students complicating their multiple qualities and locations.  
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that rhizomes proceed from the middle, 
emphasizing processes rather than beginnings and endings.  I challenge music educators 
to think and act rhizomatically, using these ideas as middles from which they can 
continue complicating and growing.   
In this section, I begin by exploring how music educators and students might 
complicate the integration of cognition, embodiment, emotions, sociality, and striving 
during musical and educative experiences.  Second, I investigate how music educators 
and students might complicate their musical and educative strivings, noting that all 
musical and educative strivings occur towards some combination of consistency and 
chaos.  Lastly, I detail how music educators and students might complicate their multiple 
local, global, and glocal musical and educative places. 
Multiplicities and Music Education 
In chapter 4, I draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) concept of 
multiplicities to posit a human ontology constituted by the inseparability of cognition, 
embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving.  In chapters 6 and 7, I use the concepts of 
multiplicities and the aforementioned human ontology to detail how these five qualities 
interact during musical and educative experiences.  Combining these ideas, I assert that 
music education does not occur absent the integration of human cognition, embodiment, 
emotion, sociality, and strivings. 
Complicating teachers’ and students’ multiplicities involves an ongoing 
questioning of the ways in which these five qualities interface with musical and educative 
experiences.  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) characterize multiplicities neither by 
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their individual components nor their unified whole but the interaction of the two (p. 
249).  I suggest here that teachers and students complicate their own integration of 
cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving by reflecting on the 
interconnectedness of these during past musicking as well as directing attention to these 
qualities while engaging in musical and educative endeavors.   
While the five aforementioned qualities always function inseparably from one 
another, focusing on all five at once can be challenging.  Drawing attention to and 
exploring a single quality and then pondering how that quality interfaces with the other 
four may enable teachers and students to complicate human multiplicities.  For instance, 
a teacher might explore how her sociality interplays with her experience of a particular 
form of musicking.  She might investigate questions including: How do my present social 
circumstances integrate with my current musical engagement?  What prior social 
experiences have I had with such musicking or similar types of musicking?  How do I see 
myself in the world during this musicking?  Who is musicking with me and who is not?  
Simultaneously, she might complicate the interplay of sociality and other qualities 
through questions such as: How does my sociality interconnect with the way I think about 
this musicking?  In what ways do my past and present social experiences integrate with 
the emotions I am feeling?  How does my sociality interplay with my body’s actions and 
reactions during this musical endeavor?  Through such questioning, teachers may 
continually work towards an intimate understanding of their own cognition, embodiment, 
emotions, sociality, and striving. 
As part of their own complicating, teachers may choose to work toward more 
complex understandings of their students as cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and 
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striving multiplicities, while simultaneously recognizing that they can never directly 
know what students think and feel.  In order to complicate their views of students’ 
multiple qualities, teachers need to rely on observation, dialogue, and experimentation.  
By watching students, talking with them, and listening to them, teachers can come to 
understand aspects of students’ cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving.  
For instance, a music educator might observe students and ponder: To what extent do 
students smile or look bored during educative experiences, and how do such embodied 
emotions integrate with their social interactions?  How do students move their bodies in 
connection with striving for the integration of consistency and chaos?  How do such 
movements alter before, during, and after listening to music?  Such observations provide 
clues into how students’ five inseparable qualities interact during specific experiences 
and to what degree students might consider such moments musical and educative. 
 Teachers might assist students in complicating the ways in which their cognition, 
embodiment, emotions, sociality, and strivings integrate during music education 
experiences.  For example, teachers might ask questions such as: How do your 
interactions with your classmates interplay with your emotions while you make music?  
How does your body change while engaging with music, and what physical sensations 
and emotions are associated with those changes in your body?  When do you enjoy 
repeating musical practices and when do you enjoy engaging in new ones?  When you 
hear music unfamiliar to you, what happens to you?  
Complicating students’ multiplicities through observation, dialogue, and 
experimentation involves teachers learning with students.  Such interactions will clearly 
need to take different forms depending on students’ ages, cultures, relationships with 
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each other, and rapport with a given teacher.  Additionally, individual students may react 
differently to such inquires.  For example, while some students might feel perfectly fine 
discussing emotions with their peers, others might prefer to write in journals or on blogs.  
Following Deleuze’s (1968/1994) assertion that teachers should learn alongside students 
(p. 23), music educators and students might collaboratively investigate their inseparable 
qualities during musical and educative experiences.   
 Students and teachers, however, continually change, and the act of thinking about, 
demonstrating, or articulating one’s cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, or 
striving alters both teacher and student.  Music educators risk missing their own and their 
students’ development if they do not continually complicate human multiplicities.  
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain, “A multiplicity is continually transforming 
itself into a string of other multiplicities” (italics theirs, p. 249).  Multiplicities are not 
stable entities but evolving collections.  Complicating teachers’ and students’ 
multiplicities demands ongoing engagement and experimentation in every experience.  
Additionally, complicating human multiplicities involves questioning the relative 
value that teachers and students place on certain qualities.  Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987) assert the rhizomatic nature of multiplicities, explaining that they “expose 
arborescent pseudomultiplicities for what they are” (p. 8).  Questioning how cognition, 
embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving interact during musical and educative 
experiences may reveal that teachers and students ascribe a hierarchy to these qualities.  
For instance, one teacher may focus on the cognitive aspect of musicking while another 
may emphasize the social nature of musicking.  Complicating includes investigating not 
only how the five qualities interact, but also how teachers and students consciously or 
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unconsciously invest them with value.  While teachers and students will inevitably favor 
certain qualities at specific times, through their complications, they might question how 
their thinking and practices can become more rhizomatic.   
Complicating necessitates a continual investigation of how cognition, 
embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving interact during music education 
experiences.  Teachers and students can explore multiple qualities through observation, 
dialogue, and experimentation.  Engaging in the ongoing process of complicating 
multiplicities may enable music educators and students to have deeper and more multi-
faceted musical and educative experiences, perhaps leading to further complications.   
Strivings and Music Education 
 In chapter 4, I posit four statements about striving: striving is an inseparable 
quality of human ontology; striving is fundamentally directionless; humans often direct, 
either consciously or unconsciously, their strivings towards various simultaneous 
processes and/or goals; striving occurs in time, thus emphasizing the temporal nature of 
existence.  In chapters 6 and 7, I expand on these ideas, arguing that musical and 
educative experiences occur when humans consciously or unconsciously strive for 
varying combinations of consistency and chaos.  In this subsection, I posit that 
complicating includes exploring how music educators and music students strive for the 
integration of consistency and chaos in and through music education experiences.  
Complicating strivings involves teachers interrogating their own musical and 
educational strivings for consistency.  Teachers might ponder questions including: To 
what extent do I seek to replicate the musical practices with which I possess the most 
familiarity?  Why do I seek such replication?   How do I tailor my instruction based on 
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my own experiences as a student?  Why do I use certain pedagogical practices?  In what 
ways do I reproduce established processes and actions?  How and in what ways do I 
challenge myself musically, educationally, and in other ways?  Why do I do so?  What do 
I avoid?  Such questions may enable teachers to understand how their own strivings for 
consistency impact their thinking and practices as well as what structures reinforce 
consistency. 
 How might music educators know what striving for consistency looks and sounds 
like for individuals and groups of students?  Complicating students’ strivings for 
consistency means exploring how they unconsciously or consciously strive for musical 
and educative experiences that propagate familiar values, ideas, and practices in light of 
their personal experiences and desires.  A student of Turkish heritage may strive to 
imitate his father’s oud playing whereas a student whose family primarily listens to 
popular music might wish to mimic the drumming of a performer in a favorite band.  
Similarly, some students growing up in towns with long histories of ensembles such as 
bands, choirs, and orchestras may strive for musical community and even family 
traditions by participating in those ensembles while other students in the same towns may 
have strive for completely different musical practices and social integrations. Teachers 
might ask themselves: What are students’ musical strivings?  In what ways are their 
strivings related to their cognition, embodiment, emotions, and sociality?    
In the above “Multiplicities and Music Education” subsection, I posit that music 
educators can come to understand aspects of students’ various qualities through 
observation, dialogue, and experimentation.  Likewise, in order to understand how 
students and community members strive for consistency, music educators can observe 
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their musicking habits as well as engage them in dialogue about their musical experiences 
outside of school.  Teachers and students might investigate their own strivings for 
consistency by exploring together questions such as: In what ways do I expect and seek 
out similarities from one musical experience to another?  How does listening to or 
making familiar music interplay with my body and emotions?  What types of music and 
musical practices do I want to hear or engage with in specific places and social 
environments?  Why do I want to hear that music, and how do I react when those 
expectations are not met?  Such conversations require deep listening, attentive 
engagement, and ongoing dialogue.   
 Complicating striving means questioning how students and teachers 
simultaneously strive for chaos as well as consistency.  As noted in chapter 6, Deleuze 
and Guattari (1980/1987) explain “chaos” as “the forces of raw and untamed matter upon 
which Forms must be imposed in order to make substances” (p. 338).  In other words, the 
continually altering difference that comprises existence prior to orderings and structures 
constitutes chaos.  Complicating strivings for chaos might involve pondering questions 
such as: When have I sung a solo in a new way, improvised a unique jazz riff, or created 
music using original techniques?  Why do I engage in innovative musical practices under 
certain circumstances and not others?  What new practices have I incorporated into my 
teaching?  How might I strive for musical and social change within my multiple 
communities?  
While students may wish to engage in the musical practices of their families, 
peers, and communities, they likely do not wish to copy those practices exactly.  In fact, 
they may not wish to engage in such practices at all.  In order to understand how students 
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strive for chaos, music educators might inquire into how students envision their 
musicking occurring differently from that of others, from peers to family to what they 
hear and see in various media.  For example, teachers might ask students questions such 
as:  How is your musicking unique to you?  How might you alter a given piece of music 
or performance?  When might you listen to a piece of music differently?  What would 
happen if you played, sang, or explored creating music in an unfamiliar way?  How does 
your musicking change over time?  In what ways can you imagine different musical 
practices impacting your local and global communities? 
 Complicating involves questioning not just how students and teachers currently 
strive for musical chaos but how they might strive for chaos.  Students and teachers, 
however, may not have had the experiences enabling them to experiment with the 
multitude of ways in which musicking might occur differently.  Brainstorming sessions in 
which teachers and students work in groups or as a class to imagine how they might 
engage with a particular piece, style of music, or musical practice differently as well as 
physical explorations of such processes may enable them to complicate their strivings for 
chaos.  Such investigations may assist teachers and students in engaging with and 
developing their strivings for chaos.   
Students and teachers might complicate their strivings for the integration of 
consistency and chaos by exploring how contemporary musical practices evolve and 
hybridize.  Drawing on the work of Deleuze, Szekely (2012) asserts the possibilities of 
“cultivating openness to the complexity and difference created as traditions evolve, which 
is vital to understanding what traditions are and how they work” (p. 174).  This type of 
investigation might enable students to understand that musical experiences involve 
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striving for a continually evolving combination of consistency and chaos.  Building on 
such explorations, students might come to understand how they do or could strive for 
varying integrations of consistency and chaos through musicking.   
Complicating students’ and teachers’ strivings for the integration of consistency 
and chaos involves an ongoing exploration of both tradition and difference in musical and 
educative practices.  Teachers and students can complicate their musical and educative 
strivings through ongoing dialogue and experimentation.  Additionally, music educators 
might choose to facilitate experiences that encourage themselves and the students they 
teach to explore how they might strive for varying combinations of consistency and 
chaos.   
Place and Music Education 
As noted in chapter 5, place constitutes a fundamental part of human existence.  
Humans simultaneously author and are authored by the multiple places they inhabit.
107
  In 
contemporary society, humans exist at the confluence of local and global musical and 
educative places.  Complicating human multiplicities’ interrelationships with places 
involves exploring the musical and educative practices and values of students’ and 
teachers’ multiple communities.   
In twenty-first century society, local and global music and educative practices 
continually interact.  As noted in chapter 5, Robertson (1995) uses the portmanteau 
“glocalization” in order to denote the simultaneous homogenization and heterogenization 
caused by the interaction of globalization and localization.  In contemporary music 
education settings, complicating involves exploring local and global music and music 
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278 
education practices as well as investigating how the local and global unceasingly 
combine, altering each other in the process.   
In order to complicate students’ and teachers’ multiple potential interactions with 
musical and educative places, music educators might map the multitude of practices 
within their immediate communities.  Drawing on the work of John Dewey, Väkevä 
(2012) writes: 
By paying respect to the manifold ways in which people let music work in their 
everyday experience, music educators can contribute to the lives of their students 
in ways that do not close off interpretive possibilities, but rather expand shared 
realms of meaning. (p. 105)   
For example, music educators might inquire into the musics that students in their classes 
engage with outside of school, the informal and formal music venues and groups that 
exist in their local communities, and how these practices integrate and change over time.   
In order to understand students’ and communities’ shared musical meanings, 
teachers and students might investigate how students and community members author 
different locations through various music and musical practices.  Teachers and students 
might explore questions such as: What musical practices occur within students’ public 
and private places?  What music defines local stores, restaurants, parks, sporting venues, 
community centers, and places of worship?  Who is in those places?  Who is not? What 
local places are devoid of musicking?  How do teachers and students author their school 
through musicking?
 108
  Complicating local musical practices requires ongoing dialogue 
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about and, when possible, observations of diverse musical venues as well as questions 
about where and how those practices occur.        
Music educators and students might complicate the glocalized environments in 
which they reside by asking how global music practices influence local ones.  They might 
explore questions including: How do local rock bands and jazz musicians utilize musical 
styles and practices that have spread from other places?  How does the musicking of 
these artists change over time as a result of globalized influences?  Conversely, music 
educators and students can question how local music practices become globalized.  For 
instance, teachers might engage students in investigations of the localized origins of 
musical practices ranging from rap and reggae to waltz and tango.  Teachers and students 
might also question how the musical practices within their own local community might 
become globalized.   
 Complicating musical and educative places requires that students and teachers use 
the technologies at their disposal to engage with musicians in diverse places.  Students 
and teachers might watch videos of various versions of the songs on websites such as 
YouTube, follow the tweets and blogs of composers, musicians, and listeners, and look 
for online resources that facilitate the learning of various musical practices.  Music 
educators and students might also complicate the global networks through which music 
and musical practices flow.  As noted in chapter 5, Appadurai (1990) posits five types of 
global flows: ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes, and ideascapes.  
Drawing on these movements, teachers and students might investigate questions such as: 
How do ethnoscapes and mediascapes spread popular or classical music to diverse parts 
of the world?  What technoscapes enable composition practices from other countries to 
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flow into the United States?  In what ways might we use technoscapes and mediascapes 
to spread our musicking to different places and to engage with the musicking of others?  
Complicating how musicking moves and changes through the aforementioned processes 
may provide music educators and students further insight into evolving global 
communities.   
  Place is a complex idea that integrates with multiplicities’ musical and educative 
experiences.  Building on the aforementioned questions, teachers and students might 
examine examples of how different communities interpret and alter global music 
practices.  Teachers and students might, for instance, investigate how musicians in 
Australia interpret American popular music and what aspects of their local musical 
practices affect those interpretations.  Complicating teachers’ and students’ multiple local 
and global places involves ongoing explorations of glocal musicking. 
Complicating serves as one of three integrated practices in which music educators 
might engage.  Like the continual focused observation of the changing arrangements 
within a moving kaleidoscope, complicating involves an ongoing investigation of how 
humans’ multiple inseparable qualities interact during music education experiences.  The 
person looking through the kaleidoscope will likely find repeated patterns as well as 
chaotic arrangements.  Similarly, complicating includes exploring to what extent music 
educators and the students they teach currently strive for the integration consistency and 
chaos as well as imagining how they might alter those strivings.  In twenty-first century 
societies, music educators and students should also complicate the musical practices 
occurring within local and global communities as well as how the two intersect and 




As explicated in chapter 7, creating educative experiences, including musically 
educative experiences, involves implicit or explicit ethical decisions.  Music education 
researchers have asserted the need for increased attention to the values propagated 
through music education.
109
  As Allsup and Westerlund (2012) summarize, “Music 
education is not only about music, but deals with ideals of human character and society, 
ideals about life in school” (p. 134).  For example, Väkevä (2012) posits the importance 
of making “visible the ethical function of music as a value-imbued practice that mediates 
our social relations” (p. 87).  Musicking and educating reinforce specific socially-
constructed values and relationships.  When teachers engage in music education without 
acknowledgement of ethical implications of their work, the values and dispositions that 
they present to students go unquestioned.   
The absence of an acknowledgement of the ethical function of music education 
can affect students in untended ways.  For instance, Regelski (2012) notes the potential 
problems that may occur when music teachers give the appearance that “their” music 
programs “exists to serve their musical needs or professional reputations, not those of the 
students or community” (p. 288).  When the implicit or explicit ethical values propagated 
through musicking in schools go unexplored, teachers may foster a disconnect between 
school music education practices and the musical and educative aspirations of students 
and communities.   
As noted throughout this document, Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) assert the 
variable nature of human conceptions of “right” and “wrong,” explaining that philosophy 
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functions “in the modern world in conformity with the spirit of a people and its 
conception of right” (p. 104).  Through their evolving social relationships, humans 
construct value systems applicable to their individual situations.  These value systems 
may consist of both stable rules and guidelines adaptable to specific contexts.
110
  The 
ontology of existence based on difference rather than similarity that Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987) propose aligns with a changeable and place conscious conception of ethical 
action.  Colebrook (2002) writes that Deleuze advocates: 
moving beyond morality—where we assume that the world has a system of good 
and evil oppositions—to ethics, where we create and select those powers that 
expand life as a whole, beyond our limited perspectives.  We create and select not 
on the basis of who we are (for this would install a value or end within life) but 
how we might become (extending life to its fullest potential). (p. 96)   
In other words, acting ethically includes contemplating both current situations and future 
possibilities.  
While it is beyond the scope of this document to examine in detail various schools 
of ethics or the intricate role of ethics in music teaching and learning, positing a 
philosophy of music education based solely on complicating and connecting neglects the 
ethical nature of those processes.  Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s writings about 
ethics, difference, and process, I assert that in addition to complicating and connecting, 
music educators should engage in the ongoing process of considering multiple 
alternatives relevant for the specific contexts in which they teach.   
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I chose the word “considering” in order posit a process through which music 
educators might think ethically about their work.  I do not mean to equate “considering” 
with acting ethically; one can certainly consider options only to act unethically.  
However, the process of “considering” may assist music educators in contemplating the 
possible ethical implications of their practices.  In this section, I detail various aspects of 
“considering.”  First, I examine the importance of considering multiple pathways opened 
through complicating.  Second, I posit the necessity of considering the quality of those 
pathways.  
Multiple Pathways 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) philosophical figuration of a rhizome 
demonstrates the possibilities of contemplating growth along varying paths.  As noted in 
chapter 3, they explain that the horizontal, variable growth of rhizomes contrasts with the 
hierarchical, ordered growth of trees.  Rhizomes can develop off-shoots in diverse 
directions, while trees primarily develop vertically.  When music educators posit the 
superiority of a limited number of values, they act in an arboreal manner, moving towards 
singular aims or singular directions.   
One can envision a music educator who contemplates multiple practices while 
only considering a single value.  For example, a teacher may define technical skill as a 
paramount value and thus consistently facilitate experiences emphasizing technique at the 
expense of other values such as creativity and emotional expression.  While having strong 
musical technique may serve an important ethical function for the given teacher, and 
perhaps for students and community, other values may produce equally valuable 
experiences, journeys, and life-long dispositions.  Schmidt (2012) laments the “absence 
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of risk-taking” in contemporary music education, arguing that it limits explorations of 
alternative ethical values and practices (p. 157).  A music educator who wishes to 
consider multiple values as well as curricular and pedagogical choices faces pressure to 
conform to the profession’s traditions and norms.   
In contrast, teachers think and act rhizomatically when they consider 
incorporating multiple aspects of ethical living into their classrooms.  Instead of 
considering only single pathways, music educators, in integration with their ongoing 
complicating, might consider multiple ethical values and actions appropriate for their 
individual teaching contexts.  The aforementioned teacher, for instance, may find that in 
addition to assisting students in developing their technical skills, she can also serve the 







 or critical multiculturalism.
114
  I argue that teachers should continually consider 
multiple pathways that educative experiences might open. 
Considering diverse pathways does not mean reverting to relativism; music 
educators need not find all values and actions equally worthwhile.  However, considering 
does mean acknowledging, through ongoing complications, the possible advantages and 
disadvantages of different aspects of ethical practices.  As Regelski (2012) summarizes, 
“The teacher’s ethical duty is to serve the musical needs of individual students in ways 
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and to a degree that would not otherwise be the case without formal study” (p. 288).115  
For example, a music educator may consider the value of collaboration, creativity, or 
developing critical literacy for a specific group of students within a certain community.  
While what Tyack and Cuban (1995) call the “grammar of schooling” (p. 85) limits a 
teacher’s daily and annual time with any group of students, forcing him to make choices, 
he can continually consider his chosen values and different values as well as his actions 
and pathways.  
Engaging in the ongoing consideration of multiple pathways requires developing 
a disposition towards change.  Bradley (2012) asserts the ethical value of moving toward 
“an epistemology that accepts its own fallibility: epistemology, that is comfortable with 
uncertainty” (p. 429).  Considering multiple pathways involves a genuine openness to 
complicating both our own values and those of the students who we teach.  As Higgins 
(2011) explains, “Learning to ask a new question requires more than putting a question 
mark on the end of some sentence which still remains intellectually declarative for us.  
One must be able to seriously entertain an alternative to put something in question” (p. 
271).  Through sustained complicating and embracing uncertainty, music educators and 
students can continuously consider diverse values and practices.  While this may seem 
difficult, Schmidt (2012) writes: 
The hardship and pleasure of a life of ethics, as in music, springs not from a 
commitment to the veneration of stability, refinement and consistency… Rather, 
the productive tensions of ethical living arise from a restless interaction between 
constant motion and adaptability. (p. 149)   
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Ethical questions and decisions involve continually adapting instruction to meet 
developing complications and considerations.   
Students’ dispositions and interests should figure prominently into a teacher’s 
considering.  Gould (2006) uses Deleuze’s conception of philosophy as an “unmapped 
nomadic wandering toward an unknown destination” to assert the possibility of viewing 
“teaching and learning as a journey along trails and paths of students’ choosing” (pp. 
202-203).  Being genuinely open to multiple pathways involves considering students’ 
values and desired musical and educative experiences.     
Students, however, are not the only people who teachers can consider when 
forming connections.  In addition to the multiple values existing within a given 
community, educators might also complicate their own values and interests.  Higgins 
(2011) asserts the problematic nature of unbridled selflessness, writing, “An educator 
who always puts students first may achieve wonderful results for a time, but ultimately 
the teacher’s own thirst for development will reassert itself” (pp. 160-1).  Considering 
teachers’ own complications and wanderings may enable educative experiences that 
teachers and students can have together.  Likewise, considering how teachers might learn 
alongside students can positively impact both them and the students they teach.  
As noted in chapter 7, Deleuze (1995) explains that as a college professor, he 
taught about his current investigations rather than his prior understandings (p. 139).  
Music educators can consider the ethical implications of both their own and their 
students’ interests and aspirations and how the intersection of those values might produce 
new journeys.  By continually complicating multiplicities and places and considering 
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multiple pathways, music educators and students open themselves to the many possible 
ethical values and practices that can guide music teaching and learning. 
Quality 
 Think about a “quality” experience that you have had.  What facets of the 
experience you imagined caused you to define it as “quality”?  The authors of the Oxford 
English Dictionary (2000) define “quality” as the “degree of excellence possessed by a 
thing.”  When I think of a “quality” experience, I picture endeavors, such as my moon 
explorations, that I found meaningful at the time and that have had a lasting impact on 
my thinking and practices.  Even if your facets of a “quality” experience match mine, we 
still might not agree on what experiences meet such criteria.  
 What each individual deems “quality” depends largely on his or her multiple 
environments and social interactions.  For example, while an American office worker 
might consider going for a leisurely walk along a meandering path a “quality” 
experience, someone living in rural Tanzania who has to walk a distance to draw water 
from a well multiple times each day may not consider such an endeavor a “quality” 
experience.  Even within societies, the definition of “quality” can vary greatly.  For 
instance, while my husband may consider going to an upscale steakhouse for dinner a 
“quality” evening, as a vegetarian, such a night would not appear at the top of my 
“quality” list.  Similarly, the definition of “quality” musical and educative experiences 
varies for every person.  I argue that in addition to considering multiple pathways, music 
educators might consider the quality of those experiences.   
 Considering what constitutes “quality” musical and educative experiences 
involves complicating how individuals and groups define “quality.”  Higgins (2011) 
288 
posits “What does it mean to flourish individually and collectively?” as an essential 
ethical question that teachers might consider (p. 259).  Drawing on this question, I assert 
that “quality” music education experiences serve to enhance flourishing for both students 
and communities.   
“Quality” experiences occur when music educators complicate and consider both 
current understandings of human flourishing and, in collaboration with students and 
communities, imagine new possibilities for growth.  Regelski (2012) asserts the benefits 
of imagining music education as a means of musical and social change.  He writes that 
the ethical virtue of school music: 
is seen in (a) what that ‘program’ actually does to enhance the musical 
functioning of the individual students for whom it exists and (b) its functional 
impact on the changing world of music in a rapidly changing world of music in a 
rapidly changing society. (p. 286) 
While Regelski emphasizes interfacing with life as it currently exists, Colebrook (2002) 
explains that Deleuze goes further, imagining multiplicities and practices that have yet to 
actualize.  She writes that for Deleuze “We increase our power, not by affirming our 
actual being—‘I am human, recognise [sic] me’—but by expanding our perception to 
those virtual powers that we are not—the creation of a ‘people to come’” (p. 99).   
Members of different societies and individual members of those societies possess 
diverse visions of flourishing.  For example, while members of a rural Virginian 
community may wish for their children to learn the traditions of bluegrass music, a music 
teacher, in collaboration with students and community members, might consider the 
value of teaching bluegrass alongside or as a hybrid with other music traditions.  Such 
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experiences complicate the ways in which students, teachers, and communities 
continually strive for the integration of consistency and chaos and consider multiple 
aspects of individual and collective flourishing.  Affecting change implies complicating, 
considering, navigating between and among, and integrating communities’ conceptions 
of flourishing and their own visions of flourishing. 
 “Quality” musical and educative experiences require ongoing engagement and 
have a sustained impact on students and communities.  In order to facilitate ongoing 
change, music educators, while simultaneously complicating, might consider looking 
beyond one-shot collaborations or single experiences.  Single experiences, such as each 
of my nightly moon explorations, have value when they connect to past and future 
endeavors; continually evolving experiences provide students the skills and dispositions 
to enable continued growth without the given teacher.  For example, a music teacher 
might aid students in having experiences with long-lasting implications when she assists 
students in creating their own music and independently sharing their music with those in 
their local and global communities in ways that students consider meaningful.   
Engaging in ethical music education practices involves considering quality 
musical and educative experiences occurring along multiple pathways.  Through ongoing 
complicating and an acceptance of uncertainty, teachers can develop a genuine 
willingness to consider multiple values and practices.  Enabling quality experiences 
implies drawing on students’, communities’, and their own visions of flourishing to form 





When I hear the word “connections,” the tune “What You Own” from the musical 
Rent often begins playing in my head.  In the song, two roommates articulate the 
tragedies, absurdities, and joys of American life in the 1990s.  At one point, the singers 
reminisce about a recent evening during which they each felt “connection in an isolating 
age.”  The juxtaposition of the words “connection” and “isolating” in this simple 
statement always strikes me as a fundamental part of the human condition.  While 
humans may relish moments of isolation, we also persistently strive to connect with 
aspects of ourselves, others, and our multiple environments.  I posit that, in integration 
with complicating and considering, music educators engage in the practice of connecting.    
In this document, I use the term connect to refer to the ongoing, changeable 
relationship between two or more ideas, things, qualities, or beings.  Musical and 
educative connecting occurs through the continuously unfolding interplay of human 
cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, striving, and glocal environments.  For 
example, as noted in chapter 7, though my moon explorations, I connected to qualities of 
myself and my multiple places though my sustained individual and collective 
experiences.  While connecting does not occur absent human sociality, it need not occur 
in the physical presence of others.  For instance, as a high school oboist, I felt a sense of 
connection to the composers who wrote the music and to the cognition and embodiment 
of my teachers and fellow musicians while I practiced alone in my living room.  Since the 
past actualizes at each passing moment, those teachers and musicians existed virtually 
during my solo practice.   
291 
I conjecture that people recognize experiences as “musical” or “educative” in part 
because they involve connecting.  For example, I might experience music when 
connecting with my cognition and embodiment while performing a demanding passage or 
when connecting with my sociality and emotion while listening to a live rock band with 
my friends.  Similarly, I may experience education when a teacher’s instruction facilitates 
connecting with the nuances of a particular musical style or when a teacher’s question 
assists me in connecting with local musical practices in innovative ways.   
 How would philosophizing about music education that emphasizes connecting 
differ from the connections already present in musical and educative experiences?  
Through their philosophical figuration of a rhizome, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) 
emphasize not just connections but diverse connections.  They write, “A rhizome 
ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and 
circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles” (p. 7).  Rather than 
limiting or replicating connections, Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain, “The 
rhizome connects any point to any other point” (p. 21).  Rhizomes are endlessly forming 
a variety of evolving, diverse connections. 
 A music educator emphasizing rhizomatic connecting would not facilitate the 
same types of musical and educative experiences day after day or year after year, since 
the same experiences would lead to similar connections and because teachers and 
students change constantly.  Rather, through her ongoing complicating and considering, 
she would seek out experiences that emphasize connecting along variegated pathways 
and inquire into how such connections interface with multiple changing qualities of 
human multiplicities in glocal places.  I assert that this facilitation of diverse musical and 
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educative connecting should occur in integration with the practices of complicating and 
considering.   
In this section, I begin by exploring how music educators might assist students in 
forming musically educative connections with their inseparable cognition, embodiment, 
emotion, sociality, and strivings.  Second, I posit the benefits of connecting with strivings 
for the integration of consistency and chaos.  Lastly, I assert how music educators might 
engage students in musical and educative experiences that enable them to connect with 
their glocal places. 
Connecting with Multiplicities 
In chapter 4, I assert a human ontology based on the integration of cognition, 
embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving.  These five inseparable qualities alter as a 
result of humans’ experiences.  In chapter 6, I note the relationship between cognition, 
embodiment, emotion, sociality, and striving during musicking, and in chapter 7, I posit 
how these five qualities interact during educative endeavors.  In this section, I offer how 
music educators, in integration with complicating and considering, might engage in 
musical and educative connecting with various aspects of human multiplicities.  
Writing about the formation of musical and educative connections with humans’ 
various qualities is problematic because it necessitates turning a complicated mix of 
simultaneous interactions into a linear story.  Yet, such articulations enable an 
exploration of the potential for diverse musical and educative connecting.  Below I draw 
on the work of four authors to posit descriptions of how teachers might assist students in 
forming musical and educative connections with their different qualities.
116
  While each 
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depiction focuses on one of humans’ inseparable qualities, I attempt to connect that 
quality with other qualities.  These examples serve not as ends but as middles from which 
I encourage readers to move in their own unique directions.   
Teachers and students can connect with aspects of themselves.  Biological 
rhizomes, such as ginger, can grow offshoots that eventually touch other parts the same 
rhizome.  Similarly, humans can connect with different aspects of their own evolving 
selves.  For instance, have you ever exercised or engaged in a physical activity only to 
find that the next day you have a pain in a muscle that you didn’t know you had?  
Through such experiences, we become aware of aspects of ourselves that we didn’t know 
existed prior to those engagements.  As a result of such interactions, we also alter those 
parts of ourselves, perhaps strengthening the muscle for future physical activity.  
Likewise, musical and educative experiences can connect us to diverse qualities of our 
own beings, allowing us to understand them in new ways and changing those qualities in 
the process.  For example, when people focus on connecting with emotions while 
musicking, they might experience and become aware of those emotions and the 
integration of them with their other qualities in unique ways. 
In combination with complicating and considering, music educators might assist 
students in connecting with their bodies while musicking by drawing their attention to 
their movements.  For instance, Bowman (2000) writes: 
When we hear a musical performance, we don't just “think,” we don't even just 
“hear,” we participate with our whole bodies. We enact it. We feel melodies in 
our muscles as much as we process them in our brains—or perhaps more 
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accurately, our brains process them as melodies only to the extent our corporeal 
schemata render that possible. (p. 50)   
In other words, humans’ bodies are never still while musicking.  Drawing on these ideas, 
music educators might engage students in developing an awareness of their bodies while 
musicking as well as experimenting with different actions during musicking, inquiring 
into how each movement influences their experiences.  For instance, teachers and 
students might connect with their bodies by investigating questions such as: How is my 
body moving with this music, even though I appear to be sitting still?  When we play this 
music, what happens to my body?  How does thinking about certain parts of my body 
while I make music change the music and my experience of it? 
 Expanding this focus on embodiment connected to musicking and cognition, 
Bowman (2000) asserts, “We need to illuminate the mechanisms by which things like 
body and culture function as constitutive attributes of cognition” (italics his, p. 51).  
Adding to this idea, I posit that cognition continually interplays with human embodiment, 
emotion, sociality, and striving while musicking.  For instance, teachers and students 
might complicate, consider, and connect with the integration of sociality and embodiment 
during musicking, pondering questions such as: How do bodily movements change when 
musicking in different places with various groups of people?  What would happen if 
students and teachers challenged socially constructed norms for embodied practices while 
musicking?  Additionally, teachers could assist students in complicating, considering, and 
connecting with the interplay of their strivings for both consistency and chaos and their 
embodied reactions to music.  For example, how might striving primarily toward either 
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consistency or chaos alter the dances students create to accompany music or the music 
they improvise for specific physical movements? 
 Elliott and Silverman (2012) suggest that teachers might ask students to focus on 
their personal emotions while engaging in music endeavors by encouraging students to 
create “musical expressions of emotions as performers, improvisers, composers, 
arrangers, and conductors” (p. 58).  In addition to creating musical expressions that others 
might perceive, by assisting students in complicating and considering the evolving 
emotions that they experience while musicking, teachers might facilitate the formation of 
new musical and educative connections to that aspect of their humanity.   
Teachers might expand such emotional awareness by facilitating experiences that 
encourage students to engage with their evolving emotions while musicking, perhaps by 
altering musical performances or diversifying their compositions.  For example, teachers 
could ask students in an ensemble to perform a passage numerous times, each with a 
different emotions selected by the participants.  Teachers and students might also engage 
in questions including: How do people engage in musicking when a baby is crying or 
during a parade?  How might emotions and bodies change during such musicking?  How 
does humans’ sociality interplay with such embodied-emotional changes?  
Humans can also connect with their sociality through musical and educative 
experiences in multiple ways.  For example, in writing about his experiences playing the 
trumpet, May (2005) draws on Deleuze’s work to articulate the importance of musical 
connections to human sociality, asserting: 
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Whether I will continue to play depends in good part on what connections I form 
as I begin. . . . Are there teachers who will deepen my interest?  Are there local 
folks who might be interested in playing together? (p. 166) 
Music teachers and students might connect with their sociality by exploring questions 
such as: How do social interactions integrate with various forms of musicking?  While 
creating music, how might we consider those who may hear it, including different aspects 
of their multiplicities?  
Facilitating opportunities for complicating, considering, and connecting sociality 
and other qualities of human multiplicities may open variations in educative and musical 
experiences.  For instance, teachers and students might contemplate: How do my 
strivings for the integration of consistency and chaos cause me to seek out various social 
contexts for my musicking?  Using input from students and community members, teacher 
and students might experiment with performing in different venues and social contexts as 
well as engaging in new forms of social interaction, such as blogging and tweeting, in 
conjunction with their performances.  
Duckworth (2006) hints at the possibilities of such engagements: 
What is the intellectual equivalent of building in breadth and depth?  I think it is a 
matter of making connections: Breadth could be thought of as the widely different 
spheres of experience that can be related to one another; depth could be thought of 
as the many different kinds of connections that can be made among different 
facets of our experience. (p. 69)   
As noted earlier in this document, contemporary music education discourse and practices 
tend to emphasize the cognitive aspect of musicking.  Rather than solely attempting to 
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replicate the musical and educative connections that teachers and students have formed in 
the past, music educators and students might experiment with, in integration with 
complicating and considering, connecting with their cognition in new ways.  For 
example, prior to or following a musical experience, educators might assist students in 
connecting with unique aspects of their cognition by encouraging them to contemplate 
relationships between their musicking and other endeavors.  Teachers might ask 
questions such as: How does this musicking relate to other musicking in which you’ve 
engaged?  How does this musicking connect with other experiences and disciplines?  
What are you thinking about while musicking?  How is your mind working during 
musicking?  In order to add depth to their connecting, music educators might ask students 
to complicate and consider how a musical experience connects with their bodies, 
emotions, social interactions, and strivings.  For example, they might inquire: How are 
thinking and feeling connected while listening to music?  How do the thoughts you have 
while making music relate to your current social contexts? 
 Forming rhizomatic connections with students’ multiple, inseparable qualities 
requires ongoing complication, consideration, and experimentation.  Music teachers can 
facilitate musical and educative experiences that help students connect with and among 
their cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and strivings.  While teachers can focus 
on connecting with a single quality, they might also investigate the interrelationships 
between that quality with other qualities. 
Connecting with Strivings 
While all five qualities of human multiplicities exist in a constant state of 
integration, striving emphasizes the temporal nature of human existence.  As noted 
298 
above, I posit that during musical and educative experiences, humans strive for the 
integration of consistency and chaos.  Facilitating musical and educative experiences 
necessitates ongoing complicating and considering of how students may currently strive 
for consistency and chaos and how connecting may reinforce and challenge those 
strivings.  
 For example, in my first year as a high school band director, I honored a tradition 
that the band had of playing Leroy Anderson’s “Sleigh Ride” at every annual December 
concert.  In the following year, I decided that I lacked the time to polish the piece along 
with our other demanding repertoire and chose not to include it on the program.  While I 
predicted that a few seniors might complain, I had no idea that my decision would lead to 
so much anger from numerous band members as well as a couple of parents; I connected 
only to my own strivings rather than to those of students and community members.  
Facilitating musical connecting to students’ strivings for consistency serves an important 
role in meeting students’ and communities’ musical and educative needs.  In retrospect, I 
could have complicated and considered students and community members by asking 
questions, including: Why is playing this piece important to you?  How does it connect 
you to multiple aspects of yourself and to your communities?   
Engaging students in complicating and considering their own strivings for 
consistency might help educators assist students in connecting with those strivings.  For 
instance, students might partake in informal learning practices, such as those used by 
popular musicians, while teachers can offer their interest and attention as well as varying 
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kinds of guidance, instruction, and support.
117
  Alternatively, students could have the 
freedom to engage in creating music in styles of their choosing while teachers could 
assist students in learning from their own successes and innovations as well as those of 
their classmates.  Such practices may enable students to form both musical and educative 
connections to strivings for consistency with practices with which they have familiarity. 
While striving for consistency, humans simultaneously strive for chaos.  I can 
imagine that the high school band members I taught would have expressed deep 
frustration if I had repeated the entire December concert program from one year to the 
next.  In addition to assisting students in connecting with their strivings for consistency 
by allowing them to play “Sleigh Ride,” in integration with complicating and 
considering, I could have facilitated musical and educative connections with their 
strivings for chaos using the same piece.  For instance, maybe we could have brought in 
band alumni or community members to perform with us, or perhaps we could have 
worked as a class or in chamber groups to create new arrangements of the song.  Such 
endeavors might have enabled students to form musical and educative connections by 
integrating their strivings for consistency and chaos.   
Jorgensen (2012) explains how desiring change has become an integral part of 
musicking in a globally-connected world.  She writes, “Interconnections between 
musicians, again informally operative, enable new musical styles and genres to emerge 
from the more pervasive knowledge about different musics and their intersection as 
musicians draw on these various traditions” (p. 466).  Students might connect with their 
own strivings for chaos in and through musical and educative experiences that challenge 
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them to complicate and consider how contemporary musicians, including themselves, 
strive for difference and variability.  For instance, students and teachers might explore 
how contemporary classical composers such as Osvaldo Golijov and Lou Harrison draw 
on Argentinean and Javanese music, respectively, or how hip hop musicians such as Nas 
draw on the works by Beethoven and Orff.
118
   
Teachers and students might also complicate, consider, and connect with their 
strivings for chaos by creating music that alters or mixes musical styles and practices, 
thereby disrupting and reimagining existent practices.  Drawing on the work of Deleuze 
and Guattari, Gould (2009) offers explicit suggestions for music educators wishing to 
form such connections, writing, “Make connections, not standards, never repeat!  Don’t 
recapitulate, perform improvisations.  Don’t be sure or almost certain, be open!  
Experiment, never look back!  Risk turns plans into possibilities!  Be flexible, even when 
standing firm!” (p. 51).  Such living may inspire teachers and students to connect with 
their strivings for chaos.     
Music teachers and students enter classrooms consciously or unconsciously 
striving for varying combinations of consistency and chaos.  Through musical and 
educative connections, teachers and students can explore their diverse strivings as well as 
the interplay of their strivings and other aspects of their beings.  While music educators 
and students may choose to focus primarily on connecting with their strivings towards 
either consistency or chaos, they might also ensure that they have the opportunity to 
experience musical and educative connections with strivings for the integration of 
consistency and chaos in ways that promote individual and collective flourishing. 
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Connecting with Places 
 In addition to assisting students in connecting with their inseparable cognition, 
embodiment, emotions, sociality, and strivings, music educators might provide students 
opportunities to experience musically educative connections with their multiple places 
and to the ways in which they are multiply emplaced in the world.  Continual 
complications of various places and emplacements foster an awareness of the diverse 
musicking occurring within students’ local, global, and glocal environments.  
Simultaneously, considering multiple pathways enables variegated connections with 
students’ multiple places. 
Connecting with local communities might include engaging with unique local 
practices, such as bluegrass fiddling or steel drum playing, inviting local musicians to 
speak and work with students, arranging collaborative performances between local 
groups and student groups, or taking students musicking into communities.  Music 
educators and students might complicate connections by asking questions such as: Where 
in our surrounding communities might we perform or engage others in musical 
experiences?  With which local musical groups might we interact?  How might we 
integrate aspects of local events and musical practices into our musicking?  How might 
we create interactive concerts or musical experiences that engage community members of 
different ages in various aspects of musicking?  When might teachers and students 
experience music and education through such connections?  
 Some ways of connecting with global places will likely require technology as well 
as understandings of how to engage in discourse with those in diverse locations.  Appiah 
(2006) explains, “The points of entry to cross-cultural conversations are things that are 
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shared by those who are in the conversation.  They do not need to be universal; all they 
need to be is what these particular people have in common” (p. 97).  An interest in 
musicking can serve as a point of entry when forming cross-cultural musical and 
educative connections.  Despite the differences in culture that may exist between a group 
of American students and musickers in another country, or even their immediate 
neighbors, through complicating and considering, teachers and students can draw on their 
common interests in music and musicking, using them as starting points for further 
dialogue.   
Heimonen (2012) articulates possibilities for music education relationships 
between students in diverse places.  She writes, “Music can be performed and taught via 
the Internet, and children all over the world enabled to learn music and take part in 
musical activities via interactive, ‘face-to-face’ media connections” (pp. 73-74).  
Utilizing free websites such as Skype in the Classroom,
119
 teachers can foster 
relationships between the students they teach and those in other states and countries.  
Students and teachers might complicate places and multiplicities through questions 
including: What types of musical practices occur in diverse places?  How can people in 
disparate locations engage with each other’s musical performances?  How can students in 
different parts of the world collaborate in creating music and making music together as 
well as in various diverse musical and educative experiences?  
Anytime teachers and students engage with cultures other than their own, 
including cultures that may exist in their own neighborhoods or within a group of 
students attending the same class, it is paramount that teachers help students consider and 




respect cultural differences and actively work against colonialism and essentialism 
(Bradley, 2012).  Teachers and students might complicate and consider questions such as: 
How can we show others that we respect differences in music and musicking?  How can 
we foster an equal exchange of ideas and practices?  Part of the practice of considering, 
as described above, involves respecting cultural differences and refusing to reinforce 
underlying systems of domination. 
As I note in chapter 5, twenty-first century musicking occurs at the confluence of 
local and global practices.  In addition to forming connections with students’ local and 
global places, music educators, in integration with complicating and considering, might 
connect with musickers in ways that illuminate the process of glocalization.  For 
example, music teachers and students might complicate how and why a song or musical 
practice has “gone global” and how it has changed in the process.  They might connect 
with glocalization by looking for variations of or dialogue about such songs online or use 
the aforementioned global linking tools to create conversations with geographically 
diverse groups of people who have experienced, performed or digitally recreated such 
songs.  Music educators and students might complicate, consider, and connect with 
glocalized musicking through questions including: How and why do local groups 
understand, interpret, and alter such songs?  What aspects of the local and global 
variations of songs do students find appealing and why?  How might students engage 
with, perform, and alter such songs?  How does the meaning of a song or musical practice 
alter as people in various locations engage with it?   
Baltzis (2005) suggests that music teachers explore local and global communities 
by promoting “dialogue between different cultures,” adding that “At the same time they 
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might contribute to the enrichment of local cultures” (p. 149).  Teachers and students 
might consider how they can apply what they have learned through connecting to 
enhance local and global musicking.  They might ask: How might we draw on the music 
and musical practices of those in disparate places to enhance our multiple local places?  
How might other members of our school and community benefit from our experiences 
with musicking in diverse locations?  
I posit that music educators assist students in connecting with themselves, their 
multiple qualities, and their glocal environments.  These diverse connections can take 
many forms.  By complicating and considering in addition to connecting, music educators 
can assist students in having musically educative experiences that promote flourishing for 
them and their local and global communities.   
Rhizomatic Philosophizing in Music Education 
 Anyone who has ever cared for plants will likely attest to the fact that they often 
change noticeably in relatively short spans of time.  Plants can sprout new leaves and 
grow inches in a matter of days, and even a completely healthy looking plant can whither 
after only a short period of neglect.  Given plants’ constantly changing nature, it seems 
appropriate that Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) use the philosophical figuration of a 
rhizome to assert the dynamic difference that comprises existence.  Biological rhizomes 
constantly grow, changing with each passing moment.  Similarly, we live in a world 
consisting of ongoing movement and variability. 
Like rhizomes, the practices of complicating, considering, and connecting exist in 
continual states of motion.  In chapters 6 and 7, I assert that the value of the questions 
“When is music?” and “When is education?” explaining that such questions emphasize 
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the variable nature of musical and educative experiences.  Similarly, I advocate focusing 
on the questions: When is complicating? When is considering? When is connecting?  I 
posit these three questions not as a checklist simply to be engaged with once over the 
course of the semester or year.  Instead, I argue the need to continually interface with 
these questions and with the practices of complicating, considering, and connecting 
within each experience and in the movement from experience to experience, over and 
over again.   
In other words, the practices of complicating, considering, and connecting occur 
unceasingly throughout teachers’ lives.  Kincheloe and Berry (2004) write, “Bricoleurs 
are comfortable with the unfinished, unresolved nature of the multidimensional, ever-
changing constructions of reality they produce” (pp. 89-90).  Some of the best 
complications, considerations, and connections may occur as a result of unplanned 
events.  For example, a student may ask an interesting question, pose a problem, perform 
a passage in a unique way, or create a song related to pressing social issue.  Focusing on 
the temporal practices of complicating, considering, and connecting allows teachers and 
students together to utilize unexpected moments, moving from them along various 
pathways.   
While all plants exist in a state of motion, rhizomes are unique because their off-
shoots grow in diverse directions.  Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explain that a 
rhizome does not possess beginnings or endings but only a middle “from which it grows 
and which it overspills” (p. 21).  Unlike the predetermined organization of a tree, with 
roots at one end and branches at another, rhizomes integrate with themselves, with each 
other, and with their surroundings.  Likewise, complicating, considering, and connecting 
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function rhizomatically, having no hierarchy.  Complicating, considering and connecting 
are practices, and while a teacher might choose to engage primarily in one practice at a 
given time, these practices need not occur in any particular order.  Ultimately, 
complicating, considering, and connecting continually integrate, and one cannot 
completely distinguish a single process from the others.   
 Drawing on these practices, I pose four guiding questions for music educators, 
music teacher educators, and music education policymakers: 
1) How might complicating cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, striving beings 
and glocal places integrate with musicking and educating? 
2) How might considering the implications of multiple, quality pathways integrate 
with musicking and educating? 
3) How might connecting to human multiplicities’ multiple qualities, strivings, and 
places integrate with musicking and educating? 
4) How might music educators utilize the inseparable practices of complicating, 
considering, and connecting in their teaching and learning? 
I hope that these questions will lead not to answers but to divergent curiosities, 
explorations, and experiences.   
I argue that a rhizomatic philosophy of music education involves the integrated 
practices of complicating, considering, and connecting.  Engaging in these practices may 
allow music educators at all levels to continually reimagine themselves, their students, 
their musicking, their educative practices, and evolving ways of being in the world.  By 
exploring these practices and questions, music educators can promote flourishing in the 
lives of students and the experiences of their multiple communities. 
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Chapter 9 
POLICY AND PERSONAL REFLECTION 
As noted in chapter 2, philosophers ultimately aim to influence thinking and 
practice.  Consistent with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) philosophical figuration of 
the rhizome, rhizomatic philosophizing involves ongoing questioning, change, and 
diverse connections.  Having engaged in rhizomatic philosophizing, I will now explore 
how the practices of complicating, considering, and connecting might function in our 
current education policy paradigm.  In this chapter, I begin by investigating how music 
educators utilizing rhizomatic philosophizing might both interface with and challenge 
current education and music education policies.   
Rhizomatic philosophizing should also change the philosopher.  After asserting 
possible policy applications, I briefly reflect my own growth, explaining how the process 
of writing this dissertation has changed me, my work, and my being in and engagement 
with the world.  Rhizomatic philosophizing is an ongoing process, and my reflections 
illuminate but single moments in my unceasing development.  
Policy 
Part of complicating, considering, and connecting involves questioning education 
and music education policies.  In this section, I examine the current policy landscape, 
focusing on teacher evaluation and national standards.  Following that, I posit how the 
philosophy of music education proposed in this dissertation might interface with or 
challenge current policies.  Then, I draw on the writings of Deleuze and Guattari to 
explain how music educators might work to change current policies and actively 
participate in the creation of future ones.   
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Current Policy Landscape 
 Given my own context as a teacher and teacher educator in the United States, I 
focus this discussion on recent American education and music education policies.  Since 
2009, Race to the Top has become the federal government’s primary education policy 
initiative.  Race to the Top awards 4.35 billion dollars for education reform to states that 
win a competitive application process.  The reforms fall into four core areas: adopting 
standards and assessments that prepare students for future economic success, building 
data systems to measure growth, rewarding and retaining effective teachers, and turning 
around the lowest-achieving schools (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).  In order to 
win funds, authors of the policy assert that states must establish “rigorous, transparent, 
and fair evaluation systems for teacher and principals” based on “multiple rating 
categories that take into account data on student growth as a significant factor” (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2009).  Although the federal government only awarded money 
to 11 states and the District of Columbia in the first and second rounds, a report by 
Learning Point Associates (2010) asserted that as of 2010, 29 states passed or intended to 
pass legislation in hopes of winning Race to the Top funds and that this new state-level 
legislation most commonly included changes in alternative certification, teacher 
evaluation, and teacher compensation.  In 2011, the federal government awarded funding 
to additional states, bringing the total number of recipients to 22.  Few music education 
authors have commented about the impact of Race to the Top on music education, 
although Block (2010) notes that MENC
120
 gave the final version of Race to the Top a 
positive reception.   
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 In 2012, the Obama administration implemented a second major education 
initiative involving teacher evaluation.  In that year, the United States Department of 
Education began granting waivers exempting states from some of the requirements of the 
No Child Left Behind Act (2001).  According to the United States Department of 
Education (n.d.), in order to receive a waiver, states must submit and have approved a 
plan meeting three criteria: “transitioning to college- and career-ready standards and 
assessments,” “developing systems of differentiated recognition, accountability, and 
support,” and “evaluating and supporting teacher and principal effectiveness” (p. 1).  In 
regard to teacher evaluation, the Department of Education asserts, “The state and its 
districts will develop these systems with input from teachers and principals and will 
assess their performance based on multiple valid measures, including student progress 
over time and multiple measures of professional practice” (p. 1).  Currently, the federal 
government has granted waivers to 34 states plus the District of Columbia (U. S. 
Department of Education, 2012).  The advent of both Race to the Top and the 
aforementioned waivers has made teacher evaluation based on student achievement a 
pressing policy issue in most states.
121
  While states and individual districts vary greatly 
in how they implement music teacher evaluations, music educators’ evaluations in many 
states depend or will soon depend partly on measured student musical achievements.
122
   
 Both Race to the Top and the waivers allowing flexibility in the implementation 
of certain requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act have led to more standardization 
throughout the country.  For example, all but five states have adopted the Common Core 
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State Standards in mathematics and English language arts.
123
  Although the standards do 
not prescribe teaching practices, they offer a demanding list of content, skills, and 
thought processes that teachers must engage students in mastering.   
Select members of the arts education community are currently updating the 1994 
National Music Standards to include more detail.  According to the National Coalition for 
Core Arts Standards (NCCAS, 2011), “To create standards delineated grade by grade, 
writers will need to incorporate specific content to an extent that the original standards 
avoided.”  Due to the increased emphasis on student growth, members of NCCAS aim to 
include examples of student work that can “provide the basis for benchmarking” in the 
revised standards.  In other words, the revised national music standards will prescribe 
both more specific content and examples of student outcomes, implying specific types of 
assessment.  While the impact of the revised music standards will depend on how states 
adopt and alter them, the work of the standards authors indicates that music education 
policy continues to move towards the problematic practice of standardization of content 
and assessment. 
Interfacing with Policy 
Education policymakers’ increasing prioritization of measurable student outcomes 
and standardization contradicts Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987) overarching 
emphasis on time and difference and their philosophy of art praising sensation and 
composition.  In fact, Deleuze (1990/1995) specifically mourns the conception of 
education as continual training for the workplace and schools that run like businesses (pp. 
175, 182).  Although policies mandating assessment and standardization and their 
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accompanying beliefs and actions contradict Deleuze’s philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari 
(1991/1994) assert that all people must actively engage with their surroundings. As noted 
in chapter 3, they write, “Philosophy finds a way of reterritorializing itself in the modern 
world in conformity with the spirit of a people and its conception of right” (p. 104).  
Philosophy functions in, not apart from, society.   
I suggest that teachers consider viewing policies, such as the forthcoming revision 
of the U.S. National Music Standards (NCCAS, 2012) and the current National Music 
Standards (Consortium, 1994), as maps rather than tracings.  As noted in chapter 3, 
Deleuze and Guattari assert that a map is “detachable, connectable, modifiable, and has 
multiple entry ways and exits,” existing in a continual state of change and development 
(p. 21).  In contrast, they explain that a tracing “is like a photograph or X ray that begins 
by selecting or isolating, by artificial means such as colorations or other restrictive 
procedures, what it intends to reproduce,” adding that tracings organize and stabilize 
life’s complexities (p. 13).   
Music educators need not interpret policy documents as stagnant entities with 
singular readings, the basic drawings of prior explorers that they must reproduce as 
tracings.  Instead, they can treat such documents as maps; like cartographers charting 
unknown lands, music educators can use policy documents for guidance to the extent that 
these basic drawings provide useful information relevant to their present teaching 
situations.  As such documents become limiting or unhelpful in their current contexts, 
music educators can and should become cartographers who alter and augment these 
maps, adding and subtracting to them or even abandoning them in light of their specific 
students and places.  I argue that music educators should become public intellectuals, 
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taking agency by changing and disrupting policy documents in the ways that they believe 
best meet the needs of the students they teach and communities in which they work.   
For example, when I began this dissertation, I lived in Arizona, where there is 
policy document called the “Arizona Music Standards.”  Within the Arizona Music 
Standards, the four performance objectives for the Grade 3, Strand 1, Concept 1 are: 
singing rounds on pitch with an appropriate tone quality, singing rhythmic patterns with 
words, reading and singing using syllable names, and responding properly to basic 
conducting cues (Arizona Department of Education, 2006).  A teacher tracing this 
document would do just that—find rounds and have children sing them.  A teacher 
mapping these concepts might engage children in singing rounds, but she would do so for 
different reasons: she would complicate the ways in which children already sing and 
imagine how singing rounds may intertwine with their current practices; should would 
consider which rounds might connect with who the evolving children are and how they 
engage musically in the world; teacher and students would sing rounds in order to 
connect to their inseparable qualities and multiple places rather than because such 
musical engagement met the standard.  Additionally, such a teacher might map new ideas 
around the given standards.  
By interpreting standards and performance objectives as temporary destinations 
along an evolving journey, music educators avoid limiting their curricula to stagnant 
tracings.  Teachers treat standards as tracings when they view them as fixed axioms 
around which instruction must form and to which instruction must conform.  In contrast, 
teachers can view standards as movable points on their own developing maps, around 
which they can wander and to which they can add and subtract detail.   
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As noted above, while I write this document, United States education policies, 
such as Race to the Top and the waivers from selected requirements from No Child Left 
Behind, link teacher evaluations to student growth.  Like standards, student assessments 
can be interpreted by teachers as either tracings or maps, and teachers can see themselves 
as tracers or as cartographers.  If school districts mandate specific assessments, teachers 
might contemplate how they can view such evaluations as variable maps rather than 
homogeneous tracings.  While exploring and measuring student growth constitutes an 
important part of teaching, teachers need not find themselves limited to reproducing the 
tracings of others.   
When teachers have the opportunity to create their own assessments in response 
to mandates, they can consider what connections they believe will most benefit their 
students and communities and then view the process of developing assessments and 
making them public as a mapping.  Educators might consider drawing on the work of 
researchers such as Wiggins and McTighe (2005), perhaps using backwards design to 
create authentic, complex assessments applicable to their overarching connections and 
goals for specific students in unique places.  While such assessments, whether created by 
teachers or by someone else for teachers, will never capture the totality of human musical 
and educative endeavors, teachers can use them to ascertain information that guides their 
future instruction. 
Music educators might also consider multiple readings of policy documents.  
Honan (2004) relates Deleuze and Guattari’s image of the rhizome to education policy, 
writing: 
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These assumptions and privileging of the policy-makers’ status are predicated on 
a structuralist understanding of reading as linear and monological.  Such an 
understanding not only ignores the multiple and varied readings of texts that occur 
but also ignores the multidimensional nature of these readings and of the texts 
themselves.  Understanding both texts themselves, and the readings of these texts, 
as rhizomatic disrupts commonplace assumptions about the relations between 
teachers and policy texts. . . . This ceaselessness of the connections between 
rhizomes shifts attention away from the construction, inner meaning, particular 
reading of any text towards a new careful attendance to the multiplicity of 
linkages that can be mapped between any text and other texts, other readings, 
other assemblages of meaning. (p. 269) 
Complicating a given policy by seeking out heterogeneous readings might assist music 
educators in considering such policies as maps rather than tracings.  For example, music 
educators can interpret a standard such as “Reading and notating music” in many ways.  
While the writers of such standard statements may have intended for teachers to address 
them with Western musical notation, teachers who view such directives as maps might 
consider educative experiences involving assisting guitar students in reading tablature, 
facilitating students’ learning of the notation systems of GarageBand, Ableton Live, or 
Pro Tools while creating their own music, or encouraging students to invent their own 
notation.  
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) challenge readers to abandon preconceived 
notions and to seek the difference that underlies existence.  Rather than ignoring current 
policies, music educators might draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical figuration 
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of evolving maps in order to interface with policies in meaningful ways without limiting 
their evolving connections and convictions.  By complicating education and music 
education policies and considering how we might think differently about such policies 
rather than how we can replicate preexisting interpretations of them, music educators can 
adapt and alter policies to meet the specific needs of their students and local 
communities.   
Changing Policy  
 Experimentation and the creation of new concepts serve important roles in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980/1987; 1991/1994) philosophy.  Educators drawing on these 
ideas would not simply accept preexisting policies but challenge and change them.  
Within our current paradigm, music educators might consider changes to national and 
state music standards as well as reconsider how they assess achievement in music.  I 
encourage the standards writers at all levels, from the local school to the national, to 
consider humans’ integrated qualities and multiple places throughout their process.  
The philosophy proposed in this dissertation suggests that the value of music standards, if 
standards are indeed valuable, lies in acknowledging both students and teachers as 
inseparably cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and striving multiplicities engaged in 
local, global, and glocal musical practices.   
Differently conceived standards might reference these multiple human qualities as 
well as promote diverse connections to multiple places.  For example, such standards 
might include “Students will consider the multiple ways in which emotions experienced 
while musicking are felt in the body” or “Students will connect with local, global, and 
glocal musical practices.”  Rather than promoting uniformity, such standards would 
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emphasize diversity between individual students and communities, and allow for 
differences, for mapping, and for the conception of students and teachers as capable.  I 
encourage standards writers to engage in rhizomatic philosophizing, viewing their work 
as an ongoing process that can flow in variable directions rather than point to single 
outcomes and stagnant endpoints. 
Assessments could also take human ontology and emplacement into 
consideration.  For instance, how can teachers assess students on their understandings of 
and ability to participate in local musical practices as well as on taking their musicking 
into their communities?  How can music educators design assessments that take students’ 
embodied musical reactions and engagement into account?  Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987) assert the importance of variability over repetition.  Music educators 
engaging in complicating, considering, and connecting would minimize standardized 
assessments that ask students to replicate preexisting musical understandings and 
practices and instead might promote types of assessment emphasizing the creation of new 
understandings and connections.  
More broadly, music educators might question the entire notion of education 
driven by standards and assessment.  Writing about the students who took his collegiate 
courses, Deleuze (1990/1995) explains, “Nobody took in everything, but everyone took 
what they needed or wanted, what they could use” (p. 139).  Music educators might focus 
on meaningful individual growth rather than uniformity.  As St. Pierre (2004) notes: 
We are in desperate need of new concepts, Deleuzian or otherwise, in this new 
educational environment that privileges a single positivist research model with its 
transcendent rationality and objectivity and accompanying concepts such as 
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randomization, replicability, generalizability, bias, and so forth—one that has 
marginalized subjugated knowledges and done material harm at all levels of 
education, and one that many educators have resisted with some success for the 
last fifty years. (p. 286)   
Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on creation, difference, and process as well 
as the aforementioned practices of complicating, considering, and connecting, teachers 
might imagine educative experiences that resist and reject standards and assessment.   
 How could teachers attempt to change the current education paradigm?  I posit 
that music educators might begin by educating themselves about politics and policy at the 
local, state, and national levels as well as questioning how policies do and might impact 
them, their students, and their communities.
124
  Subsequently, music educators can use 
their knowledge to work for the changes they believe necessary.  Guattari engaged in 
political movements, including the 1968 French protests, throughout his life.  Music 
educators act politically any time they choose to engage students and community 
members in musicking.  For instance, a band concert that replicates preexisting practices 
is as much of a political statement of compliance as singing protest songs is one of 
disruption.    
Additionally, music educators might affect change by complicating current 
education and music education policies and policy processes and considering various 
forms of political action.  Such engagement can range from individual conversations with 
parents and administrators to letters, telephone calls, and visits to elected local, state, and 
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 All education is a political, and politics play a central role in Deleuze and Guattari’s writings.  In this 
document, I use a more limited definition of politics, referring to traditional American political processes 
and actions.  For a broader definition of politics and its relationship with music education, see Gould 
(2011). 
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national representatives.  Music educators might also attempt to take an active role in 
policy creation by sitting on school, district, and state committees.  As the famous saying 
goes, “If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”   
Political involvement and policy writing are not the only avenues for changing 
education.  I once had the opportunity to ask Howard Gardner what could be done 
politically to keep arts in the schools.  He responded that the arts will only survive in 
communities that value them and that politics and policies could do little to change that 
(personal communication, December 2007).  While I certainly encourage music educators 
to learn about current education policies, to question them, and to engage politically 
whenever possible, I posit that applying the philosophy put forth in this dissertation might 
further help maintain and augment communities’ valuation of music education.  When 
music educators complicate and consider students’ multiple places and attempt to form 
musical and educative connections to those places, they afford diverse community 
members the opportunity to interact with students’ musicking in meaningful ways.   
Political engagements such as the ones described above are often considered 
advocacy—a means of communicating one’s perspective.  I assert that music educators 
concentrate on exchanging rather than advocating.  As Bowman (2005) explicates, 
advocacy seeks to conserve the status quo, moving in one direction, from the teacher to 
the community.  In contrast, “ex/changes” allow for dialogue between music teachers and 
community members as well as remind music educators to implement changes as a result 
of their communications (Richerme, 2011).  Exchanges assist music educators in 
complicating the musical practices existing within their present communities and 
considering multiple paths forward.  Assisting students in forming musical and educative 
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connections to their local places may enable teachers to alter their practices in light of 
communities’ needs.  These include not only direct connections with community 
members, but also the moment-to-moment educative experiences within classrooms that 
occur with an understanding of students’ multiple musical places.  When community 
members understand, take pride in, and interact with students’ musical learning, the need 
for unidirectional advocacy becomes secondary.  Music educators might find that 
connecting their work to students’ multiple qualities and their glocal communities allows 
them to make policy changes more easily than traditional political action. 
 Twenty-first century music educators cannot avoid interfacing with current 
education and music education policies requiring increased standardization and teacher 
evaluations based in part on student growth.  Viewing these policies as changeable maps 
with multiple interpretations rather than stagnant tracings and themselves as 
cartographers may enable teachers to meet policy demands while simultaneously 
facilitating the learning that they, their students, and their communities find most 
valuable.  Teachers might also consider ex/changing policies by complicating policies 
and policy processes and considering how they can engage politically.  Finally, despite 
the importance of policy and politics, all teaching and musicking is political, and thus 
adopting philosophies grounded in meaningful, multi-faceted interactions may help 
maintain and grow music education more than any policy or political involvement. 
Personal Reflections 
 How does a person explore the ways in which the process of writing a dissertation 
has changed her and continues to impact her life?  Such an investigation would 
necessitate that one recall, isolate, and articulate beliefs held prior to beginning the 
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dissertation.  Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) would find such action impossible, 
asserting that the entirety of one’s past exists virtually in the present moment (p. 118).  I 
cannot separate the present moment from yesterday, two years ago, or a decade ago; it all 
exists as I type each letter.  Additionally, since humans are always becoming, by the time 
you read the musings below, I will have grown far beyond them.   
Reflection, however, can help elucidate aspects of our development and inspire 
avenues for future explorations.  In this section, I offer just a few of the ways in which 
the process of writing this document has altered my perceptions, beliefs, and actions.  I 
have organized this section in the same order as chapters 4 through 8 of this document.  I 
begin with an exploration of self, move to an investigation of place and music, and end 
with reflection on education and life. 
Who and When am “I”? 
“I” have always had a ten-year plan, and although “I” know that each year my 
plan will change, having a defined vision of my future allows me to sleep at night.  While 
“I” don’t see “myself” completely ceasing to plan anytime soon, writing this dissertation 
has helped “me” to view myself as a constantly becoming being.  Recalling Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1980/1987) statement about the importance of reaching “not the point where 
one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one 
says I” (p. 3), “I” have begun to embrace life as continual process.  For example, on a 
sweltering day in July of 2012, my husband and “I” were driving between Hearst Castle 
and Yosemite National Park when our car broke down.  As we sat dehydrating on a 
desolate stretch of road surrounded by vast corn fields, “I” pondered Deleuze and 
Guattari’s writings about process.  “I” imagined myself as a nomad among the fields, 
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watching the slow progression and alterations of the clouds, the fluctuating tops of the 
corn stalks in the hot breeze, and the grasshoppers’ spirited acrobatics at my feet.  For 
those few hours, “I” had abandoned my goal of getting to Yosemite and truly enjoyed our 
unplanned adventure.  Writing this dissertation has allowed me to find joy in and at times 
seek out unexpected journeys while paying closer attention to my own becomings. 
“I” have also begun to question the qualities of my unstable being.  Throughout 
my dissertation process, “I” have repeatedly mourned that “I” felt happier believing 
myself to exist as a primarily cognitive being.  In fact, “I” have formed much of my 
“identity” and self-valuation around my cognitive abilities, at times actively shunning 
other aspects of my humanity.  For instance, my years as a dancer led “me” to devalue 
and at times hate my body, and my experiences as a female high school band director and 
overall driven woman in a male-dominated world led “me” to equate emotion with 
weakness and to prefer viewing myself as independent rather than socially 
interconnected.  While “I” could have lived quite happily never having acknowledged the 
interplay of my cognition, embodiment, emotion, sociality, and strivings, my newfound 
perspectives on human ontology have provided “me” a deeper and richer understanding 
of “myself” and others.  Maybe most notably, “I” have become more open to talking and 
writing about emotion; while “I” still find such actions intimidating, “I” increasingly 
refuse to remain silent about how emotion affects my work and life and now openly 
inquire into the role of emotion in others’ teaching and learning.   
“I” have also begun to recognize the importance of my sociality, realizing that this 
dissertation and indeed all my writing functions with, not apart from, others’ evolving 
beings.  Throughout my writing process, “I” contemplated how my committee and other 
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readers might understand and interpret my work.  “I” have become aware that 
philosophizing functions and propagates within social systems and that “I” can never 
write apart from those webs. 
Where am “I”? and When is Music? 
Writing this dissertation has challenged me to ponder and seek out the musical 
life of my local community.  I have become more open to informal musical engagements 
and to diverse musical practices and venues.  For instance, while walking in downtown 
Silver Spring, Maryland on cool fall day, I stopped to listen to a live performance of a 
steel drum band.  As I stood in the open pavilion, I noticed the joyful emotions on the 
faces of the performers and audience members as well as my own evolving feelings.  I 
took note of my body’s slight swaying as well as the embodied rhythmic actions of those 
around me.  I also pondered the social aspect of my musical engagement, how my past 
musicking and current social surroundings impacted my understandings, embodied 
reactions, and emotions.  While in the past I might have simply noted the genre and the 
form and chord progressions of such a performance, I now observed and participated in 
the experience in a much broader and more meaningful way.  Increasingly, I have sat in 
concert halls and become aware that music is not occurring, while I have more frequently 
noticed the musicking of street musicians, recordings in restaurants and stores, and the 
songs in my own head.  Approaching music with the question “When is music?” rather 





When is Education and How Might We Live? 
Writing this dissertation has been a selfish process.  Richardson (1997) states, “I 
write because I want to find something out.  I write in order to learn something that I 
didn’t know before I wrote it” (p. 87).  Likewise, my prolonged exploration along a 
variety of paths of my own choosing has given me the opportunity to challenge my views 
about numerous aspects of life, music, and education and to ask and investigate questions 
that I have held for years.  As Bowman and Frega (2012b) assert, “The philosophical 
process is at least as important as the products it creates along the way: the journey is 
often as important as the destination” (p. 32).  The process of writing this document has 
changed me and my teaching, research, and life trajectories.  I will never again teach or 
write without an awareness of people as cognitive, embodied, emotional, social, and 
striving beings or facilitate learning and musicking with students of any age that does not 
directly connect with their multiple local and global places.  I will view identities, 
stagnation, and hierarchies as temporary moments in a rhizomatic world constitutive of 
difference and movement. 
Throughout my writing process, I have frequently wondered whether I was 
writing a “correct” philosophical dissertation.  I read other philosophical dissertations and 
thought about how mine matched or did not match their form and content.  Ultimately, 
however, the writings of Deleuze and Guattari have empowered me to think differently, 
to experiment, and to connect.  Part-way through my writing, I gave up on thinking about 
whether this dissertation met preset forms and the expectation of others and instead 
focused on how it affected my own learning and how it might impact my committee 
members and other readers.  Through writing this dissertation, I have become more 
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rhizomatic, embracing horizontal thanking, experimenting with diverse connections, and 
focusing on processes.  I view this dissertation as just one more offshoot along the 
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